Put Gator In The Hall

Fun With LevERA+ At The Think Factory

2010-05-06T07:13:00.000-07:00

It was brought to my attention yesterday that my recent post on Clutch Pitchers and LevERA+ had been linked to by The Baseball Think Factory. I learned this from a friend who sent me an e-mail that quoted some of the more amusing misconceptions from the commenters at BBTF. I initially had no intention of addressing these misconceptions, reasoning that it was probably futile to reason with anyone who could have possibly understood the post to be arguing that Steve Trachsel was a great pitcher, or that Jeff Suppan was better than Jim Palmer and Tom Seaver. There were certain commenters at BBTF however who seemed to have at least a passing interest in the concept of LevERA+, and so I'll devote a few more words to the subject. I'll briefly address some of the more amusing misconceptions voiced at the BBTF and then discuss the calculation and conceptual underpinnings of the LevERA+ concept.

"No, I wasn't arguing that Steve Trachsel is better than Tom Seaver..."

Incredibly, more than a few BBTF commenters seemed to think that I was proposing the clutch adjustment factor as a measure of pitching prowess. Even more believed I was arguing that Trachsel or Jeff Suppan were "more clutch" than Tom Seaver or Jim Palmer or Ron Guidry. I was completely mystified as to how anyone could have made these extraordinary leaps of illogic until my buddy pointed out to me that the term "clutch adjustment factor" really is inapt. I have to admit he's correct, and it's possible that some of the more absurd misconceptions expressed at BBTF derive from this ill-advised term. The better term is of course "leverage adjustment factor."

The term "clutch adjustment factor" was inapt for a few reasons. First, although high-leverage situations can reasonably be termed "clutch" situations, they are clutch only within the context of that particular game, without any regard for the significance of the game in the larger context of the season, the standings, or the advancement of a team's pursuit of a pennant or world series championship. My prior posts on the subject of "clutch pitchers" and "big-game pitchers" have focused almost exclusively on the latter concept of clutch, hence the focus on September and hugely consequential games in the context of races for the post-season. A bases loaded, two-out situation in the ninth inning of a one-run game in April is a clutch situation, to be sure, but it's an aspect of clutch performance distinctly different (and, for me, less interesting) than a pitcher's performance in hugely consequential games.

In any event, the statistic I'll now refer to as "leverage adjustment factor" really wasn't the focus of the post anyway. LevERA+ was the focus, and the discussion of leverage adjustment factor just a means of demonstrating that (i) for most pitchers the difference between ERA+ and LevERA+ isn't particularly material, and (ii) for some pitchers the difference is fairly significant, at least insofar that most of us stat geeks attach some significance to 4% and 5% differences in ERA+.

So, to be clear, I'm not proposing Trachsel or Suppan for the Hall of Fame, and I'm not suggesting that Guidry's 10th place ranking on the list of largest leverage adjustment factors is a qualification for the Hall. Guidry's 17th place ranking on the list of highest LevERA+s since 1952, however, is a fact worthy of consideration in assessing his qualifications for the Hall.

The Post had nothing to do with the subject of whether 'clutch performance' is an innate ability

I believe this was the misconception underlying some of the comments about the regression analyses discussed in the post. If it isn't, then the commenters at BBTF simply don't understand regression analysis, and perhaps this is the more likely explanation for some of their comments. Giving them the benefit of the doubt, however, their comments on the regression analyses, though misguided, at least make sense if the commenters were under the impression that I was arguing that the regression analyses established the existence of an identifiable "clutch ability." I wasn't arguing that, and the post was very clear in that regard. Although the issue of whether an innate "clutch ability" can be probabilistically verified has been a hot topic for sabremetricians for a number of years, I've always found the issue to be academic in the extreme. I basically agree with Bill James on the subject: I don't know, nor do I care, whether a particular player's excellent performance in big-games and clutch situations is a function of some innate clutch ability (or coolness under pressure, heightened intensity, superior character or black magic, for that matter), but these performances did occur and shouldn't be dismissed in assessing a player's accomplishments merely because there is some prospect that these clutch performances were a function to some degree of luck or chance.

One particular commenter at BBTF who evinced an almost superhuman ability for misapprehension and misconception argued that the regression analyses were worthless without information about distributive and probabilistic characteristics - the standard deviation, measures of distribution relative to normal distribution, and probability functions. "What number of pitchers would we expect to be above 4% by random chance alone?", he asked. All of this information would be supremely relevant to the question of whether Steve Trachsel's 7.5% leverage adjustment factor was evidence of an innate clutch ability or merely a function of random chance. But all of it is completely irrelevant to whether LevERA+ is more highly correlated with pitcher winning percentage than ERA+.

The regression analyses were useful in testing the hypothesis that LevERA+, by weighting elements of a pitcher's performance by impact on win probability, would be a more accurate predictor of pitcher winning percentage than ERA+. This is the same exercise as that engaged in by the originators of the OPS stat. Although the conceptual validity of combining on-base percentage and slugging average as a measure of contribution to run scoring was manifest, OPS wouldn't be a particularly helpful statistic if it didn't more highly correlate with run scoring than both OBP and slugging average. In particular, the sabremetric pioneers were aware that slugging average attached exaggerated weights to extra-base hits, which rendered slugging average a less predictive measure of run scoring than OBP and could have resulted in OPS being a relatively useless stat. In other words, the addition of OBP and slugging average to create OPS is rather arbitrary and it is only the fact that empirical evidence confirms its higher correlation with run scoring that makes it a more useful stat than OBP and slugging average.

This is what the commenters at BBTF should have been asking if they had understood the regression analyses: did the distribution of the winning percentage and LevERA+/ERA+ exhibit a basically linear relationship? (Yes, it did). Were the parameters for the pitcher populations analyzed by the regression fully described? (They were). Were the selection criteria for the pitcher populations free of criteria that may have introduced selection bias? (They were).

The analysis of the correlation between LevERA+ and winning percentage presented an almost paradigmatic utilization of regression analysis, and the comparison of the bivariate correlations of LevERA+ and ERA+ to winning percentage revealed a statistically significant advantage for LevERA+, just as the comparison of the bivariate correlation of OPS to run scoring revealed its advantages over on-base percentage and slugging average.

No, the LevERA+ statistic provides no advantage to pitchers who improve their performance with men on base, or demonstrate an ability to escape high-leverage situations resulting from their own failure to prevent baserunners.

This is an understandable misconception, but a misconception nonetheless. The LevERA+ statistic is based on the WPA and WPA/Li statistics, and neither statistic credits a pitcher for escaping his own jams. The incremental "win probability added" to a pitcher who loads the bases but escapes the inning without surrendering a run is no different than the win probability added to a pitcher who retires the side in order. As one commenter at BBTF accurately noted, the win probabilities "zero out" for the inning, with the pitcher's retirement of batters with runners on base offsetting the negative win probabilities attributed as a result of permitting batters to reach base. This is easily demonstrated by looking at the win probability and win expectancy increments in a boxscore at B-R.com. Here's the first inning of Steve Trachsel's start against the Dodgers on May 19, 1998, in which he allowed a double and a single but escaped without surrendering a run:

Here's the first inning of Trachsel's start against the Giants on September 29, 1998:

In each case, the summation of the win probability events for the inning reflected in the highlighted field above gave Trachsel the same WPA credit: he increased his team's win probability by 5% by pitching a scoreless top of the first. The fact that he allowed a double and single in the first game and retired the side in order in the second game made no difference.

Another commenter at BBTF queried whether bullpen performance has an impact on LevERA+. It doesn't, and this is another advantage of LevERA+ over ERA+. ERA+, like ERA, charges a run to a pitcher if he leaves the game with a runner on first and two out and the reliever permits the runner to score, and it weights that run the same as it would if the pitcher who walked the batter had surrendered a home run to that batter. WPA, and therefore LevERA+, charges the pitcher only with the probability of a runner scoring from first with two out. The reliever's performance is irrelevant, and the run allowed by the reliever has no affect on the LevERA+ of the pitcher who left the game.

The Calculation of LevERA+ and leverage adjustment factor

LevERA+ is simply the product of ERA+ and the leverage adjustment factor. The leverage adjustment factor is obtained by (i) multiplying a pitcher's clutch stat (listed in the "Win Probability" table at B-R.com) by 10 and then dividing the result by his runs allowed, (ii) adding the quotient obtained in (i) to 1, and (iii) multiplying the results obtained in (ii) by his ERA+. A pitcher with a negative clutch stat will accordingly have a negative result in (i), a figure lower than 1.0 in (ii), and will have a LevERA+ lower than his ERA+. Here's the formula (omitting the "+" from LevERA+ and ERA+ so as not to create confusion in the formula):

LevERA = ERA * (1 + ((clutch*10)/ RA))

As an example, assume a pitcher with an ERA+ of 120, a clutch stat of 1.0 and runs allowed of 100. The clutch stat is multiplied by 10 (i.e., the run conversion factor necessary to turn to the wins-based clutch stat into an equivalent number of runs). The result - 10 - is then divided by 100 (the pitcher's runs allowed). The result - .1 - is then added to 1 to arrive at 1.1. The pitcher's LevERA+ is the product of 120 (his ERA+) and 1.1, or 132. If the pitcher's clutch stat had been -1.0 rather than 1.0, then the product of his clutch stat and 10 would be -10, -10 divided by his 100 runs allowed would be -.1, and the sum of -.1 and 1 would be .9. The product of his ERA+ of 120 and .9 yields a LevERA+ of 108.

The actual conversion unit for converting wins-based stats like WPA to runs varies depending upon the run scoring environment (which is itself a function of the park, general scoring levels in the league and, perhaps most significantly, the pitcher's own performance). However, these factors are already factored into the WPA stat, and therefore the general, historically-derived conversion of 10 runs per win is the appropriate multiplier for the pitcher's clutch stat. (I initially didn't realize this, and my first post on LevERA+ therefore used a run conversion figure calculated individually for each pitcher, which had the effect of double-counting the run-scoring environment factor already contained within WPA).

Conclusion

In sum, Steve Trachsel was a very mediocre pitcher who allowed far more runs on average than did Jim Palmer or Tom Seaver. Trachsel had a propensity however for allowing runs in lower-leverage situations on average than other pitchers, and the distribution of his runs allowed skewed more toward low-leverage situations than the distribution of Palmer's and Seaver's runs allowed. This obviously doesn't make Trachsel a better pitcher - he allowed far more runs that Palmer and Seaver - but the difference between Trachsel and Palmer/Seaver in terms of leverage-weighted runs allowed and LevERA+ was slightly narrower than the difference in terms of mere ERA+.

Again, the list in my prior post of leverage adjustment factors (or "clutch adjustment factors", as I termed it) was merely illustrative; it is the LevERA+ statistic that actually measures pitcher performance in a way more highly correlated with winning percentage than ERA+.

Thank you to the moderator of the BBTF discussion about LevERA+ for urging the commenters to be more open-minded in their consideration of the stat and more careful in their reading and interpretation of my prior post (although the moderator also apparently misunderstood the purpose of the regression analysis to be aimed at measuring the probability that leverage adjustment factors were a measure of innate clutch ability). BBTF is a good aggregator of baseball news and so I link to it at this website. I don't generally read the comments, but I found a lot of the snark exhibited in the discussion of LevERA+ to be first-rate and genuinely funny. I hope a few of the commenters find their way to this post and that some of the misconceptions about LevERA+ are cleared up. LevERA+ is really just an adjustment to ERA+, a small improvement on it. But as Sean Forman learned last month, any tinkering with the beloved ERA+ is a controversial and incendiary venture. It is a venerable and ground-breaking stat. I hope others recognize LevERA+ as merely a small refinement of it.

Clutch Pitchers and LevERA+

2010-05-02T07:30:00.000-07:00

Clutch factor is the percentage difference between a pitchers LevERA+ and his ERA+. Below is a list of the top 15 clutch factors among pitchers with 2000 innings pitched since 1952. There are some very familiar names on the list and some not so familiar names. The most familiar names are of course the two Hall of Famers on the list, Jim Palmer and Tom Seaver. The list also includes three southpaws who are generally regarded as among the greatest lefties of all time but not quite worthy of the HOF: Billy Pierce, Ron Guidry and Vida Blue. There are three active players on the list: Suppan, Colon and Halladay. Among the 202 pitchers who've pitched 2000 or more innings since 1952, these are the only 15 with a positive clutch adjustment factor higher than 4.0%.

1. Steve Trachsel 7.5%

2. Pat Hentgen 5.7%

3. Jeff Suppan 5.5%

4. Johnny Podres 5.3%

5. Jim Palmer 5.3%

6. Darryl Kile 5.2%

7. Pedro Astacio 5.2%

8. Billy Pierce 5.1%*

9. Juan Pizzaro 4.9%

10. Ron Guidry 4.5%

11. Vida Blue 4.5%

12. Tom Seaver 4.4%

13. Al Leiter 4.4%

14. Bartolo Colon 4.2%

15. Roy Halladay 4.2%

Each of these pitchers have an ERA+ that can fairly be said to be deceptively low. Another way to put it is that they were better pitchers than their ERA+ figures might indicate. The fact that Steve Trachsel pitched much more effectively in higher leverage situations may not be particularly interesting, but the significant clutch factors for the more notable pitchers on the above list should be of interest. Five have LevERA+'s well over 120, putting them among the top ranks in this statistic among pitchers with 2000 IP since 1952:

Halladay, 140.1, 3rd behind Martinez and Clemens.

Seaver, 133.7, which ranks 7th

Palmer is 8th with a 132.7

Pierce is 12th at 128.2.*

Guidry is 17th at 124.3.

Some might be moved to ask "why all this attention to LevERA+, Gator Guy?" The answer is simple: LevERA+ is a more accurate measure of pitching prowess than ERA+ because it is more highly correlated with pitcher W-L records. Regression analyses of the 202 pitchers who have pitched more than 2000 innings since '52 reveal that the correlation coefficient between LevERA+ and winning percentage is .726, as compared to .682 for ERA+, a significant difference given that (i) the difference between ERA+ and LevERA+ is generally very small, rarely exceeding 4%, and (ii) nearly half of a pitcher's winning percentage is determined by how many runs he receives in support.

Regression analyses of 617 pitchers who have pitched at least 500 innings since 1952 similarly revealed that winning percentage was more correlated with LevERA+ than ERA+. The larger sample size also permitted analyses that controlled for run support by selecting a data subset that excluded pitchers with extremely good or poor run support. This was done by removing from the data set pitchers with very high or low ratios of winning percentage to LevERA+. After multiplying winning percentage by 1000, the average ratio of winning percentage to LevERA+ was approximately 5.0. There were 437 pitchers with a ratio between 4.5 and 5.5, and the coefficient of correlation between LevERA+ and winning percentage for this subset was .8848. The correlation between ERA+ and winning percentage was .8473.

The correlation coefficients for the 240 pitchers with a ratio of winning percentage to LevERA+ of between 4.75 and 5.25 were extremely high: .9662 for LevERA+ and winning percentage and .9152 for ERA+ and winning percentage. At levels of correlation this high, the difference between the LevERA+ coefficient and the ERA+ coefficient is very significant. For the 240 pitchers with a ratio between 4.75 and 5.25, the R-squared coefficient of determination for LevERA+ was .9336, meaning that run support and other factors accounted for less than 7% of the variation in winning percentage. The corresponding R-squared coefficient of determination for ERA+ was .8376.

The findings with respect to the correlation between LevERA+ and winning percentage are consistent with regression analyses of the primary set of 617 pitchers that showed a correlation between clutch adjustment factor and winning percentage of .2697 and an R-squared of .0727.

The regression analyses described above establish conclusively that LevERA+, calculated on the basis of the win probability-based "clutch" statistic at B-R.com, is a more accurate predictor of pitcher winning percentage than ERA+.

______________________________

* Pierce pitched nearly 700 innings prior to 1952, but the LevERA+ stated above reflects only the 2610 innings he pitched since 1952.

The Bully Factor

2010-04-27T05:23:00.000-07:00

Bill James has a new article up entitled "The Bully Factor" that examines pitcher performance on the basis of quality of the opponent. The article was prompted by an inquiry from a subscriber to his website, but Bill says the idea of breaking down a pitcher's performance by quality of opponent originated in a 1969 when Bill argued to a college buddy that Marichal was better than Gibson and his buddy (a big Cards fan) responded by insisting that Marichal tended to beat up on the weak sisters in the league (in the '60s NL, that would be teams like the Mets and Astros). Bill's response at the time, without knowing any of the actual facts, was "bullshit."

Bill finally got around to crunching the numbers and posted his spreadsheet online for downloading (clicking on the preceding link will automatically download the excel spreadsheet to your hard drive). I believe the article itself is only available at Bill's subscriber-only website. Basically, Bill divided teams into four quality categories based on their aggregate records by each decade and then broke down a pitcher's starts against teams in each category. The findings are interesting, if not all that significant. Bill himself makes no great claims as to the significance of his research in judging pitchers. Bill doesn't really make this point but I will: given two pitchers with identical records, one should prefer the pitcher who pitches better against A-list competition. Why? Because if the pitcher's team is in contention, games against other contenders are two-fers. A win against another contender is not only a win for your team but a loss for the other contender.

Here's how Bill described his methodology in arriving at a single metric he refers to as "the Bully Factor":

How do we measure the extent to which each pitcher dominated inferior competition? I looked at six factors relative to that issue, which were: 1) The percentage of the pitcher’s wins that came over “D” quality competition, 2) The difference in the pitcher’s winning percentage versus “A & B” teams and his winning percentage versus “C & D” teams, 3) The difference in the pitcher’s ERA versus “A & B” teams and his ERA versus “C & D” teams, 4) The difference in the pitcher’s overall effectiveness RANK (1 to 702) versus “A & B” teams and his overall effectiveness rank versus “C & D” teams, 5) The difference in the pitcher’s overall effectiveness rank (1 to 702) versus “A” teams compared to his overall effectiveness rank versus all teams, and 6) The player’s career win total versus “A & B” teams compared to his career wins versus “C & D” teams.

I made up an index of these six indicators, which I called the “Bully Factor”; a high Bully Factor indicates that the pitcher pitched much better against weak competition than against strong competition—much better, or in some cases much more. Later, I’ll list the pitchers at the top and bottom of the chart, but first, let’s look at the guys with the most “normal” data, the guys in the center of the chart.

So who are the biggest bullies among notable pitchers? Well, to begin with, Bill was pretty much on target with his "bullshit" response to his buddy's assertion that Marichal was a bully and Gibson wasn't: Marichal generally performed better against the quality competition, whereas Gibson had a greater tendency to beat up on the weak sisters in the league. Bill is careful not draw any grand conclusions from this fact, as well he should be, because Gibson's spectacular big-game record certainly refutes any argument that Gibson couldn't step it up against good teams in big games. But the fact remains that as between the two Gibson did more padding of his stats against the bad teams than Marichal did.

Here are the biggest bullies among the more notable pitchers of the last 60 years (Bill's data covers pitchers with 100 or more starts since 1952): Bob Turley, Denny McLain, C.C. Sabathia, Early Wynn, Jack Morris, Justin Verlander, Roy Oswalt, Bob Lemon, Tim Wakefield, Ken Holtzman, Herb Score, Mel Parnell, Joe Niekro, Camilo Pascual, Derek Lowe and Mark Buehrle. Zack Greinke also has a pretty big Bully Factor so far in his brief career.

Some other notable pitchers who had Bully Factors well above average are Sam McDowell, Luis Tiant, Tim Hudson, Dave Stewart, Mike Hampton, J.R. Richard, Steve Rogers, Don Newcombe, Vida Blue, Bob Gibson, Andy Pettitte, David Wells, Randy Johnson and Bert Blyleven.

Notable pitchers with very low Bully Factors include Frank Lary (aka "the Yankee Killer"), Carlos Zambrano, A.J. Burnett, Kenny Rogers, Bartolo Colon, Jarrod Washburn, Phil Niekro, Dave Stieb, Floyd Bannister, Bob Welch, Frank Viola, Mel Stottlemyre, John Lackey, Al Leiter and Bret Saberhagen.

Some other notable pitchers who had Bully Factors distinctly below average are Bret Saberhagen, Fernando Valenzuela, Nolan Ryan, Tommy John, John Candelaria, Juan Marichal, Mickey Lolich, Cliff Lee, Robin Roberts, Sandy Koufax, John Smoltz, Tom Glavine, Mike Cuellar, Dennis Eckersely, Ron Guidry, Dwight Gooden, Dave McNally, John Tudor, Johan Santana, Curt Schilling and Frank Tanana.

Of most interest to me were the pitchers who performed particularly well against the A category teams. Generally speaking these teams had winning percentages over .550 for the decade. There are five pitchers who really stand out, compiling excellent winning percentages and ERAs against A category teams: Whitey Ford, Sandy Koufax, Bret Saberhagen, Pedro Martinez and Johan Santana. Against A category competition, each had a winning percentage above .630 and an ERA below their career ERA.

There are ten other pitchers who had a winning percentage above .570 against A quality competition (min. 25 wins against A competition): Dwight Gooden, Freddy Garcia, Roy Halladay, Jack Sanford, David Wells, Jim Maloney, Juan Marichal, Tom Glavine, Ron Guidry and John Candelaria.

Categorizing teams based on their records over a decade rather than annual records will produce some anomalies. Just for example, a pitcher who just came into the AL within the last few years will have his games against the Tampa Rays thrown into the D category of weak sisters even though the Rays have been anything but weak the last few years. As another example, Bill's data shows Saberhagen with a .570 winning percentage against teams with decade records above .500 and .601 against teams with decade records below .500. Splits based on annual team records, however, show that Saberhagen's numbers are flipped: he had a .606 W% against teams with records above .500 and a .571 W% against teams under .500.

Still, as always, James is provocative. And some of the findings are very striking. Ford and Koufax were great against top flight competition. Jack Morris and Justin Verlander really feasted on the worst teams. Draw your own conclusions as to the significance of these facts.

Andy Pettitte

2010-04-25T05:04:00.001-07:00

Andy Pettitte: Hall of Famer, or just a good pitcher on great teams who was lucky to get great run support? If Andy retired today, I'd have to believe the BBWAA would come down decidedly in the latter camp. But another 15 win season in 2010 and some more October glory could change that.

I would have to admit that Andy is still a marginal HOF candidate, at least by the ostensible standards of recent HOF balloting. But if I had a vote, I'd have to ask myself: can I really vote to exclude a guy who has been such a large part of so much baseball history, and a crucial cog for so many world champions? And what if Pettitte tops the 250 win mark? He's a sure bet to top 240 wins and that's a formidable figure in this era. Who among the best active pitchers is a good bet to reach 240 wins? In an age where Cy Young award winners win 15 or 16 games, I'd venture that not even Sabathia and Halladay - the two most likely to hit 240 - are even-money bets.

The key to Andy's HOF chances is his reputation as a big-game pitcher, of course. But as staggering as his post-season numbers are, Pettitte critics are still loathe to acknowledge Andy's big-game bona fides. As best I can tell, they regard Pettitte as a post-season version of the regular-season Jack Morris: a guy who won a lot but only because he had great run support. This is a myth.

A closer look at Pettitte's post-season record reveals that Pettitte's excellent post-season record is more a function of his clutch pitching than his run support. It also reveals that Pettitte has been getting better in the post-season as he gets older. And if one looks at Pettitte's September record while ihs team is in contention for a playoff berth, they find a record remarkably similar to his outstanding post-season record. Let's take a closer look and see if you don't agree that Andy Pettitte should already have his ticket punched for Cooperstown.

The Post-Season

Here's the post-season record:

Click on the above stat line to see Pettitte's post-season game log. Pettitte's been getting even better in recent years, compiling an 8-2 record and 2.98 ERA in 96.2 innings over his last four post-seasons ('03, '05, '07 and '09). If not for two egregious bullpen collapses by the Astros bullpen in October 2005 Pettitte's post-season record since '03 would be 10-2.

Considering the level of competition a pitcher faces in the post-season, these are great numbers. The stat geeks and ERA+ worshippers, however, aren't impressed by Pettitte's post-season ERA. They assume that his 18-9 record must be a function of autumnal thunder from the Bronx Bombers' bats. Not so. The Yankees have provided Pettitte with an average of 4.575 runs/game. That's slightly above the post-season average of 4.19 runs/game since 1995, but well below the regular-season major league average of 4.81 and still further below the A.L. average of 4.98. A pythagorean calculation based on Pettitte's post-season run support and his runs allowed/game projects a record of 15-12 for a .556 winning percentage. Pettitte has significantly outperformed his pythagorean record, however, by performing exceptionally well in high-leverage situations in the post-season and by pitching his best in those games where pitcher performance is most critical - games in which his team provided between three and five runs of support. These two factors render Pettitte's 3.90 post-season ERA extremely misleading.

Pettitte's "clutch" figure in his 16 post-season starts since 2002 is 1.21 according to Fangraphs.com. This means that Pettitte's clutch pitching in these 16 post-season starts has been worth an incremental 1.21 victories. This translates to approximately 12 fewer earned runs if the runs allowed (and not allowed) by Pettitte in the post-season are weighted in proportion to their impact on the Yankees' win expectancy. This means Pettitte's Leveraged ERA is therefore 2.17 in the 99.2 post-season innings he's pitched since the 2002 post-season, approximately 33% better than his nominal 3.25 ERA. Fangraphs doesn't have the post-season clutch statistics prior to 2002, but if Pettitte's clutch performance prior to 2002 were neutral (i.e., a clutch figure of 0) his Leveraged ERA for his entire post-season career would be 3.47, approximately 11% better than his nominal 3.90 ERA.

Pettitte's clutch pitching within post-season games has been matched by his tendency to pitch his best in games where his performance is most critical in determining the outcome. In games in which the Yankees scored between 3 and 5 runs, Pettitte had a superlative 2.99 ERA and a record of 8-3. In games in which the Yankees scored between 2 and 4 runs Pettitte was even better: a 2.75 ERA and a record of 7-3. By contrast, since 1995 the record of home teams in League Championship Series when they score between 2 and 4 runs is 22-45. Pettitte's record in the post-season when receiving between 2 and 5 runs of support is a significant factor behind his 18-9 record and his ability to outperform his pythagorean projected record.

The World Series

Pettitte's World Series record has been a story of feast or famine. He's had two absolutely atrocious starts - game 1 of the '96 Series and game 6 of the '01 Series - in which he allowed a total of 13 earned runs in 4.1 innings. He's compiled a 2.70 ERA in his other 11 WS starts. Pettitte has actually experienced some pretty tough luck in the World Series, taking losses or no-decisions in four games in which he made quality starts and compiled a cumulative ERA of 2.02.

Perhaps most impressive about Pettitte's World Series record is the number of games in which he's turned in dominating performances. In the last 20 years there have been 24 World Series games in which a starting pitcher has pitched 7 or more innings and not allowed an earned run. Tom Glavine, Randy Johnson, Curt Schilling and Jack Morris each had one, for a combined total of four such games out of their cumulative 24 World Series starts. Greg Maddux and John Smoltz each turned the trick twice, for a combined total of 4 such games in their cumulative 13 World Series starts. Andy Pettitte has pitched four such games in his 13 World Series starts. Only four pitchers have had more than two 7 inning, 0 earned run World Series starts during the post-1920, live-ball era: Waite Hoyt and Bob Gibson, each of whom had three, and Whitey Ford and Andy Pettitte, each of whom had four. That's some pretty select company - only Hall of Famers need apply.

Pennant Races

Pettitte's September record when competing in a tight race for a division title or post-season berth is similarly exceptional. He's 26-9 in 51 starts with a 3.69 ERA (approx. a 125 ERA+). He's won four or more September starts in tight races three times: he was 5-1 for the Yankees in his rookie year of '95, 4-1 for the Yankees in '03, and 4-0 with a 1.86 ERA for the Astros in '05 as he and Roy Oswalt led Houston's charge into the World Series.

Pettitte's September record in title races is very similar to Seaver's and Palmer's:

Not much to choose from between Andy Pettitte and these two first-ballot Hall of Famers when it came to pennant races. Pettitte wasn't a Palmer or Seaver from April to August, but in the two months of the baseball season that dominate the history books Andy Pettitte was the equal or better of many of the greatest pitchers in the history of the game. Not that Pettitte's regular season record is anything to sneeze at; it compares quite well with the careers of many recent HOF inductees, such as Hunter, Drysdale, Jenkins and Bunning, as well as pitchers like Jack Morris and Bert Blyleven who are within striking range of induction. An argument for Pettitte's elevation to the Hall is not an exercise in incrementally loosening the HOF criteria by setting the bar at the level of the most dubious previous inductee, unless one takes the untenable position that none of Hunter, Drysdale, Bunning, Jenkins, Haines, Pennock, Hoyt, Gomez, Sutter, Coveleski, Lyons, Bender and Chesbro really belong in the Hall. If this is the position of those who would oppose Pettitte's induction into the Hall, then the debate is not about whether to lower HOF standards but whether HOF standards should be radically raised.

Pettitte's argument for the Hall is the same as that for so many HOF inductees: he has remained for many years among the first rank of his contemporaries if not the top handful, he contributed significantly to great teams, and he distinguished himself in the September and October games that matter the most.

One last data point to consider. Pettitte will likely approach Morris's career win total, if not pass it. He will have a significantly better winning percentage, a significantly superior ERA+, and his pennant race and post-season records will be not only superior to Morris's but vastly deeper as well. If, as appears likely, Morris breaks the 50% mark in HOF balloting within the next five years, then Andy Pettitte deserves more than the 75% necessary to gain entry into Cooperstown.

Superchief

2010-04-19T09:20:00.001-07:00

Allie Pierce Reynolds was the unquestioned ace of teams that won six World Series. He is not in the Hall of Fame. This has always struck me as extremely odd. Bizarre, even. If the ace starting pitcher on the team that won five consecutive World Series isn't a Hall of Famer then I'm missing something. But Superchief missed by just one vote in the December 2008 balloting by the pre-1943 Veterans Committee, garnering 8 of the 9 votes required for induction. That's good news for Reynolds, and it might be good news for Ron Guidry, too.

Yes, Reynolds played on great teams. Yes, he pitched to Yogi Berra for his entire Yankee career. Yes, the centerfielders patrolling Yankee Stadium's vast center-left expanse were Joe Dimaggio and then Mickey Mantle. But consider the following: Reynolds was 7-2 in 15 World Series appearances, nine of which were starts. His ERA was 2.79, which equates to an ERA+ of approximately 140.

He faced the Dodgers in four of the six World Series in which he played, pitching against them in 11 of his 15 WS appearances. Each of those Dodgers teams led the N.L. in scoring. The '49, '52 and '53 Dodgers teams featured Snider, Robinson, Reese and Campanella, each a Hall of Famer, and a near-miss Hall of Famer in Gil Hodges. The Dodgers of that era won six NL pennants in the decade between '47 and '56 and are rightly considered one of the greatest NL teams of all time. Reynolds went 5-1 with a 2.77 ERA against The Boys of Summer.

Only one of the Yanks' pennants was won handily during their streak of five straight world championships; the 1953 team led the league by ten or more games for most of September. The '49 to '52 teams each prevailed in very tight races, generally besting Indians and Red Sox teams that were themselves stocked with all-stars and Hall of Famers. Reynolds pitched brilliantly down the stretch in those pennant races, winning four September games each of those years. The Yankees played 157 games in September in their six world championship years during Reynolds' career, a number almost exactly equivalent to one full season, and Reynolds won 22 games in those Septembers.

Reynolds lost the openers to the '51 and '52 World Series and each time followed with a complete game victory in Game 4 to even the Series, saving the Yankees from falling into an all but insurmountable deficit and sparking Yankee comebacks on their way to another world championship.

Quite simply, Allie Reynolds was the greatest big-game pitcher of his era. As great as those Yankee teams were, it was Reynolds and his rotation mates, Vic Raschi and Eddie Lopat, who were the key to the Yanks' success in the five World Series between '49 and '53. Whether it was the World Series or the heat of a September pennant race, Superchief was at his best, and without him the Yankees' historic world championship tally of the late '40s and early '50s would have been fewer by two and perhaps more.

Reynolds may have won only 182 regular season games in his career, but I'm willing to bet that the biggest winners and Hall of Famers of his era - Spahn, Wynn, Roberts, Lemon and Feller - would gladly trade a huge chunk of their career win totals for just a few of Superchief's World Series rings. And I'm willing to bet that the multitude of Hall of Famers on the Dodgers, Giants, Indians and Red Sox teams who competed against Superchief would agree that he is more than worthy of induction into the sacred Hall.

Reynolds' success in recent Veterans Committee balloting may be good news for Guidry because their careers are so remarkably similar. They had similar career lengths, with Reynolds pitching 100 more innings than Guidry. Each periodically pitched out of the bullpen. Each had a huge impact on numerous tight pennant races. Each was the ace of teams that won multiple world championships. Guidry's teams didn't have quite the level of success of Reynolds' Yankee teams, but on the other hand Guidry compiled a slightly superior regular season record in terms of ERA+, winning percentage and number of league leading performances.

If Reynolds is inducted it will plainly be because of his outstanding pennant race and post-season performances, particularly his role in leading the Yankees' stretch drives in the years '49 to '52. If these factors carry Superchief into the Hall then they should militate for Guidry's induction as well, because even Superchief must take a backseat to Ron Guidry when it comes to dominating pennant race performances. Reynolds' record in pennant races is notable for its consistency; like Guidry, Allie had five outstanding September performances in the midst of white hot pennant races. But Guidry's record exceeds Reynolds' in two respects: Guidry never stumbled in a pennant race, whereas even Superchief had a tough finish in '48 while the Yanks were chasing the Indians; and Reynolds' Septembers, while superlative, were never as dominating as Guidry's epic performances in '77 and '78.

The similarities don't end with the numbers. Both Reynolds and Guidry were quiet, stolid leaders, respected by their teammates for combining an unflinching competitive fire with an unflappable demeanor. Each let their play on the field do the talking. Neither liked talking about himself. As the Associated Press noted in its article on the subject of Reynolds' passing in 1994:

The late Dale Mitchell, who played with Cleveland, once said Reynolds might not have made the Hall because he refused to promote himself. "He's not that kind of guy," Mitchell said. "But I'll tell you one thing: In Yankee Stadium in September with that fastball, there wasn't anybody ever lived who was any tougher. With those shadows, we were like ducks in a shooting gallery."

Both Reynolds and Guidry exemplified the team-first ethic, the value of which can't be measured by statistics. Like Guidry, Reynolds graciously accomodated the spot-relief role periodically assigned to him, acceding to manager Stengel's strategy for the good of the team. When asked about his failure to make the Hall, Reynolds expressed his preference for winning over personal accolades.

I'm kind of indifferent now about whether I make the Hall of Fame," he said. "If it happens, it happens. I'm pretty much laid back on that. They've got to have some kind of rules. I knew that was going to happen with all the relief work I did for the Yankees. That really was a career-shortener. But to me, that was important. Teamwork was more important than some kind of honor."

As was the case with Guidry, pitching from the bullpen when the situation demanded it probably cost Reynolds more than one 20-win season. Superchief averaged more than 10 relief appearances per season with the Yankees, as a consequence never making more than 31 starts in a season. Stengel's strategy was a huge success for the Yankees, less so for Reynolds personally.

It appears as if the Veterans Committee may be prepared to finally look beyond the sterile statistics and recognize Allie Reynolds' contribution to six World Series winners. And if they do, they should take a close look at Ron Guidry, too, whose career win total doesn't capture his role as the ace pitcher for the most successful American League teams of his era. As the plaque in Yankee Stadium's Monument Park puts it, Guidry was "a respected leader of the pitching staff for three American League pennants and two world championships. A true Yankee."

The plaque really says it all. If it's the only plaque he ever gets, there's no doubt Guidry will be just fine with that. But he deserves another plaque, one that will hang in Cooperstown.

ERA+: Looking Behind The Stat

2010-03-31T09:29:00.000-07:00

ERA+ is a great analytical tool. It permits comparisons of ERAs across different eras and different run environments by adjusting for general league scoring levels and park factors. Its advantages over simple ERA are obvious. It is the single pitching statistic most often regarded as the definitive tool for analyzing pitching careers. Some stat geeks have become so enamored of ERA+ and its derivatives that they deny certain baseball truisms that might call into question the validity of judging pitchers primarily on the basis of ERA+. They tend to deny the concept of clutch pitching, despite the fact that certain pitchers evince a tendency to pitch measurably better or worse in high leverage situations (see this post for a discussion of Leveraged ERA+, or LevERA+, which weights runs allowed (and runs prevented) based on the impact on win expectancy). They also tend to discount the theory that most pitchers "pitch to the score" by changing their pitching approach depending on the game situation.

A host of statistics confirm that most pitchers do indeed pitch to the score. Pitchers as a group subscribe to the theory that when granted a big lead it is better to put the ball over the plate and make the opposition hit their way back into the game rather than risking a rally fueled by bases on balls. Virtually all successful pitchers walk fewer batters when working with a significant lead. Virtually all pitchers, successful or not, surrender more runs when working with tremendous run support from their teammates. Baseball-Reference.com recently added pitching splits based on team run support, showing a pitcher's performance in games in which they received between 0 and 2 runs of support, 3 to 5 runs of support and 6 or more runs of support. The vast majority of pitchers will surrender more runs on average when working with 6 or more runs than they do when working with 5 or fewer runs. The run-support splits further confirm that variations in ERA in high run-support scenarios have little or no impact on a pitcher's winning percentage in these scenarios, with good pitchers winning between 90% and 95% of these decisions regardless of how much their ERAs increase with great run support.

These statistics don't reveal defects in the ERA+ statistic but rather reveal the limitations of the statistic. They reveal that the ERA+ of pitchers who are blessed with generally superior run support, like Jack Morris, may be misleading. In games in which Morris received six or more runs of support he allowed 18% more earned runs than he did when working with 3 to 5 runs of support. This didn't prevent Morris from winning 93.3% of his decisions in these games, approximately the same percentage as pitchers who had much smaller increases in ERA in similar situations. The incremental runs allowed by Morris in high run-support games significantly inflated his ERA and ERA+ but had virtually no impact on game outcomes or his teams' fortunes.

Morris is representative of most elite starting pitchers in this regard. They tend to allow significantly more runs when they have good run support to work with. The following list shows the percentage by which these pitchers' ERAs increased or decreased in games in which they received 6 or more runs of support (relative to games in which they received 5 or fewer runs of support).

Obviously, for a given ERA (or ERA+) the optimal distribution of runs allowed by a pitcher would have the pitcher allowing the fewest runs in games in which his run support was weak and the most runs in games where his run support was strong. Pitchers who pitch relatively better where their run support is particularly weak or strong see little benefit to their winning percentages; even the best pitchers in the lowest run scoring environments will win less than 25% of their decisions when they receive 2 or fewer runs of support, and even average pitchers will generally win nearly 90% of their decisions in games in which they receive 6 or more runs of support. The impact of a pitcher's performance is greatest in those games where his run support is in the middle range - three to five runs of support - and those pitchers who pitch well in those games see the most beneficial impact on their winning percentages.

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A vivid demonstration of how misleading ERA+ can be is the comparison between Jim Palmer and Bert Blyleven in the 1970's. Although they had similar ERA+s in the '70s (Palmer, 137; Blyleven, 130), Palmer exhibited both aspects of a pitcher who maximized his run support by pitching well in high-leverage situations and by optimally distributing his performances, surrendering significantly fewer runs when supported with 5 or fewer runs. Blyleven, by contrast, pitched relatively worse in high leverage situations and surrendered approximately as many runs when getting 5 or fewer runs as he did when getting 6 or more. The effect of these contrasting characteristics can be seen in their winning percentages during the '70s in games where they received between 3 and 5 runs of support: Palmer had a .752 winning percentage; Blyleven had a .596 winning percentage. Palmer had a 154 ERA+ in these games; Blyleven had a 123 ERA+.

Palmer pitched a slightly lower run scoring environment in Baltimore, and accordingly 3 to 5 runs represented slightly better run support than the same number of runs when scored in the parks Blyleven pitched in during the '70s. However, this potential mitigating factor is offset by the fact that Blyleven received better run support overall when receiving 3 to 5 runs of support, getting an average of 3.93 runs/game as compared to Palmer's 3.77 runs/game. After adjusting for the different scoring environments, the run support received by each within the 3 to 5 run category is almost precisely the same. The huge disparity in their winning percentages when receiving between 3 and 5 runs of support cannot be explained by disparate run suppport, and is almost solely a function of the fact that Palmer pitched significantly better when receiving middling run support.

Blyleven had a slightly better ERA+ than Palmer when receiving 6 or more runs of support, but winning percentage in this category is largely inelastic (meaning that it doesn't vary much even with significant fluctuations in ERA+ ). Palmer lost only one such game in the '70s, Blyleven lost two. Blyleven also had a better ERA+ than Palmer when receiving between 0 and 2 runs of support, but Palmer had a significantly better winning percentage, .267 to Blyleven's .211. Palmer's advantage when receiving weak run support can be explained by Palmer's far superior record in one-run games, which will constitute a significant percentage of games in which a pitcher receives two or fewer runs of support.

As the Palmer/Blyleven comparison demonstrates, relatively similar ERA+ figures can mask significant differences in pitcher performance. Although Palmer's ERA+ in the '70s was only marginally better than Blyleven's, Palmer's substantially better performance in high leverage situations and better performance in those games where pitcher performance is most likely to affect the outcome (i.e., the 3 to 5 run support category) produced a substantially better W-L record.

* * * * * *

Most pitchers perform essentially the same in clutch situations as they generally perform and exhibit fairly small deviations in performance under high and low run support scenarios, allowing slightly fewer runs in lower run support scenarios and slightly more runs when working with great run support. For these pitchers ERA+ is a reasonably accurate measure of their contribution to winning games. There is a smaller set of pitchers who exhibit countervailing characteristics, for instance pitching better in clutch situations but performing slightly worse in lower run support scenarios than in high run support scenarios (Mike Mussina is an example of such a pitcher). For these pitchers, too, ERA+ is a reasonably accurate measure of their true pitching performance. But there is a third category of pitchers, like Palmer, for whom ERA+ materially understates their performance. Other examples of such pitchers are:

Ron Guidry. Guidry pitched much better in higher leverage situations, compiling a LevERA+ more than five points higher than his nominal ERA+. Guidry also pitched significantly better in games where he received 3 to 5 runs of support, compiling an ERA+ in those games of 130.5 as compared to an overall ERA+ of 119 and an ERA+ of 109.4 in games in which he had run support of 6 runs or more.

John Tudor. Tudor had nearly a 129 LevERA+ (as compared to a 124 ERA+). He also excelled in matching his performance to the game scoring environment, pitching his best in lower scoring games while allowing more runs in high run support scenarios.

Whitey Ford. Ford's LevERA+ of 137 was even more impressive than his outstanding 133 ERA+. Ford also allowed nearly 9% fewer runs when receiving 5 or less runs of support than he did with 6 or more runs of support.

Tommy John. John's 114 LevERA+ was approximately three points higher than his ERA+, and his ERA was nearly a full run higher when receiving support of 6 runs or more than when he was working with 5 runs or less. His ERA in high run support scenarios hurt his ERA and ERA+ but not his winning percentage, and accordingly his ERA+ is deceptively low.

Juan Marichal. Marichal had a slightly higher LevERA+ than ERA+, 125 to 123, and he allowed approximately half a run more when supported with 6 or more runs than he did when working with 4 to 5 runs. Between his fine clutch pitching and his tendency to allow insignificant runs when working with great run support, Marichal's 123 career ERA+ is deceptively low.

On the other end of the spectrum - the Blyleven end, so to speak - Dave Stieb, Curt Schilling, Orel Hershiser and Steve Rogers are notable examples of pitchers whose LevERA+s were lower than their ERA+ and who tended to pitch better when graced with huge run support than they did in games in the critical 3 to 5 run support category. Like Blyleven, their ERA+ figures don't tell the full story.

* * * * * *

ERA+ is an analytical tool, not the dispositive argument many stat geeks believe it to be when discussing the relative merits of pitchers. In most instances, other factors being approximately equal, the pitcher with the 120 ERA+ will be better than the pitcher with the 110 ERA+. But there are many instances where the pitcher with the distinctly lower ERA+ is the superior pitcher because he made more optimal use of his run support, pitching well in high leverage situations and matching his performance to his team's, surrendering fewer runs when runs are at a premium and/or more runs when his team has provided great run support.

In short, any apparent comparability between Bert Blyleven's performance in the '70s and Jim Palmer's is illusory. Palmer was clearly the better pitcher and it's not even particularly close. This may not be apparent if one looks only at ERA+, but one doesn't have to look too hard behind the ERA+ stat to learn that while they may have allowed a similar number of runs, Palmer generally allowed them when he could afford to and Blyleven too frequently allowed them at the worst possible times. This fact, not disparate run support, accounts for the huge difference in their W-L records. ERA+ won't tell you that. It's still an important measure of pitching performance, but there are now statistics readily available that, when viewed together with ERA+, give a much fuller and accurate picture of a pitcher's performance.
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* Koufax's +59% figure is an anomaly produced by the fact that Koufax played in wildly disparate scoring environments, pitching in distinctly hitter-favorable parks until '62, and then switching to the pitcher friendly Dodger Stadium just as he was hitting his stride. As a consequence, a disproportionate number of games in which Koufax received 6 or more runs of support occurred early in his career when he was not yet the Koufax of legend, and this significantly skews the numbers.

Clutch Septembers of the '20s and '30s

2010-03-25T07:48:00.000-07:00

I've discussed the great pennant race performances of pitchers over the last 50 years. It's time to look at some of the legendary pennant race performances from long ago. These performances help to explain why certain pitchers with conspicuously thin career qualifications for the Hall were nonetheless inducted into the Hall of Fame. They also help to explain why some pitchers who were never seriously considered for the Hall are nonetheless revered by the oldtimers. Some names will be very familiar, others less so. But each of these pitchers put together performances in the heat of pennant races that lifted their teams to glory.

Dizzy Dean, 1934

Let's start with Dizzy Dean. Everybody knows about Dizzy's 30-win season for the Gashouse Gang in '34.They might not recall however that it was Dizzy's performance in August and September of '34 that made him a national figure and a baseball legend, as Dizzy led the Cards comeback to catch the defending World Champion Giants.

After briefly leading the NL in late May the Cards had fallen behind the Giants and remained between 5 and 7 games behind the defending World Champs for most of July and August. The Cards kept pace with the Giants throughout August and early September but failed to make up much ground. They were still 4.5 games back on September 16th when Dizzy squared off againt the Giants. Dean and the Cards beat the Giants 5-3 to close to 3.5 games back with 14 left to play. With time running out, the Cards decided to hitch their fortunes to Dean's arm and began pitching him virtually every other day in an effort to catch the Giants. Dean pitched a three-hit shutout against the Dodgers on Sept. 21, pitched in relief in both ends of a doubleheader two days later on the 23rd, pitched a complete game victory on Sept. 25, pitched a complete-game shutout on two days rest on the 28th, and then pitched a complete-game shutout on one day's rest on the 30th. All in all, Dizzy pitched in six of the Cards' last 11 games as they caught and passed the Giants.

From August 1 to the end of the season, Dizzy went 12-3 with 3 saves, posting an incredible 1.48 ERA in 155.1 innings and winning his last nine starts in a row. Dean's fast finish not only brought a pennant to the Gashouse Gang, it permitted him to win 30 games - the last time a National League pitcher would ever accomplish that feat.

Dean topped off his dream season by winning two of his three starts against the Tigers in the World Series, including the clincher in game seven. There is no question that Dean's superhuman achievements during the Cards dash to the NL pennant in '34 form the bulk of the Dean legend and was a significant part of his elevation to the Hall. Without that performance, and the 30 win season that resulted from the Cards decision to pitch Dean every other day down the stretch, it's likely Dizzy wouldn't be in the Hall.

Jesse Haines, 1928

The Cardinals were perennial contenders in the mid and late-20's, and Jesse Haines was their ace. After spending most of 1926 as the Cards' No. 3 starter, Haines came to the fore in the legendary World Series matchup with the Yankees of the Murderers Row era, pitching a complete-game shutout in game 3 and winning the decisive 7th game with a 6.2 inning, two run effort against Ruth, Gehrig and Co.

Haines was the unquestioned ace of the Cards staff in 1927, going 24-10 as the Cards narrowly missed winning another NL pennant. Haines pitched brilliantly in August, helping the Cards keep pace with the Pirates and Giants in a torrid three-way race, but stumbled in September and the Cards came up short. Haines redeemed himself in 1928, however, putting together a pennant race performance that ranks among the best in baseball history.

The Cards were just half a game in front on August 24th when Haines took the mound against the Phillies. Haines' shutout against the Phils triggered a five-game winning streak that extended the Cards' lead to 5.5 games by August 28th. But the lead slowly dwindled through early and mid-September and remained between one and two games for much of the last two weeks of the season. As the Cards were trying to hang on, Jesse Haines was the Cards' personal life preserver. Beginning with his win against the Phils on August 24th, Haines reeled off eight consecutive complete game victories, compiling a 1.38 ERA over that stretch. Three of Haines' last four starts came with the Cards up by one game or less. Haines didn't allow as much as three earned runs in any of those eight starts until the last one, when he beat the Boston Braves to keep the Cards up by one with three games to go.

The Cards held on to win the NL pennant but were swept by the Murderers Row Yankees in the World Series. Haines started and lost game 3 of the Series, after two errors on one play by Cards catcher Jimmie Wilson led to three Yankees runs that broke a 3-3 tie in the sixth. Even with this loss, however, Haines' numbers against the great Yankee lineups in the '26 and '28 World Series are impressive: in four appearances against Murderers Row in those two World Series, Haines won two of his three starts and put up a 1.99 ERA. Haines added a complete-game four-hitter against the A's in the 1930 World Series, and finished his World Series career with a 3-1 record and 1.67 ERA, World Series stats virtually identical to Ron Guidry's.

Jesse Haines 210 career wins and .571 winning percentage didn't much impress the BBWAA during the '50s and early '60s, but Jesse finally made the Hall in 1970 because enough Veterans Committee members remembered Jesse Haines' central role on those Cardinals teams that fought Murderers Row to a draw in the '26 and '28 World Series.

Big Bill Lee, 1938

Big Bill's remarkable stretch drive in the great NL pennant race of 1938 has been largely overshadowed by Gabby Hartnett's legendary "homer in the gloamin'" that gave the Cubs a crucial victory over the Pirates just as umpires were preparing to call the game due to darkness. Hartnett's homer, however, wouldn't even be a footnote to history but for Lee's astounding September performance because the Cubs would have already been eliminated.

The Pirates entered September with a fairly comfortable lead over the Cubs, Giants and Reds, who appeared to be in a tight race for 2nd place. The Pirates faltered in early September, however, and by September 14 the four teams were separated by just 3.5 games. Lee began September by shutting out the Pirates. He then pitched shutouts against the Reds and Giants, helping to move the Cubs into 2nd place just 2.5 games behind the Pirates. Lee pitched a fourth consecutive shutout on Sept. 22nd against the Phillies, but the Cubs were still 3.5 games back with 13 to play. Lee's scoreless streak was finally snapped by the Cardinals on Sept. 26, but Lee pitched his fifth straight complete-game victory. The Pirates arrived in Chicago the next day with a 1.5 game lead to begin a three game series with the 2nd place Cubs. The stage was set for one of the most remarkable finishes in NL history.

A diminished but still formidable Dizzy Dean was tapped by the Cubs to pitch the first game against the Bucs. Dean's arm was no longer what it was, damaged as a result of his attempt to compensate by overthrowing after a line-drive in the '37 All-Star game broke a toe on his landing foot and restricted his ability to follow through. Dizzy was only a once-a-week pitcher for the Cubs in '38, but when he pitched he was spectacular, taking a 6-1 record and 1.91 ERA to the mound to face the Pirates. Dean pitched brilliantly against the Pirates and took a 2-0 lead into the bottom of the ninth. Dizzy had runners on 2nd and 3rd with two outs in the ninth when Hartnett, the Cubs manager, waved in Bill Lee. Lee promptly through a wild pitch that allowed the runner to score from third, but with the tie run just 90 feet away Lee struck out Pirate catcher Al Todd to end the game. The Cubs were just half a game behind the Bucs.

The next day the Cubs and Pirates were tied 3-3 when the Pirates scored two runs in the 8th inning off Cub pitcher Larry French to take a 5-3 lead. Hartnett brought in Big Bill with no one out in the 8th to stem the rally and Lee managed to finish the inning without permitting further damage. It was Lee's third appearance in three days. The Cubs responded with two runs in the bottom of the 8th to tie the game 5-5, and Lee, who was slated to start the next day's game, was replaced by Charlie Root to pitch the top of the 9th. Root held the Pirates scoreless in the 9th, and the rest is history. Hartnett's bottom of the 9th shot in the gathering darkness at Wrigley Field remains one of the most famous home runs in baseball history.

The Cubs were now in first place for the first time since early June. Lee took the mound to make his fourth appearance in four days; his last start had been just three days prior. The Cubs, perhaps conscious of the fact that Lee was running on fumes, scored three runs in the bottom of the first to take a quick lead. By the end of the fifth inning the Cubs had an 8-1 lead, having pounded the Pirates pitching trio of Bauers, Brandt and Blanton. The Cubs won the game 10-1 to finish the series with the Bucs with a 1.5 game lead. Lee recorded his sixth complete game victory in September. For the month, Lee was 6-0 with two saves and a microscopic 0.64 ERA. He had started four games against the other contenders in the NL race and won them all, with wins over the Pirates bookending his month. The Cubs held on to win the pennant, maintaining their lead over the Pirates for the last three games of the season.

Lee started the first and fourth games of the World Series for the Cubs against the Yankee juggernaut manned by a roster of Hall of Famers. Lee pitched well but to no avail, surrendering just three earned runs in 11 innings against the likes of Gehrig, Dimaggio, Dickey, Gordon and Henrich, but losing both games. Ruffing and Gomez were too much for the Cubs batters, and the Yankees swept the Series.

When one considers Lee's iron-man performance against the Pirates in late September and the fact that three of his four September shutouts came against other contenders, Big Bill's pennant race performance for the Cubs in '38 might be the most spectacular in National League history.

A Recipe For Catfish

2010-03-24T06:12:00.000-07:00

Catfish Hunter is frequently cited by the stat geeks as a prime example of an unworthy HOF inductee. He doesn't have a plaque at the Baseball Think Factory's Hall of Merit, where Dave Stieb, Bret Saberhagen and Wes Ferrell are enshrinees. Hunter's ERA+ is presumably the problem the HOM balloters have with Hunter. It can't be the 224 career wins, since Stieb, Saberhagen and Ferrell each have significantly fewer. I've offered my explanation for Hunter's induction into the HOF, an induction I believe was more than worthy. I thought I'd look at Catfish's Team Relative performance.

During his ten-year prime from '67 to '76 Catfish outperformed his team by 11.3%. That's not a very good figure for a Hall of Famer, and I wasn't particularly surprised by it. What I was surprised by was Hunter's Team Relative index for his five-year prime of '71 to '75, which covers the A's World Series years and his first season with the Yankees. I apparently had assimilated the argument of the stat geeks that Hunter's record during that period was purely a function of pitching for a great team and getting huge run support. Not true, as it turns out. Hunter's Team Relative index for that five-year period is 28%. If you remove the '75 season, Catfish outperformed his A's teams by 29.3%. And if you limit the analysis to just the three World Series championship years with the A's, Catfish's Team Relative index was 34.6%.

To be clear, I'm not arguing that Catfish didn't benefit from great run support. He did. And I'm not arguing that Catfish would've had five consecutive 20-win seasons if he'd played for Blyleven's Twins teams in the '70s. What I am arguing, however, is that the claim that Hunter's great record during this period was just a function of great run support from a great team is demonstrably untrue. Take away the great run support and Hunter was still outperforming his team by 28% over a five-year period and a robust 34.6% during the A's championship years. Those are Hall of Famer-type numbers, albeit for a relatively brief period. It is simply a myth to argue that any pitcher with a Team Relative index like Hunter's was merely a product of great run support and great teams.

Let's look at another pitcher generally dismissed by the stat geeks as a mere product of great run support: Jack Morris. Morris's Team Relative index during his peak nine-year period of '79- '87 was 15.8%, not much by HOF standards but right there with Bunning's 16% index for his 11-year peak. That means if Morris had played for an average hitting team with a .500 record he still would have posted a .579 win% over those nine years. I think it's fair to conclude therefore that Morris's actual winning percentage of .615 during his peak was perhaps 30% attributable to his run support; the bulk of the credit, however, has to go Morris. If I'm not mistaken, Morris detractors would look at his 105 ERA+ and conclude that Morris's .577 career winning percentage was attributable 95% to his superior run support. This is plainly not the case. The Team Relative analysis demonstrates that Morris was able to perform far above the standard a career ERA+ of 105 would typically indicate.

It's no mystery why Catfish is in the Hall. He's in for the same reason Waite Hoyt, Jesse Haines, Lefty Gomez, and Red Ruffing are in the Hall despite falling well short of 300 wins, and for the reason Curt Schilling will make the Hall. They excelled on the big stage and made a huge impact for great teams. They put their imprint on legendary pennant races and World Series contests. That counts for a lot in HOF balloting, and it should.

The Celebrated Mr. K

2010-03-23T04:22:00.000-07:00

His blazing five-year stretch from '62-'66 has become the standard by which all other great pitchers are measured. The Gold Standard. The definition of pitching dominance. Anyone who considers a new mode of analyzing pitching greatness has to insert his five peak seasons into the formulas and see what comes out. If you plug into your formulas his stats from these five seasons, during which he won five straight ERA titles, three pitching triple crowns and three 25+ win seasons in four years, and a historic result doesn't come out the other end, then maybe you need to double check your methods and formulas.

From '62 to '66 Sandy Koufax outperformed his team by 41%. If you exclude the '62 season, where Koufax's injury and the Dodger's decision to rush him back into the rotation in late September significantly skew the numbers, then Koufax outperformed his team by 49.5% from '63 to '66*. That's Randy Johnson territory. A 50% Team Relative performance over a period of years could be known as the Sandy-Randy Standard.

Randy Johnson's peak four-year period by Team Relative analyses was actually the five-year period from '93 to '97 that includes his injury-shortened '96 season when he went 5-0. It also includes the strike abbreviated '94 and '95 seasons. Over that five-year period Johnson's Team Relative performance was 58.2%. History suggests, however, that Johnson would not have maintained the .920 winning percentage he compiled in '95-'96 had he pitched full seasons. Johnson's true peak, as measured by wins, ERA+ and most other measures, actually occurred with the D'backs from '99 to '02, and he compiled a 49.9% Team Relative performance during that period.

Maddux compiled a 52.6% Team Relative performance from '94 to '97, but that period also included two strike-shortened seasons.

Guidry's Team Relative performance over his three-year peak from '77 to '79 was 40%. Seaver had a 44.2% Team Relative performance for four years between '68 and '71. If one excludes Gibson's injury-shortened '67 season, Gibson maintained a 41.1% Team Relative performance from '65 to '70. If one excludes Marichal's injury-shortened '67 season, he maintained a 33.8% Team Relative performance from '63 to '69.

For Schilling's three 20-win seasons - '01, '02 and '04 - he had a Team Relative performance of 48.2%. For Guidry's three 20-win seasons he had a Team Relative performance of 43.5%.

Team Relative analysis confirms that Koufax's great run was indeed among the very best four or five year stretches in baseball history. Throw in the huge innings totals Koufax put up in these years, the no-hitters, strikeout records, pennant race and post-season performances, and it's clear why Mr. K became a legend.
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* Koufax's best season by far as measured by Team Relative performance was his injury-shortened '64 season, when he posted a 19-5 record for a Dodger team that was truly terrible but for Koufax, compiling a .442 winning percentage in games in which Koufax was not the pitcher of record. Koufax outperformed that team by nearly 89%.

Lost In Translation

2010-03-22T06:06:00.000-07:00

Not surprisingly, an analysis of Bert's prime years of '70 to '79 demonstrates that despite his superlative ERAs he didn't significantly improve his team when he was on the mound. Yes, Bert didn't get good run support from his teams, who scored .35 runs/game fewer for Bert than they did for other starting pitchers. It is also true that in measuring Bert's performance against his teams' Bert was competing against some pretty good pitchers. For the entire decade, Bert pitched on staffs that were slightly above average even without Bert's contribution, and the staffs on his '70, '72, '77 and '79 teams were among the very best in their leagues. But the Team Relative analysis controls for these factors, of course.

Even after increasing Bert's run support to team average, and adjusting his team's W-L record downward to reflect what it would have been with an average pitching staff, Bert still only outperformed his team's W-L record by 10.2%. That's down in Drysdale territory. As I've previously noted, Bert hugely underperformed his Pythagorean projection during those ten years, compiling a .536 winning percentage as compared to a .599 PythPro. If Bert had been able to perform to his PythPro he wouldn't be such a hot topic today because he would have been inducted into the Hall years ago.

Bert's Team Relative performance was worst during his first six years with the Twins, the period that prompted the Sports Illustrated article wondering why Bert wasn't a bigger winner. Bert's outperformed his team by 8.3% during those years. He improved slightly in his stints with the Rangers and Pirates from '76 to '79, outperforming his team by 13.9%, still well short of what we'd expect from a top flight pitcher. Bert's worst year in this regard was '72, when he performed only 2.2% better than his team despite receiving .44 runs/game more than the other Twins starting pitchers. This is one year where Bert can truly be called a victim of a poor distribution of run support, with a disproportionate number of games falling at either end of the spectrum - a large number of games in which he received three runs or less and a large number of games where he received seven or more. Amazingly, in Bert's 38 starts there were only five games in which he received 4, 5 or 6 runs of support. Bert's run support distribution was also very poor in '75 and, to a lesser extent in '73 and '74.

Bert's run support distribution was more conventional in '76 to '79, although his average run support in '76 was terrible - only 2.75 runs/game. But remember, the Team Relative analysis controls for poor average run support*; it doesn't control for poor run support distribution. In '77, '78 and '79, Bert's run support was almost precisely team average. After controlling for Bert's run support for the '76 to '79 period, a period during which his run support distribution was more conventional and his ERA+ was a very good 125.5, he still only managed to outperform his team by 13.9%. And since we've acknowledged Bert's poor run distribution in the period '72 to '75, we should also acknowledge that Bert's Team Relative performance in the period '76 to '79 was skewed by his W-L record in the '79 season, when the Pirates' bullpen and bats bailed out Bert an extraordinary 13 times after Bert left the game in a position to lose. To give you some idea of how extraordinary this "bailout" total is, consider that Bert was similarly bailed out only 18 times in the preceding nine years. Bert's 12-5 record in '79 is extremely misleading, and if not for his good fortune and the Bucs late-inning dramatics for Bert in '79 his record would have been something like 12-15, which more than eliminates the improvement we see in Bert's Team Relative performance in the late '70s.

I've not modeled Bert's projected record from '72 to '75 assuming a more optimal distribution of run support. It could be done using a system that generates a random distribution of run support and Bert's projected W-L record using such a system would no doubt benefit. There's also no doubt, however, that any benefit to Bert from a more conventional distribution of run support from '72 to '75 would be largely offset by his '79 season, when Bert easily could have lost an additional 10 games and his 12-5 and .706 winning percentage was not reflective of his performance: he had a 109 ERA+, a LevERA+ of 99, and won only 12 of his 37 starts for a World Series championship team.

Again, this Team Relative analysis is limited to Bert's peak decade of '70 to '79. As the Bert Backers would no doubt argue, Bert had some great seasons outside this period, primarily '84 and '89. But the '70 to '79 period forms the overwhelming bulk of Bert's argument for the Hall. For the balance of his career he had a .533 winning percentage and 108 ERA+, and despite the excellent '84 and '89 seasons the 80's were an exceedingly erratic period for Bert, a period in which poor seasons ('80 and '88) and injury limited seasons ('82 and '83) detract from his case for the Hall. The argument of the Bert Backers is almost exclusively based on the '70s, during which he posted his best ERA+ figures, almost 2/3s of his shutouts and six of his eight 200 strikeout seasons. But the fact is that for all of Bert's statistical achievements in the '70s, they didn't translate into a commensurate win total and W-L record and Bert didn't improve his team as much as he should have. And the problem wasn't run support.

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* For example, Bert posted a 13-16 record in '76, worse than his team's 79-83 record. But the Team Relative analysis has Bert outperforming his team by 32% after adjusting for his run support.

Big Unit, Indeed

2010-03-20T06:39:00.000-07:00

It's an amazing sight when you're watching great athletes compete at the highest levels in their sport and one competitor is so great that the opposition is just overmatched. I mean dominated; not just beat, not just bested, but dominated, almost completely helpless. In the realm of baseball, the greatest pitchers, at their best, will do this. Major league hitters, the best in the world, men with preternatural reflexes and freakish hand-eye coordination, are left to wave futilely at pitches or are so flummoxed they can't even swing.

I remember watching Clemens pitch against the Yanks in '97 and wondering how in the hell anyone ever hit the guy. I remember watching Pedro against the Yanks in September '99, the game he struck out 17, and feeling sorry for Yankee batters. Jorge Posada couldn't even get the bat off his shoulder. He had no idea what was coming - 96 mph fastball, or slider, or change-up or curveball. Yankee after Yankee left the plate after striking out shaking their head on the way back to the dugout, no doubt feeling the way Mickey Mantle felt after facing Koufax for the first time in the '63 World Series, when he said to the umpire as he was turning to leave the plate after striking out, "now how in the hell am I supposed to hit that shit."

But for sheer dominance, the ability to induce not only helplessness in big league batters but terror, there has perhaps never been anyone like Randy Johnson. It was sometimes like watching little league baseball, where the big kid is on the mound, the one that seemed to mature about two years ahead of the rest of the kids, and the ball is blowing by the batter before they can even think about swinging. One kid gets smoked and the next batter approaches the batters box looking like they're going to the gallows. They have no chance. When he was at his best, that was Randy Johnson on the mound. Too big, too nasty, too fast. And that slider - Christ, you pitied lefthanded hitters who had to face Randy Johnson.

The ironic thing is that Johnson was arguably never considered the best pitcher in the game during his prime. Before you say, "hey, wait a minute...", consider this: Maddux was off the charts in '94 and '95, throwing strike after strike without ever hitting the white of the plate. Clemens was spinning back-to-back pitching triple crowns in '97 and '98. And then Pedro was dominating from '99 to '02, like a Marichal with more speed and a Hoffman-like change-up. Note that I didn't say Johnson was never actually the best during this period - he unquestionably was in 2001 when Pedro missed half the season. I said he was never considered the best. Johnson had the misfortune during his peak of '93 to '02 of always seeming to be in the shadow of another all-time great. Even in 2001 Johnson was a bit overshadowed by his loquacious and self-promoting mound-mate, he of the Bloody Sock.

During his ten-year peak, Johnson posted seasons of 18-2 (the strike-shortened '94 season), 20-4, 21-6 and 24-5. After sulking his way through the first half of the season in Seattle in '98, he went to the National League and went 10-1 with a 1.28 ERA in eleven starts for the Astros. I remember thinking as Johnson was doing this, "man, those NL batters have never seen anything like this."

Judging just by the W-L records, Randy Johnson was as close to unbeatable for those ten years as anyone has ever been in major league baseball. He was 175-58, for a .751 winning percentage. Only Grove had a comparable winning percentage across a similar number of decisions, going 172-54 for a .761 winning percentage between '27 and '33. There was a difference, however. Grove was pitching for Connie Mack's Athletics, the team that sent Ruth and Gehrig packing for home at the end of the season in '29, '30 and '31. Grove was lavished with spectacular run support by Foxx, Simmons and Cochrane. He pitched to one of the all-time great field generals in Mickey Cochrane. He had a hell of a supporting cast. Johnson received generally good run support from his Seattle and Arizona teams, but it was actually slightly less than team average, and needless to say the overall quality of those teams didn't approach the Athletics of the 30's.

The team relative analysis for Randy Johnson yielded a number that made me go back and double-check the formulas in the spreadsheet. After those checked out, I reconsidered the whole concept of the team relative analysis as a metric for pitchers. But I think its validity still holds. I had to reconsider the concept and double-check the methodology because it produced for Randy Johnson a result so outlandish, so amazing, that it was hard to believe.

Between '93 and '02, Randy Johnson outperformed his team, after adjusting for factors other than his own performance that might have effected his W-L record and his team's W-L record, by 50%. Yeah, you read that right - 50%.

It's a figure that significantly exceeds Seaver and Maddux. And it's a figure that I'm pretty certain will exceed Koufax's figure for his peak period of '62 to '66. If I don't miss my guess, it's a figure that only Walter Johnson will be able to approach over a decade period. And even Walter won't hit Randy's mark unless either his run support was significantly worse than other Senator pitchers received or those Senator pitching staffs were better than they appear to be at first glance.

This result is not the product of any significant adjustment to Johnson's record produced by the methodology. A straight comparison of Johnson's W-L record to his teams' records in games other than those where Johnson got the decision shows that Johnson outperformed his team by nearly 46%. After adjusting for the fact that (i) Johnson's run support was slightly below team average and (ii) Johnson was outperforming a very good D'back pitching staff from '99 to '02, that figure increased to 50%.

Unless I can identify some flaw in this concept I'm forced to reconsider my opinion that Grove was the greatest southpaw in the history of the game. Hell, Randy Johnson might have been the greatest pitcher, period. True, these analyses are restricted to peak periods of about a decade, but it's not like Randy had a short career; he won 300 games, after all. And I think it unlikely that other candidates for greatest ever will have achievements outside their peak decade that will militate in their favor, although Clemens might.

In terms of sheer power-pitching dominance, we were watching Walter Johnson at his peak when we were watching Randy Johnson from '93 to '02. We were watching peak Koufax. We were watching Grove at his very peak, say from '28 to '33. I'm not sure I appreciated that at the time. In fact, I'm pretty certain I didn't. But the Big Unit was indeed that great.

More Team Relative Analyses: Lefty Grove

2010-03-19T14:05:00.000-07:00

Lefty Grove weighs in at 36%. I didn't realize what tremendous run support Grove got from the Athletics in the early 30's.

It may be a shade behind Seaver and Maddux, but it doesn't change my opinion that Lefty was The Man among post-1920 pitchers. What it does do is make me appreciate how great Seaver and Maddux were. Man, that 35%+ improvement over team performance is one upscale neighborhood.

Reappraisals of Palmer, Bunning and Drysdale

2010-03-19T08:11:00.000-07:00

The analyses of pitcher performance relative to his team have yielded some interesting results.

As I described in the "The Theory of Relativity" post, it is possible to compare a pitcher's W-L record and winning percentage to his team's and adjust for factors that distort the comparison. These adjustments involve adjusting the pitcher's run support to equalize it with the run support the team provided to the other pitchers on the team and normalizing the ERAs and runs allowed by the rest of the staff to league average. These two adjustments assure that a pitcher won't benefit or suffer by virtue of run support that deviated from team average, or by virtue of the fact that the rest of the pitching staff, to whom the pitcher is effectively being compared, were either better than league average or worse than league average. A pitcher may be a great pitcher but his W-L record relative to his team's won't be very impressive if the rest of the team's pitching staff is comprised of great pitchers. In comparing Greg Maddux's W-L record to his team's it is obviously necessary to adjust for the fact that the Braves' pitching staffs were great and produced tremendous winning percentages because of the presence of guys like Glavine and Smoltz.

Here are the new results. Curt Schilling's ten-year peak from 1997 to 2006 was pretty impressive, as his excellent winning percentage and ERAs would suggest. Schilling outperformed his team by approximately 27% over that decade. Bob Gibson outperformed his team by approximately 28% over his nine-year peak of '64 to '72; not sure whether people will find that disappointing or impressive. Both these results obviously cast Ron Guidry in a very good light, because Schilling's and Gibson's team relative performance figures are right in Guidry territory. Ron is in good company.

Here are the results I found surprising. I ran the numbers on Bunning, Drysdale and Palmer. I've always thought of Bunning and Drysdale as being very similar, and I've conceived of Palmer as an American League version of Tom Seaver, although a shade behind Tom Terrific. My team relative analyses have fundamentally changed my appraisals of these pitchers.

I didn't expect Drysdale to fare very well in this analysis, simply because his a straight comparison of his W-L records to his teams' isn't very impressive. I expected, however, that Drysdale would benefit from the fact that the Dodger pitching staffs were generally exceptional during his era. Drysdale came in at 9.75%. Now remember that Dave Stieb came in at approximately 17%. That's a big difference. I know Drysdale made in the Hall in large part because of his participation in a lot of great pennant races and World Series, but those who question Drysdale's HOF bona fides have new ammunition for their argument.

Bunning polled in at 16%. That's a pretty good figure, and it's far better than Drysdale.

Now here was a bit of a stunner. A straight comparison of W-L records for Jim Palmer and his Oriole teams never looked all that impressive, because those Orioles teams posted great records during Palmer's peak from '70 to '78. Still, I expected that Palmer would benefit greatly from the fact that those were great pitching staffs the Orioles fielded in the '70s. Well, they were great staffs in the early '70s, but from '74 to '78 they really weren't all that good when you take away Palmer. For the full nine-year period the Orioles posted a 103.6 ERA+ when you subtract Palmer's ERAs. Good, but not great. After adjusting for the quality of the Oriole pitching, Jim Palmer outperformed his team by 20.4%. That's better than Bunning, but not by much. And it's nowhere near Tom Seaver's neighborhood of 37%.

O.K., Jim Palmer wasn't Tom Seaver. Does that make me reconsider whether Palmer was a legitimate first-ballot HOFer? No, not at all. Eight 20-win seasons in nine years is quite an accomplishment, and Palmer was an undoubted big-game pitcher, posting some pretty impressive pennant race performances and superlative post-season numbers. But he wasn't as good as I thought he was.

As with any other statistic or metric, it's important to put it in context. It is an all too common failing of many fans who fancy themselves sabremetricians that they attach too much weight to a single statistic. Schilling comes out well ahead of Palmer in team relative performance. That tends to confirm what Schilling's great winning percentage and ERAs had already told us: Schilling was a damn good pitcher. But Palmer was rock-solid consistent and was generally a bigger winner than Schilling over their respective peaks, even after adjusting for the difference between the four-man rotation that Palmer pitched in and the five-man rotation Schilling pitched in. Palmer had one stinker in '75 when he had significant arm issues, but was excellent every other year. Every pitcher gets a pass for one season where he had arm issues; Seaver had one during his peak, Guidry had one in '84, and most other great pitchers also had one. Schilling had more than his share of them, however, and was significantly limited in his contribution to his team in '99, 2000, '03 and '05 as a result of poor performance or limited innings due to arm issues. He was excellent when he was on, like Saberhagen, but like Saberhagen you can't just ignore all the seasons where his team didn't get what they justifiably expected.

Bunning would appear at first glance to have had more than his share of off seasons during his peak, but that's deceptive. Bunning was very durable and never really missed time due to injury issues during his peak. Some of his pedestrian W-L records, particular in 1960, are easily explained: poor team, terrible run support. There's reason to believe that if you put Bunning on those '70s Orioles teams he might have posted another four or five 20-win seasons. But there's also reason to believe he might not have. It has to be noted that Bunning pitched on some good teams that gave him pretty good run support, like the '61 Tigers and '64 Phillies, and he didn't post 20-win seasons. He did well enough, posting good ERAs and winning 17 games in '61 and 19 in '64. But a Hall of Famer should have been winning 20 games, and probably 22 or 23. Bunning had a bit of a tendency to pitch to his team's level. That's not a particularly damning observation, but it's an important consideration.

Back to Guidry for a moment. The myth is that Guidry's spectacular W-L record was in large part a function of great run support from a powerful Yankee offense. It's a myth. The '77 and '80 Yankee teams could hit, no question, but the Yankees of the pennant winning years of '77 to '81 were unquestionably pitching and defense oriented teams. Look at the stats. And Guidry's run support from the Yankees was in any event strictly average for those teams. Guidry outperformed those teams, and those exceptional pitching staffs, because he was an excellent pitcher, made optimal use of his run support, was a clutch pitcher who pitched best in critical situations, and was in short a winner. That term - winner - is a term a lot of the self-styled stat geeks scoff at, but if they looked a little closer at the stats the concept would be plain. Some pitchers are winners. Some aren't. Blyleven wasn't. Steve Rogers wasn't. To a lesser degree Stieb wasn't either. It doesn't mean they weren't good pitchers. But it means they weren't as good as their generally superior ERAs and ERA+s would suggest. The stat geeks should ponder that for a moment.

The Theory of Relativity

2010-03-18T05:43:00.000-07:00

I love a lot of the new pitching stats. They're great analytical tools. Take FIP, for example ("fielding independent pitching"). It's based on the proposition that what happens on a ball put in play is frequently a function of random chance and team fielding. Bill James recognized its utility and cited Wally Bunker's 1964 season as an example of a pitcher apparently benefiting from some good luck insofar as his BAbip that year was .216. It turns out that Bunker in fact had a pretty good facility for generating low BAbip's in his career, presumably because, like Maddux in his prime, he was adept at keeping the ball away from the fat part of the bat and inducing batters to hit pitches outside the hitter's sweet spots in the strike zone. But Bunker never again came close to posting the .216 BAbip he posted in '64, despite being backed by the legendary team defense of the '60s Orioles.

FIP tends to understate the effectiveness of a pitcher with a demonstrated ability to consistently generate very low BAbips. Take The Great Rivera, for example. I was skeptical of Mariano's decision in '97 to move almost exclusively to the cutter because it seemed to sharply cut into his strikeouts. "Throw the high fastball!", I would shout, longing for Mariano's incredible strikeout ratio in '96 when he K's 130 batters in 107 innings. Still, I had to admit that batters seemed almost incapable of getting good wood on the cutter, but bloops and dribblers can and do become hits, while strikeouts can't and don't. Bloops and dribblers that found holes in the defense became, in my mind, "Mariano Specials." Obviously Mariano's decision to go with the cutter has been thoroughly vindicated and my early concerns were unfounded. But Mariano never fares too well in the FIP stat, and that's misleading because Mariano has demonstrated an ability to consistently generate low BAbips (Mariano's career BAbip is .265, as compared to a major league average of .299).

As Bill James has noted regarding FIP and various other new and sophisticated measures of pitching performance, they have a tendency to throw out a lot of information in an effort to isolate and identify a pitcher's performance independent of non-pitching factors. Bill is a little unsettled by this, and so am I. As he's argued, W-L records are the antipode to FIP and similar stats, incorporating all information, including unfortunately things that have nothing to do with a pitcher's performance, like offensive support and team fielding. However, the inclination of the stat geeks to summarily dismiss W-L records is extremely misguided. It is possible to start with W-L records and make appropriate adjustments, and that's what I'm about to propose.

The Theory of Relativity, in contrast to FIP, throws out nothing but attempts to adjust for everything (or at least most things) that happens outside of the pitcher's performance. Simply put, it compares a pitcher's W-L record to his teams record in games where the pitcher was not the pitcher of record (i.e., it subtracts the pitcher's W-L record from the team's), adjusting for factors that effect the pitcher's and team's W-L records but are largely unrelated to the pitcher's own performance. If a pitcher received run support better or worse than the run support a team generally provided its pitchers, the pitcher's W-L record is adjusted (via the Pythagorean theorem) to reflect what his W-L record would have been had he received run support equal to his team's average. It also adjusts for the performance of the rest of the team's pitching staff, because even a good pitcher who receives excellent run support will appear to fare poorly relative to his team's W-L record if the rest of the starting pitching staff is comprised of Walter Johnson, Pete Alexander, Tom Seaver and Randy Johnson, with Gossage, Eckersley and Rivera coming out of the bullpen.

These pitching staff adjustments are accomplished by taking the team's ERA+ (exclusive of the subject pitcher's own ERA+) and adjusting the team's W-L record to reflect what it would have been had the rest of the staff generated a 100 ERA+ (again, based on the Pythagorean theorem). It simply takes the team's ERA+ exclusive of the subject pitcher's ERA+, calculates the runs allowed or saved by the staff's performance above or below the assumed 100 ERA+, and adds or subtracts those incremental runs to the team's runs allowed. A Pythagorean record is then generated assuming a league-average staff.

Once you've adjusted the pitcher's record for run support and adjusted the team's record for the rest of the pitching staff's performance, you compare the pitcher's adjusted W-L record to his team's adjusted W-L record. The impact of run support on the pitcher's W-L record relative to his team's is thereby eliminated, and the impact of the rest of the staff's performance on the team's W-L record is similarly eliminated. A good pitcher will have an adjusted W-L record much better than his team's adjusted record, and a poor pitcher will have a worse one. Measuring the difference between the adjusted records of the pitcher and the team provides a good measure of the pitcher's performance. It doesn't expressly adjust for team defense (a notoriously difficult aspect of team performance to measure), but it implicitly incorporates it because bad team defense will lower the denominator representing the team's W-L record and therefore increase the relative impact of the pitcher's W-L record (adjusted for run support) relative to his team's W-L record (adjusted for the performance of the rest of the pitching staff).

The concept of simply comparing a pitcher's record to his team's is not novel, but the defects in the system became apparent to me when I was comparing Phil Niekro's relative W-L record to Don Sutton's. Even if the records were adjusted for variations in run support, Sutton would still tend to fare poorly compared to Niekro because Niekro would benefit by being compared to the poor Braves pitching staffs of the '70s, while Sutton would suffer from being compared to the generally excellent Dodger's pitching staffs of the '70s. It was easy for Niekro to outperform the sub-average pitchers on the Braves staff, but more difficult for Sutton to outperform the Tommy John's, Claude Osteen's and Andy Messersmith's who generally populated the Dodger staffs. It's fairly easy, however, to adjust for this, and the conceptual validity of the adjustment should be obvious. Still, the process of collating the team pitching data from different years, incorporating it into the adjustment formulas and generating the Pythagorean adjustments is a little involved and so for the moment I'll only present an analysis of three pitchers: Tom Seaver, Ron Guidry and Dave Stieb.

I selected these three pitchers because I thought they would be illustrative. Bill James has noted how spectacular Seaver's winning percentage was given the generally mediocre nature of the Mets teams he pitched for in the late '60s/early and mid-70s. I selected Guidry because I knew that his record was spectacular even after accounting for the fact that the Yankees teams he pitched for were generally pretty good, but I didn't know how his relative record had been affected by his run support and the quality of the Yankee pitching staffs. And I selected Stieb because (i) I knew that he had significantly underperformed relative to Pythagorean projections during his prime years in the early and mid-80s, and (ii) I was tired of beating up on Bert Blyleven. (I knew Blyleven also underperformed his Pythagorean projections in his prime, but I genuinely like the guy and he was by many measures a borderline great pitcher - certainly better than Stieb - albeit not a Hall of Famer).

I compared nine-year peaks for each of the pitchers. This was convenient because both Guidry and Stieb had distinct nine-year peaks that account for all of their superior seasons. One could select various nine-year periods for Seaver, because his peak extended well beyond nine years, but I selected his first nine seasons, comprising substantially his entire Met career. I'll begin the comparison by noting some things that you probably already know. For instance, the Mets were not a good team once you subtract Seaver, notwithstanding their two NL pennants and their '60 World Series championship. Their team winning percentage from '67 to '75 was .495 (mediocre, but not bad), but was only .463 once you subtract Seaver's .636 winning percentage from the equation, and that obviously stinks. You probably also knew that the Mets' problem was poor hitting. They actually had very good pitching, even after stupidly trading Nolan Ryan, posting a team ERA+ of 108 from '67 to '75. Once you subtract Seaver's superlative ERAs, however, the team ERA+ was 102.2. That's not great, but it's pretty good considering the staff's ace pitcher is excluded. Another way too look at it is that the Mets staff was above average even without the great Seaver.

I was somewhat surprised by how good Stieb's winning percentage was from '82 to '90. He was 135-90 for a very good .600 winning percentage. But I was also slightly surprised by how good the Jays teams were in that period. They had a .548 winning percentage, and were generally a pretty good team even aside from the excellent '85 and '87 seasons, other than in '82. Even subtracting Stieb's W-L record the Jays still had a .539 winning percentage. I was very surprised, however, by how good the Jays pitching was in that period. They had a team ERA+ of 109.9 and an ERA+ of 106.9 even after subtracting Stieb. Even without Stieb the Jays staff in the '80s was as good as the Yankees pitching in the period '77 to '85 (primarily because the Yankees pitching sagged significantly from '82 to '84). Jimmy Key and Doyle Alexander were no slouches, and Jim Clancy was a pretty good No. 4 starter. And the Tom Henke-led bullpen was generally pretty solid and sometimes excellent.

The Yankees had a team winning percentage of .575 from '77 to '86, and were well over .500 every year other than '82. The Yanks' winning percentage drops to .552 without Guidry, still very good but not that much better than the Jays' .539 W% without Stieb. The Yanks pitching was better than the Mets but not as good as the Jays, posting an overall 106.3 ERA+ and a 103.7 ERA+ without Guidry. The period of '77 to '85 was really a tale of two Yankee pitching staffs: the excellent staff from '77 to '81 and the generally mediocre staff from '82 to '85.

On the offensive support side both Guidry and Seaver received run support slightly better than team average, in each case about 3%. Stieb's run support was 1.2% below team average. Accordingly Guidry's and Seaver's adjusted W% was slightly lower than their actual W% and Stieb's slightly higher. The adjustments were quite small in each case, with Stieb's W% going up from .600 to .606. Guidry's adjusted W% dropped 18 points to .679 and Seaver's dropped 14 points to .622.

The big beneficiary of the adjustment to team W% by assuming an average pitching staff was Stieb. The Jays W% (exclusive of Stieb) drops from .539 to .518. A Jays staff with a 100 ERA+ would have added about 36 runs per year to the Jays' runs allowed total.

The effects of these adjustments were essentially negligible for Guidry and Seaver, with the reduction in their personal W%'s being largely offset by the reduction in the team W% resulting from translating their good team pitching staffs into average staffs. Stieb, by contrast, saw a significant increase in his W% relative to his team's. Simply comparing Stieb's .600 W% to his team's .548 W% shows that Stieb outperformed his team by 9.5%. Adjusting for run support and pitching staff, however, increases Stieb's relative performance figure to 17%. That's a pretty good figure, and though I've not yet run the figures for various HOFers I'm willing to bet that it compares favorably to some of the more marginal inductees.

Seaver outperformed his team after adjusting for run support and pitching staff by a tremendous 37%, which is almost precisely the figure obtained by comparing his straight W% to his team's.

Guidry outperformed his team after adjusting for run support and pitching staff by 27%, which represents less than a one point increase over the approximately 26% figure obtained by comparing his .697 W% to his team's .552 W% without Guidry.

Just to give some idea of how astounding Seaver's figure is, my preliminary calculations appear to suggest that Koufax outperformed his team during his historic five-year run from '62 to '66 by slightly north of 40%. Seaver's 37% relative performance figure maintained over a nine-year period, therefore, appears to be a historic feat, and I'm willing to bet that few other pitchers since 1920, if any, can match it.

Stieb's figures demonstrate how a pitcher who had run support below team average and pitched on a good staff can have actually outperformed his team by a larger margin than a simple comparison of W% between pitcher and team would indicate. On the flip side, a pitcher whose performance relative to his team's at first glance appears to be superlative can be revealed as a fundamentally average pitcher if he received both great run support relative to his team's average run support and pitched on a team with an inferior pitching staff. Obviously neither Seaver nor Guidry are examples of this, and I'm not sure off the top of my head which pitcher might fit this profile. I know Andy Pettitte has received tremendous run support throughout his career, but he's also pitched on generally excellent pitching staffs. If anyone can suggest such a pitcher in the comments section I'd appreciate it. I'm going to start looking by first identifying poor pitching staffs from recent decades and then examining the run support received by their starting pitchers.

The performance of Seaver, Guidry and Stieb relative to each other was not a complete surprise. For one thing, Stieb slightly underperformed his Pythagorean record from '82 to '90, compiling a .600 W% relative to a .613 Pythagorean projection (Stieb significantly underperformed the Pythagorean projection during his very best years of '82 to '85, indicating that he slightly outperformed Pythagorus over the balance of his nine-year stretch). The Pythagorean comparison doesn't provide for any of the adjustments in the Relativity method I've described, but it does indicate that Stieb didn't make particularly good use of his run support. Guidry, by contrast, hugely outperformed his Pythagorean projection from '77 to '85, posting a .697 W%, more than 40 points higher than his .654 Pythagorean projection. That's a big difference. Seaver underperformed his Pythagorean projection but by an insignificant amount, posting a .636 W% from '67 to '75 as compared to a .641 Pythagorean projection, well within the margin of error in Pythagorean projections.

What did we learn by comparing a pitcher's performance to his team's after making the Relativity adjustments? Well, without having finished fully computing the figures for a meaningful number of other pitchers, I think we learned that Stieb was a pretty good pitcher; Seaver, as one must have expected, was a truly great pitcher and a worthy member of the inner sanctum in the Hall of Fame; and Guidry was precisely between Stieb and Seaver. My own takeaway is that the gap between Seaver and Guidry was about what I'd expected: it's significant, because Seaver is unquestionably among the very elite in the history of baseball, and Guidry, although deserving of HOF induction in my opinion, is admittedly a marginal candidate if one focuses soley on career statistics and ignores the astounding big-game record and his degree of dominance over a decade. I think the Relativity analysis also suggests strongly that the gap between Stieb and Guidry is about as big as the gap between Guidry and Seaver. It's significant, and it belies any comparison of the two based on nothing more than ERA+.

The results for Stieb and Guidry confirm a few things and dispense with a few myths. They confirm that Guidry's improved performance in high leverage situations translated into incremental wins, and Stieb's poor performance in high leverage situations translated into incremental losses. Stieb may have had the superior ERA+, but Guidry's LevERA+ was distinctly superior, and the difference explains in part the disparity in their ability to outperform their teams. The Relativity analysis also dispenses with the myth that Guidry's outstanding career winning percentage was just a product of good run support and great teams. Guidry did indeed get good run support and pitched for good teams, but the fact remains that he outperformed his teams by a huge margin. A .600 winning percentage for a Yankee pitcher in the years '77 to '85 would be good but not that much better than the Yanks' record for those years. A .697 winning percentage, however, is spectacular even after adjusting for run support and the quality of the Yankee teams.

Based on what we've seen so far I think it's clear that elite pitchers will outperform their teams by 17% after adjusting for run support and the quality of the rest of the pitching staff. All time greats - and I mean pitchers among the top six or eight of all time - may outperform their team on an adjusted basis by more than 35%. And it should be clear that pitchers who outperform their team on an adjusted basis by more than 25% are no doubt Hall of Famers. If there are any doubts about that, the Relativity analyses of pitchers like Drysdale, Bunning, Sutton, Niekro, Ryan, Palmer are likely to resolve those doubts.

UPDATE: I just ran the numbers for Greg Maddux for the period '92-'02. He's an interesting case, of course, because he pitched on such great pitching teams, and so his 15% outperformance of his team's record on a straight comparison of W% could be expected to rise significantly. But - wow. Maddux shoots up to a relative performance index of 42% when adjusted for run support and pitching staff. I didn't appreciate how poor Maddux's run support was relative to team average. The Braves scored 4.86 runs/game when Maddux wasn't pitching, but only 4.41 for Greg. Maddux is just north of Seaver's 37%. I guess no one should be surprised.

The Guidry Decade

2010-03-15T04:36:00.000-07:00

I've noted before the fact that Ron Guidry is the only pitcher in baseball history to lead the major leagues in wins and lead his own league in ERA and SO over a ten-year period and yet be rejected by the Hall. He averaged nearly 17 wins per season in the decade between '77 and '86 and had a 3.23 ERA (121 ERA+). When apprised of Guidry's achievement, my fellow baseball fans have had remarkably similar reactions, initially expressing some surprise at Guidry's accomplishment but then arguing that Guidry's statistics during this period, while impressive, were pre-eminent during this period only because this decade happened to occur at an odd interregnum in baseball, when greats like Seaver, Palmer and Carlton had just passed their prime and before the rise of Clemens, Maddux, Johnson and Martinez. They suggest that Guidry's performance really wouldn't have been that exceptional in any other era in baseball.

I must admit that I was inclined to give some credence to this argument. I assumed the win total wouldn't be that impressive when compared to all the titans who pitched during the eras of four-man rotations that prevailed in baseball until the '80s. I believed it was probably true that averaging about 17 wins a season over a decade while posting an ERA+ of 120 or greater was not all that unusual during many other eras in modern baseball history, and so I decided to check the record book. It turns out I was wrong. Averaging nearly 17 wins a season over a decade while compiling an ERA 20% better than the park-adjusted ERAs of your contemporaries has always been an achievement only the greats have attained. It turns out that this level of excellence over a decade gives a pitcher an almost automatic entree into Cooperstown. By my count, there have been 27 pitchers who accomplished this since 1920. All but four have already been inducted into the Hall of Fame or are almost certain to be inducted upon eligibility. And it further turns out that Guidry's accomplishment is becoming exceedingly rare in the age of the five-man rotation and seven inning starts.

The last pitcher to average as many wins as Guidry did over a decade was Randy Johnson from '97 to '06. Maddux came very close during the same period but finished a win shy of equaling Guidry's 16.9 wins per season. Maddux averaged 16.9 or more wins per decade from '95 to '04 and for each of the preceding seven ten-year periods* (i.e., every ten-year period commencing between 1988 and 1994). Since Guidry, only five pitchers have averaged 16.9 wins or more per season over a ten-year period while compiling an ERA+ of 120 or better: Maddux, Johnson, Clemens, Glavine and Mussina. Only two pitchers currently pitching have a realistic chance at accomplishing the feat any time in the next four years - Halladay and Santana. Halladay needs to win 39 games in the next two seasons to do it. Santana can do it by winning 70 games over the next four years. Although each as a realistic chance, the odds are long. (For the most recent ten-year period - 2000 to 2009 - Andy Pettitte led all major league pitchers with 148 wins.)

Guidry's statistical accomplishments between '77 and '86 were relatively rare even in the day of the four-man rotation, at least in the American League. Just as only Clemens and Mussina matched Guidry's feat in the AL over the 25 years since Guidry did it, only three American League pitchers accomplished the feat in the 30 years before Guidry. Bob Lemon did it for each of the ten-year periods concluding in '55, '56 and '57, averaging 19.7 wins per season with a 122 ERA+ during his best ten-year stretch. Whitey Ford did it for each of the ten-year periods concluding in '63, '64 and '65, averaging 17.3 wins with a 136 ERA+ during his best ten-year stretch. And Jim Palmer did it for each of the ten-year periods ending in '77, '78, '79, '80, '81 and '82, averaging 19.2 wins and a 139 ERA+ from '70 to '79.

In the history of the American League since 1920, only ten pitchers have averaged 16.9 wins per season and a 120 ERA+ over a ten-year span: Grove, Ferrell, Feller, Newhouser, Lemon, Ford, Palmer, Guidry, Clemens and Mussina. Only four other pitchers have averaged 16.9 wins per season in the AL since 1920: Hunter, Morris, Lolich and Wynn. There have been only two ten-year periods in the American League in which as many as two pitchers have accomplished this: Grove and Ferrell from '28 to '37 and Grove and Ruffing from '31 to '40. Feller and Newhouser would have done it within the same ten-year period if Feller hadn't lose four years to military service. In other words, had Guidry's magnificent decade occurred at any other time in AL history since 1920 he would have been one of only three pitchers at most to accomplish this feat in that ten-year period.

There was only one brief era in modern baseball history - the late '60s to late '70s - when there were more than three pitchers in any ten-year period to average 16.9 wins per season while maintaining a 120 or better ERA+. There were five pitchers to accomplish the feat in the decade from '69 to '78: Jenkins, Perry, Palmer, Carlton and Seaver. There were four pitchers in each of the decade periods of '68 to '77 and '71 to '80, and it was the same four pitchers for each period: Perry, Palmer, Carlton and Seaver.

In other words, Guidry's statistical accomplishments from '77 to '86 would have placed him among the very top echelon of elite pitchers in any era, generally accompanied by only one or two other pitchers in averaging nearly 17 wins per season and a 120 ERA+.

* * * * * *

Here's the full roster of pitchers on the 17 wins/120 ERA+ list since 1920, listed in chronological order (click here to see a spreadsheet with the full details of their peak ten-year stretches):

Besides Guidry, there are three other pitchers on this list who failed to make the Hall of Fame. Two of them, Wes Ferrell and Lon Warneke, had their peak years in the '30s. The other, Bucky Walters, had his peak years in the late '30s and during the war years. They had remarkably similar careers, each winning between 192 and 198 games and compiling ERA+s between 115 and 119. Each won between 170 and 175 games during their peak decade, meaning that for each pitcher his peak decade comprised substantially his entire productive career. Of the three, Walters was the only one to receive more than token support among HOF voters, twice topping 20% in the balloting in the mid-60s.

Bill James argues in his recent Gold Mine article that none of these three pitchers have as strong a case as Guidry for inclusion in the Hall. According to Bill, none had as many seasons as Guidry in which he ranked among the very best pitchers in the league, and though each had one or more truly superlative seasons, none had a season of historical significance comparable to Guidry's '78 season. As Bill saw it, Ferrell had a marginal case for the Hall, but Walters and Warneke fell distinctly short of the standards HOF voters have historically applied to pitchers.

I generally agree with Bill's analysis (although I think he sells Ferrell a little short). I would make another point, however. While each of Walters, Ferrell and Warneke was among the leading winners in baseball during his peak decade, their ten-year win totals (175 for Ferrell and Warneke; 170 for Walters) were not particularly notable for the period. Certain of their contemporaries, as well as premier pitchers in succeeding decades, far exceeded their 10-year win totals, with Grove, Hubbell, Spahn, Marichal, Feller, Roberts, Lemon and Jenkins all averaging approximately 20 wins per season or more. Guidry's ten-year total, by contrast, ranks with the very best ten-year win totals during the era of the five-man rotation. Since Guidry's ten-year peak, only Maddux, Glavine and Johnson have eclipsed Guidry's tally by as much as one victory per season, and only Maddux's best 10-year stretch ('92 to '01) topped Guidry's total by two victories per season.

Guidry won almost as many games in a decade as did Ferrell, Warneke and Walters, despite pitching in an era where the five-man rotation and sharp decline in complete games have rendered the 17-win season the functional equivalent of the 20-win gold standard of prior eras. That fact alone would seem to distinguish Guidry from the three other pitchers who have failed to make the Hall despite a decade of averaging 17 wins per season and a 120 or better ERA+, and would seem to dictate that he join the 23 other pitchers who have accomplished this feat and are either already in the Hall or on a glide path to Cooperstown.

* * * * * *

Guidry's ERA+ during his peak decade is roughly equivalent to the peak-decade ERA+ of seven Hall of Fame pitchers on the list of those who averaged 16.9 wins or more and a 120 ERA+ over a ten-year stretch, and it is equal to or better than various Hall of Fame pitchers who didn't make the list. The following HOF pitchers on the list had an ERA+ under 130 during their best 10-year stretch: Bob Lemon (122), Don Drysdale (121), Ferguson Jenkins (123), Mike Mussina (129), Red Ruffing (124), Robin Roberts (123), Steve Carlton (127), Warren Spahn (128). The following HOF pitchers narrowly missed making the list and had an ERA+ during their peak decade roughly equivalent to or lower than Guidry's:

Jim Bunning, 164 wins, 124 ERA+
Don Sutton, 164 wins, 120 ERA+
Nolan Ryan, 160 wins, 116 ERA+
Early Wynn, 188 wins, 116 ERA+
Lefty Gomez, 160 wins, 127 ERA+
Waite Hoyt, 166 wins, 114 ERA+
Eppa Rixey, 166 wins, 119 ERA+
Herb Pennock, 163 wins, 116 ERA+
Catfish Hunter, 184 wins, 111 ERA+

* * * * * *

Let me anticipate the reaction of many: "O.K., Guidry had a ten-year peak comparable to many Hall of Famers, perhaps even most, but he had no career to speak of outside of that ten-year peak, and had a shorter career than virtually all HOF pitchers other than Koufax and Dean." I would respond, simply, by asserting that (i) most HOF pitchers have very little to speak of in terms of HOF-worthy accomplishments outside of their peak decade, and (ii) Guidry's career was as long as, or virtually as long as, more than a dozen HOF pitchers.

Guidry pitched in 14 seasons and pitched enough innings to qualify for the ERA title in ten of those. Guidry's ten full seasons are as many or more than Koufax, Dean, Gomez, Lemon, Walsh, Chesbro, McGinnity, Sutter, Joss and Waddell. The following pitchers only had 11 full major league seasons: Hunter, Newhouser, Vance, Haines and Coveleski. Drysdale and Three-Finger Brown each pitched in 14 major league seasons, twelve of which were substantially full seasons. If Guidry's career was too short, the shortfall seems too insignificant a reason to exclude him from the Hall.

The list of HOF pitchers with far longer careers but virtually no HOF qualifications outside their peak decade is a much longer list. For every Spahn, Maddux or Carlton who truly had more than ten HOF worthy seasons there are two or three HOF pitchers whose accomplishments outside their ten-year peak did little more than pad their career statistics.

Let's begin by taking two very striking examples: Early Wynn and Don Sutton, each of whom had very long careers and joined the cherished 300 win club.

Wynn's peak decade was '50 to '59, during which he won 188 games and had a 116 ERA+. On either side of the that peak decade Wynn was 83-94 with a 92 ERA+ ('39 to '49) and 29-31 with a 105 ERA+ ('60 to '63). Outside of his peak decade, Wynn had two seasons where he won more than 13 games: 1943, when he went 18-12 with a 110 ERA+, and 1947, when he went 17-15 with a 103 ERA+. Neither season was the equal of his average season during his peak decade.

Sutton's peak decade was '71 to '80, in which he won 164 games with a 120 ERA+. On either side of that peak Sutton was 66-73 with a 95 ERA+ ('66 to '70) and 94-81 with a 102 ERA+. Like Wynn, Sutton didn't have a single season outside his decade peak where his W-L record and ERA approached his average season during his peak. Like Wynn, he didn't have a single season outside of his peak that, if replicated over a 10 or 12 season period, would have given him a credible argument for the HOF.

The same is true of many other pitchers who most would agree are greater than Wynn or Sutton. Take Bob Gibson, for example. Gibson had a brilliant peak between '63 and '72, winning 191 games and posting a 136 ERA+. Gibson didn't have a single season outside of that peak decade that would have qualified him for the list I've discussed in this post if replicated over a decade (i.e., 16 or more wins and a 120 ERA+). His '62 season was by many measures an excellent season (he led the league with a 151 ERA+), but his 15-13 record for a winning team was worse than any of his peak decade years.

Carl Hubbell had a ten-year peak very similar to Gibson's where he was a consistently big winner with superlative ERAs. Outside that peak decade he didn't have a single season where he won more than 11 games.

The following HOF or presumptive HOF pitchers didn't have a single season outside their ten-year peak in which they won 15 games and had a 112 or better ERA+: Drysdale, Lemon, Newhouser, Marichal, Wynn, Ruffing, Roberts, Vance, Hubbell, Sutton, Gomez, Hunter, Feller, Coveleski, Pedro Martinez and Curt Schilling. The following pitchers had exactly one such season outside their peak decade: Bunning, Jenkins, Palmer, Gibson, Ryan, Hoyt and Randy Johnson.

The fact is that most HOF pitchers were truly great for a period of about ten years. Pitchers like Walter Johnson, Maddux, Spahn, Clemens and Seaver who had multiple outstanding seasons outside their peak decade are the exception, not the rule. It is clear that Ron Guidry had a peak decade that is comparable to the peak decades of many Hall of Famers - Bunning, Drysdale, Lemon, Wynn, Sutton, Gomez, Hunter, Jenkins, Ruffing and Roberts, among others. It is also clear that none of these pitchers did anything outside of their peak decade that materially added to their HOF qualifications.

* * * * * *

I would humbly submit that by any statistical measure Guidry's HOF qualifications are the equal of Bunning's, Dyrsdale's, Lemon's, Newhouser's, Vance's and Gomez's. To the extent they won more games in their career it is because they pitched in the era of four-man rotations. I would also submit that Guidry's HOF qualifications are the equal of Ruffing's, Hunter's, Sutton's and Niekro's. To the extent they won more games than Guidry they did so primarily because they had many more seasons where they were perhaps competent major league pitchers but not HOF quality pitchers.

There will no doubt be those who argue that many of these pitchers don't meet their particular idea of HOFers. Hunter, Bunning and Drysdale are examples of more recent HOF inductees who are frequently characterized as marginal inductees. Vance, Newhouser, Coveleski, Pennock, Hoyt and Faber are just a few examples of other pitchers who have been deemed by many to be marginal HOFers. I think it is fair to say that Guidry's HOF qualifications stack up pretty well against the qualifications of all the pitchers I've named in this paragraph. If one wants to argue nonetheless that Guidry doesn't belong in the Hall then they are in effect arguing for a much smaller Hall of Fame and for HOF standards that are radically more restrictive than the standards that have been observed for the last 75 years.

P.S. Here's a list of pitchers who just missed making the 17 wins/120 ERA+ list, either because they had too few wins, an ERA+ less than 120 or because some of their peak seasons occurred prior to 1920.
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* Win totals for any pitcher who pitched during strike-shortened '81, '94 and '95 seasons have been adjusted to reflect shortened seasons. For example, Maddux's win totals for any decade that includes both the '94 an '95 seasons was divided by 9.6 rather than 10 because approximately 40% of a season was lost between the premature end to the '94 season and the belated start of the '95 season.

The Sheer Improbability

2010-03-12T12:26:00.000-08:00

My last post on pitchers who won two-thirds of their starts in a season got me to thinking again about Gator's amazing record in September division title races. I noted Lefty Grove's incredible '31 season in which he won 27 of 30 starts, a feat unmatched in baseball history. I noted that Bob Welch won a higher percentage of his starts in 1990 than any pitcher since 1954, and he won only 24 games during his best 30-start stretch.

I've noted before the sheer improbability of winning 26 of any 30 starts selected on the basis of any unbiased criterion. It's highly improbable that a pitcher would win 26 of 30 weekend starts, or starts in day games at home, or starts against teams in your own division. But to get an even clearer idea of how difficult it is to win 26 of any 30 starts, even 30 starts selected by a manifestly biased criteria, consider the following.

Let's make the criterion games in which a great Hall of Fame pitcher received 11 or more runs of support in a start, a very biased criteria because tremendous run support will skew the results toward an extraordinarily high percentage of starts won. Steve Carlton made 32 starts in his career in which he was lavished with 11 or more runs of support. He won 27 of those games, or a slightly lower percentage than Guidry's percentage of wins/start in September pennant races. Don Sutton got 11+ runs of support in 25 starts and won 20. Phil Niekro won 16 of his 21 starts in which he received 11+ runs. Fergie Jenkins had the best record in this category of the pitchers I examined, winning 20 of his 22 starts where he received 11+ runs. All in all, these four Hall of Fame pitchers started exactly 100 games in which they received 11+ runs of support and they won 83. You don't need your calculator to determine that works out to 83%. Ron Guidry won 86.7% of his September starts in division title races.

That's how difficult it is to win 26 of 30 major league starts under even the best of circumstances. Take a Hall of Fame pitcher, give him the run support of his dreams, and he still won't win 26 of 30 starts.

I'll be turning back to Guidry's big-game record in future posts because it is, I believe, the crux of his case for the Hall of Fame, if for no other reason than that most fans, sportswriters and HOF voters are probably unaware of this record. Guidry for some reason isn't associated with the term "big game pitcher" in the same way that various other pitchers are. If you ask most knowledgeable baseball observers to name a big-game pitcher from the '70s and '80s they'll mention Jim Palmer, Tom Seaver, Jack Morris or Luis Tiant. Each of those pitchers was indeed a great big-game pitcher, but Guidry was even better. I think the Veterans Committee of the Hall of Fame should be aware that Guidry was the best big-game pitcher of his generation. It might not be enough to put him over the top, but I think we can all agree that a pitcher's big-game performances are an important qualification for the Hall. It certainly helped put Catfish Hunter in the Hall. It was unquestionably the reason why Bob Gibson was a first-ballot inductee in 1981 and Juan Marichal wasn't. And when Curt Schilling makes the Hall, as he almost certainly will, it will be in no small measure a result of his spectacular big-game record in October.

I obviously believe, with passion and conviction, that Gator belongs in the Hall. If the Veterans Committee disagrees, if they believe his career was too short, or his peak too brief, I'll disagree but I'll respect their judgment. But if the Veterans Committee denies Gator and are unaware that he was one of the greatest big-game pitchers in baseball history, that would be a shame.

Start The Game, Win The Game

2010-03-10T13:18:00.000-08:00

Trivia question: since 1920 there have been only two pitchers to win two-thirds or more of their starts in a season more than twice (minimum 30 starts). Who are they? While you think about that I'll give you some idea of how special this achievement is.

Since 1954 a pitcher has started 30 or more games in a major league season more than 3000 times. Only 30 times has a pitcher started 30 or more games and won two-thirds of his starts. That's less than 1% of the 30-start seasons since 1954.

Since 1954 only four pitchers have accomplished this feat more than once. Can you name them? Here are some hints. Sandy Koufax never did it, narrowly missing in '66. Greg Maddux never did it, either, although he came close in '95 when he won 19 of 29 starts. Whitey Ford came close in '56 and '63, but never did it. Steve Carlton never did it, although he won 27 of his 41 starts in '72.

The following all-time greats did it once: Bob Gibson, Randy Johnson, and Tom Seaver. What year do you think Gibson did it? No, it wasn't '68, it was '70. Doc Gooden did it in his great '85 season. Denny McLain did it in '68 when he won 31 games.

Here are three of the four post-1954 pitchers who did it more than once: Roger Clemens did it twice, in '86 and '90. Juan Marichal did it twice, in '66 and '68. Pedro Martinez did it in '02 and would have done it '99, when he won 22 of his 29 starts. Let's give Pedro credit for that season, however, because he would have done it even if he hadn't won that 30th start.

The answer to our trivia question? Here's another hint first: both pitchers to have won 2/3s of their starts in a season more than twice are lefties. The answer? Lefty Grove did it four times, in '28, '30, '31 and '32. And Ron Guidry did it three times, in '78, '83 and '85. They are the only two pitchers since 1920 to have won 2/3s of their starts in a season more than twice.*

Bob Welch won an extraordinary 77.1% of his starts in 1990. The only other pitcher to have started 30 or more games in a season and won 75% or more of them is Denny McLain in his great '68 season when he won 75.6%. Pedro won 75.9% of his 29 starts in '99. The only other pitchers to have topped the 70% mark are Clemens in '86 (72.7%), Seaver in '69 and Guidry in '78 (71.4%), and Cliff Lee in '08 (71.0%). Dave McNally won precisely 70% of his starts in '71.

The only pitchers since '54 to turn the trick while winning 25 or more games are McLain, Welch, Marichal, Seaver, Guidry, Newcombe and Stone.

Doc Gooden, of course, was the youngest pitcher to turn the trick - 20 years old. Warren Spahn, of course, was the oldest - 42 years old.

Lefty Grove's 1931 season deserves special mention. Grove went 31-4 in '31, making 30 starts and 11 relief appearances. Grove won 27 of his 30 starts. Yes, you read that right: Grove won 90% of his starts in '31. He lost his first start of the season to the Senators. He lost his last start of the season to the Yankees. In between he won 27 of 28 starts, losing only a 1-0 decision to the St. Louis Brownies on August 23rd. Grove was outdueled that day by Dick Coffman, who would go 9-13 for the season and would win finish his career with only 72 wins and a .431 winning percentage. However undistinguished Coffman's career, for one Sunday in August in 1931 he was better than the man many believe to be the greatest pitcher of all time.

Here are some more pre-1954 seasons where pitchers won two-thirds of their starts:

Warren Spahn. In addition to his great '63 season, Spahnie won 23 of his 32 starts in 1953, making him one of the very select club of pitchers two have accomplished the feat more than once.

Hal Newhouser. Prince Hal won 2/3s of his starts in '45 and '46. He almost certainly did it in '44 as well, but splits aren't available for that year. However, unless Hal won 6 of his 13 relief appearances that year (very unlikely) he also won 2/3s of his starts in '44.

Bob Feller. Rapid Robert accomplished the feat twice, in '40 and '51. He also narrowly missed in '39, winning 23 of his 35 starts.

Carl Hubbell. King Carl won 24 of his 34 starts in his great '36 season.

Dizzy Dean. The Diz won 26 of his 33 starts in his great '34 season. He won 24 of 36 the next year.

Robin Roberts. Roberts won 28 of his 37 starts in '52.

Bucky Walters. Bucky won 27 of his 36 starts in '39. He won 2/3s of his starts in '44, too.

Dazzy Vance. Dazzy did it in '24 and '25. Dazzy joins Lefty, Dizzy and Hal Newhouser as the only pitchers to accomplish the feat in consecutive seasons.

Paul Derringer. Oom Paul did it in '39, the same year his teammate Bucky Walters turned the trick. They are the only teammate tandem to ever accomplish the feat.

Lefty Gomez. Lefty won 2/3s of his starts in '32 and '34.

Bob Lemon. Bob won 22 of 33 starts in '54.

That's not a comprehensive pre-1954 list, but it demonstrates how difficult it was for even great pitchers to win 2/3s of their starts in a season.

Here is the full list since 1954, including Pedro's '99 season in which he made only 29 starts:

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* As noted above, Hal Newhouser might have done it, too, but the game logs for 1944 aren't available. However, even if Hal did it three times, two of those times would have occurred during the depleted WWII years.

Leverage Adjusted ERA (Or "Not All Runs Are Equal")

2010-03-08T22:29:00.000-08:00

It's been surprising to me, given the profusion of new pitching statistics (FIP, VORP, Component ERA), that we haven't seen an expression of ERA or ERA+ that adjusts for leverage, weighing runs allowed in high-leverage situations more and runs allowed in low-leverage situations less. The data is available in the game logs at Baseball-Reference.com, but aggregating the data would be a tedious exercise. Fangraphs.com aggregates the data on a seasonal basis in the WPA, WPA/LI and Clutch statistics, but expresses the statistics in terms of incremental games won or lost rather than adjusted ERA.

Fangraphs calculates "Clutch" by subtracting WPA/LI, which aggregates the unleveraged increase or decrease in win probabilities associated with each plate appearance against a pitcher, from WPA, which also aggregates the win probabilities but assigns a leverage factor to each event based on the game situation (score, inning, base and out situation). Generally speaking, a pitcher with a positive Clutch factor performed better in high-leverage situations relative to his overall seasonal performance, or declined in performance in low-leverage situations relative to his overall seasonal performance, or some combination of the two. A better performance in high-leverage situations means that the incremental outs the pitcher got in high-leverage situations count for more than an average out (i.e., an out obtained in a game situation with a leverage factor of 1.0). A worse performance in low-leverage situations means that the incremental runs the pitcher allowed in low-leverage situations count for less than the average run (i.e., a run scored in a game situation with a leverage factor of 1.0).

The significance of the Clutch statistic should be obvious: not all runs allowed (and runs prevented) are equal. For example, the run surrendered in the bottom of the ninth of a tie game should be counted differently than the run surrendered in the bottom of the first inning after the visiting took a six run lead in the top half of the inning. ERA and ERA+ count each run the same, notwithstanding that the two runs I used as examples are likely to have had hugely disparate impacts on the outcome of the game. The advantage of expressing the number of leverage-weighted runs allowed as a variation on ERA should also be obvious: most fans will not know whether a Clutch factor of 0.74 is merely above average, or very good, or a spectacular achievement, but fans know how to compare a 116 ERA+ to a 135 ERA+.

It turns out that a Clutch factor of 0.74 - meaning that the pitcher's clutch performance was worth 0.74 wins for the season - is very high. A Clutch factor of 2.0 in a season is truly spectacular, and 3.0 or above exceedingly rare. Curt Schilling was a spectacular clutch performer in 2001, improving on his usual performance that year by 30% with runners on, by 48% with runners in scoring position and two-out, and by 20% in "late and close" situations. These spectacularly clutch performances translated into 2.03 incremental wins for Schilling as measured by win probabilities added. But if one expresses this same statistic by adjusting his ERA and ERA+ to reflect not only how many runs he allowed, but the impact of these runs given the game situation, what happens to Curt's 2.98 ERA and 157 ERA+ for 2001?

Leverage-adjusted ERA+ (or "LevERA+) is calculated by expressing the 2.03 wins Curt added by virtue of his clutch performance in terms of the equivalent number of runs. The concept of expressing wins in terms of equivalent runs is a common one in sabremetrics, although the appropriate win-to-runs conversion factor is difficult to calculate and varies depending on the league scoring level and "park run environment". Fortunately, Fangraphs has already calculated the conversion factor for us, and it can be found simply by dividing RE24 by REW (here's the Fangraph glossary that describes these two stats). Curt's RE24 for 2001 was 50.87 and his REW was 5.09. That means the appropriate win-to-runs conversion factor for Curt in 2001 was 50.87/5.09, or 9.99 (which is a fairly typical conversion factor in today's game). Multiplying Curt's 2.03 Clutch factor by 9.99 reveals that Curt's clutch performance was the equivalent of allowing 20.28 fewer runs than the 86 runs Curt allowed in 2001, or 23.58% fewer runs. Reducing Curt's earned runs allowed by the same 23.58% results in a figure of 65 leverage-adjusted earned runs (as compared to Curt's actual 85 earned runs in 2001). That means Curt's LevERA in 2001 was 2.28 and his LevERA+ was 205.

This is an extreme example, of course, because a Clutch factor of 2.03 for a season is extremely high. Most pitchers will have a Clutch factor much closer to 0 (that is, they were neither "clutch" nor "anti-clutch") and accordingly a LevERA+ that varies very little from their ERA+.

Just to give a further idea of how extreme Curt's 20 run Clutch improvement was, consider that since 1974 (the date from which the Clutch stats are available at Fangraphs) the largest career Clutch improvements and declines measure less than 100 runs. Curt, oddly enough, had a career Clutch factor of negative 5.26, which translates into 53.4 more runs and 50.75 more earned runs over his career. Again, that may not sound like much but it moves Curt's career ERA+ of 127 to a 122.1 LevERA+. That's still excellent, of course, but it's a difference to which most fans, and certainly most sabremetrically inclined fans, would attach some significance.

Another HOF aspirant with a significantly negative Clutch factor is our old buddy Bert Blyleven. Bert's Clutch factor for the first four seasons of his career - '70 to '73 - are not available, but it can be estimated on the basis of the leverage statistics at Baseball-Reference.com that Bert's Clutch factor for those four years would be slightly negative (very negative in '70, very positive in '71, mildly negative in each of '72 and '73). Let's assume for purpose of calculating career LevERA+ that his Clutch factor was precisely zero for his first years. That leaves Bert with the -3.88 Clutch factor he accumulated from '74 to the end of his career. That translates to 37.12 more runs and 33.48 more earned runs over his career, making Bert's career LevERA+ 115.9.

Here are the top 25 LevERA+'s among pitchers with 2000 or more innings pitched since 1952:

Guidry, Appier, Tudor, Palmer and Santana had the largest increases over ERA+. Maddux and Brown had the largest decreases.

There were three pitchers who ranked in the top 15 in ERA+ but not in LevERA+: Schilling, Smoltz and Mussina. Schilling had the largest drop (127 ERA+, 122.1 LevERA+). Smoltz dropped from a 125 ERA+ to 122.4 LevERA+. Mussina dropped from a 123 ERA+ to a 122.4 LevERA+.

In evaluating levels of run support provided to pitchers, increasing attention has been focused on run distribution and the potential that an adverse run distribution can make a pitcher's run support look better than it really was. A pitcher whose run support as measured by average runs/game scored by his team in his starts may have really received relatively poor run support because he received a very large number of runs in a small number of games, or had a concentration of games at the both the low-end and high-end of the spectrum. Although these kinds of adverse run distribution situations can (and do) occur within seasons, it is very unlikely that the phenomenon could persist over a lengthy pitching career, and I've seen no data that suggests that any pitcher in fact suffered from adverse run distribution over the course of his career.

Very little attention has been paid, however, to the distribution of runs allowed by pitchers, despite the fact that certain pitchers have exhibited distinct tendencies to pitch differently in high-leverage and low-leverage situations. Unlike distribution of run support, adverse distribution of runs allowed is far more likely to persist over a career because of the potential that a given pitcher possesses the tendency to pitch better or worse in high-leverage situations (or pitch better or worse in low-leverage situations, or some combination of the two). LevERA+ is a measure of the impact of the distribution of runs allowed by a pitcher. It reveals that certain pitchers, like Bert Blyleven, contributed to their own mediocre W-L records by performing relatively poorly in critical situations, and it reveals that other pitchers, like Ron Guidry, produced spectacular W-L records not only because of superior run support but because of their superior performance in critical situations.

Did You Know...

2010-03-03T09:11:00.000-08:00

There are eleven pitchers since 1954 who won at least 50% of their starts. Here they are:

Pretty heady company for Gator. I count nine pitchers who are already in the Hall or are mortal locks, and one pitcher - Roy Halladay - who's making a pretty strong case. And then there's Ron Guidry.

Spahn's figure includes just his starts from and after 1954. It is likely that many pitcher's from the pre-1954 era would make this list because pitchers completed a far higher percentage of their starts in those days and accordingly tended to have fewer no-decisions. Pitchers like Walter Johnson, Lefty Grove and Christy Matthewson would probably top this list.

The presence of Guidry, Martinez, Halladay, Mussina and Clemens is impressive because they pitched in an era when pitchers generally incurred no-decisions in more than 20% of their starts. Spahn, Gibson and Marichal, by comparison, had no-decisions in only 12%, 14% and 17% of their starts, respectively.

Randy Johnson just missed the list, winning 49.9% of his starts.Some other notables:

Pettitte, 49.8%
Seaver, 47.9%
Maddux, 47.9%
Morris, 47.6%
Schilling 47.2%
Gooden, 47.1%
Hunter, 46.6%
Carlton, 46.1%
Tiant, 45.2%
Glavine, 44.7%

UPDATE: As of May 1, 2010, here are the top 100 pitchers in terms of percentage of stars won since 1952 (clicking on the preceding link will take you to the spreadsheet at Google Docs):

BlyLeverage

2010-02-28T11:22:00.000-08:00

Bill James did a piece a few years ago on Bert Blyleven in which he addressed the great mystery surrounding Blyleven's conspicuously mediocre W-L record. While conceding that Bert's critics make some good points - "Blyleven did not do an A+ job of matching his effort to the runs he had to work with" - he ultimately concluded that Bert's biggest problem was his lack of run support, not his failure to pitch better in critical situations. Bill attributed roughly two-thirds of Bert's relatively poor record to lack of run support and one-third to Bert's tendency to pitch relatively poorly in tight games.

Bill's analysis was disappointing in certain respects, however. First, he didn't note that Bert's relatively poor career W-L record is almost purely a function of his performance in the first nine years of his career ('70 to '78). Had Bert compiled a W-L record commensurate with his ERAs and run support in the '70s Bert would already be in the Hall and Bill James and I wouldn't be writing about him. Second, Bill didn't discuss Bert's pertinent statistics from this period that likely explain the disparity between Bert's excellent ERAs during that period and his pedestrian W-L record. As I've previously noted, Bert had terrible record in "late and close situations" in that period, far worse than any premier pitcher of that era that I've examined, and lost a disproportionate number of close games. While it strikes me as reasonable and logical to infer that a pitcher who performs poorly in the late innings of tight games will lose a disproportionate number of close games, I thought I'd look at the records of various pitchers in one-run games and attempt to determine if there is any significant correlation between a pitcher's performance in close games and his record in one-run games.

I began by identifying pitchers who either distinctly improved their performance in high-leverage situations or exhibited a distinct decline in performance in high-leverage situations.* I then compiled their records in relatively low-scoring one-run games in which they started and pitched at least 5 innings, reasoning that higher-scoring one-run games and games in which they pitched fewer than five innings are less a function of their performance and more a function of other factors. Accordingly, I looked at one-run games with scores of 4-3, 3-2, 2-1 and 1-0. A comparison of these one-run games to Bill James's data on all one-run games pitched by the pitchers referenced in his Blyleven article indicated no significant differences, meaning that none of the pitchers performed materially differently in higher-scoring one-run games.

Here are the pitchers in the two categories:

To begin with, one thing ought to be perfectly clear: you can't draw any inference from this list about who may be clutch and who may not. I don't care if Bob Gibson and Catfish Hunter exhibited a decline in performance in high-leverage situations - you can't tell me they weren't clutch.

Now, to the analysis. The six pitchers who improved in HL situations improved by an average of 7.5%, ranging from Guidry at 3% to Palmer at 13%. The nine pitchers who declined in HL situations did so by an average of 7.44%, ranging from Gibson at 2% to Rogers at 18% (I probably should have excluded Gibson, the only pitcher whose performance varied by less than 3%, but I left him in to make the point that this analysis is not intended to be any kind of dispositive argument about clutchness). The six improvers had a winning percentage of .614 in one-run games in which they started and pitched at least five innings. The six decliners had a winning percentage of .520 in such games. The correlation coefficient between performance in HL situations and one-run game winning percentage was a fairly strong .69.

There were outliers in each category. Ford improved by 6% in HL situations but had only a 32-29 record in one-run games (but, as with Gibson and Hunter, you can't tell me Whitey wasn't clutch). On the other end, Carlton and Sutton each declined by 12% but had winning percentages of .566 and .545, respectively. The best record in one-run games was Koufax, who had a winning percentage of .682 (and improved in HL situations by 6%). The worst record in one-run games was Blyleven, who had a winning percentage of .432 (and declined in HL situations by 6%).

This is obviously a very small sample set. There are more pitchers in the "decline" category than the "improve" category simply because that category seemed to fill out faster (primarily because I began by looking at pitchers referenced in James's Blyleven article and most of them just happened to exhibit performance declines in HL situations). I'm considering adding more pitchers to the analysis but compiling the records of one-run games is a fairly tedious exercise. If I can bring myself to pore through the game logs I'll update this analysis.
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* I opted to go with the high-leverage statistics at Baseball-Reference.com rather than the "late and close" statistics for various reasons but principally because the "late and close" statistics are just too narrow for this purpose, excluding anything before the sixth inning and even many situations in the late innings in which the difference in the score is only two runs. Additionally, "late and close" statistics have become increasingly less relevant over the last 30 years, as pitchers accumulate very few innings beyond the sixth inning. Whereas the "late and close situation" typically constituted between 15% and 20% of a pitcher's innings in the '60s and '70s, they generally constitute less than 10% of a contemporary pitcher's innings.

Welcome To The Club, Bill

2010-02-28T06:31:00.000-08:00

Bill James is coming out shortly with his Bill James Gold Mine 2010. He has a chapter in the book entitled "Comparing Starting Pitchers Across History." The chapter has been pre-released online and you can read it here.

In this chapter, Bill returns to one of his favorite subjects: Hall of Fame standards for starting pitchers. He's noted many times in the past that Hall of Fame voting in recent years appears to reflect a movement away from traditional HOF standards for starting pitchers toward an emphasis on longer careers and the accumulation of huge career statistics (high career win totals, strikeouts, etc.). If it were up to today's HOF voters would pitchers like Drysdale, Lemon, Newhouser, Bunning, Hunter, Gomez and Dean be in the Hall of Fame? It's not at all clear.

Bill introduces a system based on something called "Season Scores"* that awards points to a pitcher for ranking among the top starting pitchers in the league and awards bonus points for a particularly dominant season: for ranking as the top pitcher in the league, leading the league in Season Score by 50 points or more, and compiling a historically high Season Score. A pitcher can accumulate a maximum of 9 bonus points, three for each of the three achievements listed in the preceding sentence. Bill identified twelve seasons since 1930 in which a pitcher earned the maximum 9 bonus points. Oddly, this hasn't been achieved since Doc Gooden's 1985 season; not Pedro, not Randy, not Roger, not Greg. Here are the twelve seasons:

Grove, '30 and '31
Hubbell, '33
Dean, '34
Roberts, '52
Koufax, '63, '65, '66
McLain, '68
Carlton, '72
Guidry, '78
Gooden, '85

The method for calculating Seasons Scores and then cumulating to arrive at a career HOF-worthy point total is rather prosaic and so I won't go into the precise method here. It is notable less for sophisticated statistical analysis than for the high correlation between top Season Scores and the balloting that awards Cy Young's and HOF inductions. It is, in other awards, an insight into the approach the baseball writers have used, wittingly or unwittingly, in evaluating pitchers for the Hall and for Cy Young Awards. Bill found that his system very accurately predicts which pitchers make the Hall, at least among pitchers who retired prior to 1990; after that the system breaks down, in the sense that various pitchers who've accumulated enough career HOF-worthy point totals to have traditionally qualified for induction have failed to even merit serious consideration among HOF voters. Dwight Gooden and David Cone are two such examples.

Bill identifies only two pitchers who retired prior to 1990, accumulated career HOF-worthy point totals well in excess of the traditional requirement, and yet have failed to make the Hall. Bill calls these two the "true outliers" in the analysis. They are Bert Blyleven (of course) and Ron Guidry. As Bill puts it:

"Blyleven and Guidry are so far above the Hall of Fame line that one would think that their Hall of Fame selection would not be an issue. Blyleven, of course, has become a popular candidate. Guidry has not."

Bill's system for comparing starting pitchers across history has led to a re-evaluation by Bill of Guidry's HOF qualifications, although it's important to note that Bill doesn't claim that his system is the "right" system or is preferable to the judgments of the HOF balloters. Accordingly, he doesn't really take a position on whether Blyleven or Guidry belong in the Hall, in his own estimation, but merely concludes that they belong in the Hall if the standard is the one historically used by HOF voters.

Bill returns to his "Guidry and Gomez" comparison that he's made before, most notably in his Historical Baseball Abstract. But whereas Bill formerly believed that Gomez was a marginal HOF inductee, and Guidry a shade behind Gomez in his qualifications, he now believes that both are clear HOFers and that Guidry is actually more deserving.

"In the past, I have analyzed this comparison in this way:

1) Gomez was fortunate to make the Hall of Fame, being very marginally qualified,

2) Guidry was similar but a little bit behind Gomez, thus not in a range where his Hall of Fame selection was likely,

3) Gomez had three outstanding seasons; Guidry only one, 1978, and

4) Gomez made the Hall of Fame, in part, based on his post-career reputation as an entertainer and ambassador for the game.

But the implications of this new method are totally incompatible with that analysis. As this method sees it, putting Gomez in the Hall of Fame was not a reach. Gomez is well qualified based on the number of high-quality seasons that he produced. And Guidry, rather than ranking behind Gomez, in fact ranks far ahead of him."

Bill then examines his rankings of Guidry among the league's best pitchers in various seasons and observes that "Guidry [had] four seasons among the league's four best pitchers, and he was competing in a 14-team league. Gomez had four such seasons, competing in an eight-team league."

Bill sums it up this way:

"By Guidry's era, career win totals had come to dominate the Hall of Fame discussion. Perhaps this is right; perhaps it is wrong. I am not suggesting that my new method here should substitute for all other judgments about Hall of Fame selections, not at all. There are many other ways to look at the issue. Perhaps those other ways are better.

But while those other pitchers have 100+ wins more than Guidry, Guidry's winning percentage was far better than Carlton's, or Sutton's, or Niekro's, or Kaat's, or Tommy John's, or Ryan's, or Blyleven's or Gaylord Perry's; it was even far better than Tom Seaver's. Guidry was further over .500 - wins minus losses - than most of those pitchers.

Steve Carlton's ERA was 41 points better than the league norm for this career. Don Sutton's ERA was 45 points better-than-league, Tommy John's was 42 points better, Blyleven's 50 points better. Jim Kaat was 15 points better than league. Ron Guidry's ERA was 76 points better than the league average.

I am merely pointing this out: in general, through baseball history, pitchers who have this many seasons as one of the best pitchers in their league have been almost automatic Hall of Fame selections. Historically, the Hall of Fame has made room for all pitchers with 250+ wins, but also for pitchers who were more dominant in shorter careers."

Well put, Bill. Your analysis is already driving some of the stat geeks crazy, but your point is nonetheless valid. Ron Guidry does indeed belong in the Hall of Fame. Even forgetting many of the aspects of Guidry's career I've discussed in this blog, Ron still qualifies for the Hall based on the standards employed by the HOF in the first 60 years of HOF balloting. Throw in the fact that he was the best big-game pitcher of his generation and it's a no-brainer.

I know Bill will insist he wasn't campaigning for Ron's induction, but I'm inviting him into the "Put Gator In The Hall" club anyway.

On The Subject of "Clutch"

2010-02-21T09:36:00.000-08:00

It's a word you hear a lot about in discussions of athletics. It's a given among most sports fans and commentators that some performers are clutch and some aren't. Does anyone dispute that Michael Jordan was clutch? Does anyone dispute that John Elway was clutch? We all remember those game-winning shots and game-winning 4th quarter drives. Those were clutch, right? Ron Guidry's 26 wins in 30 September pennant race starts? That's gotta be clutch, doesn't it? And does anyone really dispute that Derek Jeter is clutch?

Well, yes, some people do dispute that Derek Jeter is clutch. And, frankly, they make some pretty good points. They correctly caution us that we should be careful about placing too much emphasis on "the flip" in '01 in the ALDS against the A's, or the walk-off home run in '01 against the D'backs in game 4 of the 2001 World Series. And they're right about relying on anecdotalism, or isolated instances of "clutch plays", or, more generally, very small sample sets. Those may have been clutch plays, but do they necessarily make Derek Jeter a clutch player? They point out that Derek Jeter in the post-season is pretty much like Derek Jeter in the regular season - almost identical batting average, OPS, and just a little bit more HR power in Oct/Nov than in April to September. Jeter's not being "clutch", they argue; he's merely being Jeter.

Reggie Jackson? Surely a .755 slugging average across five World Series establishes beyond question Reggie's clutch bona fides, right? Well, what about those 11 ALCS series, the skeptics ask. Those were big games, too, and Reggie slugged .380 and had an OBP under .300.

Here's Bill James on the subject of "clutch":

"The prominence of clutch performance as an element in player ratings can be attributed to three factors: (1) Hero worship journalism; (2) Self-aggrandizement by athletes, particularly retired athletes serving as TV announcers; (3) The fact that we all need, at times, to escape the implications of our logic."

Bill then cites ex-athletes like Joe Morgan, Ray Knight and Reggie Jackson as commentators who have a tendency to cast every contest as a "test of character, determination, and fortitude."

"My attitude toward this can probably be inferred from my tone. I do not believe that athletes are better people than the rest of us, I do not believe that athletic contests are tests of character, and I do not believe that there is any such thing as an ability to perform in clutch situations. It's just a lot of poppycock."

While rejecting the notion of an ability to perform in the clutch, however, Bill agrees that certain players have performed so well in clutch situations, for whatever reason, that they deserve credit for it and extra consideration when assessing their historical standing.

Bill contrasts Don Drysdale and Bob Gibson to illustrate his point. Bill cites Gibson's well-known big-game reputation, his tremendous performance down the stretch in the 1964 NL pennant race, and his remarkable World Series record (7-2, seven straight wins, two game 7 victories, 2 World Series MVPs) and contrasts Gibson's clutch achievements with Drysdale's pennant race performances.

"This is an absolute fact that doesn't change depending on how you feel about it: Don Drysdale started 13 games in his career in the heat of the pennant race against the team the Dodgers were trying to beat - and never won. Not even once. He never pitched particularly well without winning; 0 for 13.*

"I don't believe that this reflects a character failing on Drysdale's part. I think it's just something that happened. Sometimes he had been overworked; sometimes maybe a pitch or two got away from him. Sometimes you make good pitches and get beat. If there was a big game next week, I'd as soon have Drysdale pitching for me as anybody else.

"Nonetheless, it did happen; he did, in general, pitch poorly in pennant races (with some exceptions), and he did repeatedly fail to beat the Dodger's kep opponent in the heat of the pennant race. In rating Drysdale's career, is this something that should be ignored, or something that should be considered?"

Bill answers his own question directly and succinctly, stating "if a player really does come through in big games or fail in big games, I don't think we can afford to ignore that."

Bill then argues that there are, in his opinion, about 20 players who should be rated up or down "a little bit" because of their clutch performances. In addition to Drysdale and Gibson, Bill mentions five other players for whom the clutch factor would figure in Bill's analysis: Yogi Berra, Joe Carter, George Brett, Steve Garvey and Reggie Jackson. Although Bill doesn't say so, I think it's fairly clear that each of these five would be uprated by Bill for clutch performance. But Bill doesn't explain why, and it's really not clear to me what Bill's methodology was in arriving at these five examples. If it's post-season performance (and I believe that is what Bill primarily relied on) then it should be noted that none of these players have aggregate post-season numbers that put them among the all-time post-season performers (with the possible exception of Reggie Jackson). And each of them have very notable chinks in their post-season records. The point is this: why these guys but not Lou Gehrig? Henry Aaron? Lou Brock? Allie Reynolds? Lefty Gomez? Babe Ruth? Mickey Mantle?

The fact is that there were two different Yogi Berras in the World Series - the one that hit .188 in his first five World Series and the one that was a fire-breathing monster in the next 7 Series in which he played. Gehrig and Ruth virtually never had a poor World Series - why don't they deserve Bill's uprate?

Why Joe Carter? His aggregate post-season numbers are even weaker than his generally mediocre regular season numbers. And he only played in five post-season series. What about Lou Brock and Henry Aaron, each of whom may have played in only three post-season series but put up numbers that are off the charts? And if it's Carter's World Series winning walk-off HR in the '93 WS that qualifies as a clutch uprate for Bill, then what about Bill Mazeroski, whose HR to win the classic 7 game Series in 1960 is even bigger than Carter's walk-off, and whose aggregate post-season numbers are far better than Carter's? Or what about Mantle, who hit more hugely consequential World Series HRs than anyone?

Well, Bill himself pointed out that the subject of clutch performance is inevitably very subjective and, as he put it so eloquently, "it's a dangerous area to get into, because when you reach into the bullshit dump, you're not going to come out with a handful of diamonds."

Still, you can't avoid the whole "clutch" debate; it's a classic sports fan subject. And it's a subject that in many ways is an implicit premise of this blog about so-called big-game pitchers. There are some players who were so undeniably great in big games, in tight pennant races, or in post-season competition that you have to take notice. And in the final analysis, I suppose I don't care if these performances were the result of some innate clutch gene, or some identifiable super-ability in the clutch. These performances occurred, they took place in the biggest games on the biggest stage, and the implications for their team and for baseball history were profound. So I'm with Bill, here: I don't think we can afford to ignore that.
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* Bill, although generally correct about Drysdale's conspicuously poor record in September against other contenders, is simply wrong in his claim that Drysdale never won such a game. Drysdale beat the Giants on September 19, 1959 to draw the Dodgers even with the Giants with six games to go, pitching six innings, giving up one unearned run and striking out 8; and Drysdale beat the Pirates on September 15, 1966 to put the Dodgers up by 2.5 games over the Pirates with 17 games to go, going 8.2 innings and giving up 5 hits and 3 runs.

Bill James Ranks The Lefties

2010-02-20T06:32:00.000-08:00

Bill James ranked the 100 greatest pitchers in baseball history in The New Bill James Historical Baseball Abstract. The book was written after the 1999 season (and ultimately published in 2001) and consequently greats like Roger Clemens, Greg Maddux, Randy Johnson, Pedro Martinez and Mariano Rivera are not as elevated in James's rankings as they would be today (ranking 11th, 14th, 29th, 49th and unranked, respectively). Based on more recent commentary by James I think it's pretty clear that Randy Johnson, in particular, would make a huge jump in James's ranking.

Here is James's list of the top 20 southpaws of all time through 1999 (my list is here; open it up in a new window and do a side-by-side comparison of the lists):

A pretty good list, Mr. James. Bill's list is based on his Win Shares analyses, which combine career Win Shares, top three Win Share seasons, Win Shares over the pitcher's best five consecutive seasons and career Win Shares per season. Accordingly, Bill has Sandy Koufax ranked ahead of Steve Carlton despite having barely half Carlton's career Win Shares.

Bill's top 10 would look pretty much the same today, I believe, with two exceptions: Randy Johnson would jump ahead of Koufax and probably even Spahn, taking the two spot behind Grove; and Glavine would likely crack the top 10 given his superior 2000 to 2002 seasons (55-27, 133 ERA+).

It's harder to speculate about what Bill's second 10 would look like today. Bill and his buddy Rob Neyer seem to think fairly highly of Andy Pettitte (Bill has said Andy will likely make the Hall of Fame, and Neyer has said that Andy is "qualitatively" better than Jack Morris). And Johan Santana is probably already on the cusp of Bill's second 10. However, the presence of Wilbur Cooper and Eppa Rixey on Bill's list suggests to me that he perhaps adhered too slavishly to his Wins Shares index, and I don't think either Pettitte or Santana fare too well on that basis (although Santana will certainly get there with another four or five good years).

Bill has seven pitchers ranked ahead of Guidry who I'd ranked behind: Plank, Newhouser, Waddell, Cooper, Pierce, John and Kaat. Conversely, Bill has Gomez ranked one spot behind Guidry whereas I had ranked Gomez one spot ahead of Guidry. The difference between our approaches to Plank and Waddell is easily explainable: I copped out and argued that it was simply to difficult to compare "deadball era" pitchers to post-1920 era pitchers. As for the rest, this is my take on Bill's take:

Newhouser. Bill seems to hold Prince Hal in unusually high regard. It's not clear to me how Bill weights the War Years, but it seems as if he doesn't discount them as much as I do. He also made a couple of very strange claims about Newhouser's post-War Years in his Historical Baseball Abstract, arguing that Newhouser was the best pitcher in the AL in '47 and '48. Well, it was Feller in '47 and, for my money, either or both Gene Bearden and Bob Lemon were better than Hal in '48 (I admit, Hal's and Lemon's numbers in '48 are pretty damn similar, but Lemon pitched TEN shutouts, and that tipped the balance to Bob). Anyway, I had Prince Hal 14th on my list of post-1920 lefties.

Cooper. Cooper was good, and very consistent, between '16 and '24, but I think Bill's ranking of Cooper is a case of too much reliance on the Win Shares analysis. Also, while consistency is certainly a virtue, Bill seems to value it more highly than I do. See the discussion of Jim Kaat, below. Cooper was honorable mention on my list (i.e., not in the top 15).

It's difficult to tell what Bill thought of Cooper, with Cooper's mini-bio in Bill's Abstract consisting only of two extended quotes from two other writers that dealt more with Cooper's personality than his pitching.

Pierce. I, too, am a Billy Pierce fan (perhaps I just fancy slightly built lefthanded power pitchers), but he barely missed my list of the top 15 post-1920 lefties. Here are my two reservations regarding Billy.

First, in considering his excellent W-L record during his peak (i.e., '51 to '60) you have to recall that the White Sox had some very good teams in those years. In fact, the White Sox had a cumulative .568 winning percentage over that decade; Billy managed a .584 winning percentage over that period. That's not much of a difference.

Second, Billy seemed to disappear a bit on the Chisox down the stretch of those '50s pennant races. Take his great '55 season, for instance (1.97 ERA, 199 ERA+). The White Sox were half a game up on the Yanks and 1.5 games up on the Indians when Billy took the mound against the Indians on Sept. 3, but he gave up 8 hits and 6 walks in 5.1 innings and lost, 6-1. A week later he faced the Yanks and couldn't make it out of the 2nd inning, giving up 6 runs in 1.1 innings. Ten days later, with the White Sox now five games back of the Yankees but still alive, Billy lost to the Indians and Early Wynn, 3-2, eliminating the Sox from the pennant race.

In 1953 the Sox were just 6.5 games back of the Yanks after Billy shutout the Tigers on August 14th, but Billy won only two more game the rest of the way, and his second win was on the last day of the season, long after the Sox had been eliminated.

In '57 the Sox were staying within striking distance of the Yanks through August and September (between 4 and 6.5 games back for most of those two months), but Billy went only 5-5 with a 5.04 ERA in August and September, after taking a 15-7 record and 2.45 ERA into August. He was hammered in both his starts against the Yanks down the stretch, giving up 9 earned runs in 10.1 innings.

And when the Sox finally won the pennant in '59 Billy struggled down the stretch, winning only two games in August and September. It was the same story in '60 - the Sox were right there with the Yanks and Orioles in August and September, but Billy pitched very poorly over his last 8 starts (ironically, the Sox won six of those starts anyway, despite Billy averaging less than 4.5 innings per start and posting a 5.14 ERA).

I don't think these late season swoons figured into Bill's analysis at all. They figure into mine, however, and they exerted a pretty heavy drag on Pierce's ranking in my list of all-time lefties.

John. Honorable mention on my list. He was a big winner when healthy for the Dodgers and Yanks in the late '70s and in 1980. And he was consistently good even during his abbreviated seasons. But there were just too many seasons when he didn't make enough starts, didn't pitch enough innings, and therefore didn't have enough impact.

Kaat. Bill has an extended take on Kaat in the Abstract, and emphasizes how consistent Kaat was during the '60s and '70s. It's true, Kaat was very consistent, but he was too often consistently mediocre from '68 to '73, during a period that should have been the peak of his career (ages 29 to 34). I've lauded Kaat in this blog - for his back-to-back 20 win seasons for poor White Sox teams in '74 and '75, and for his spectacular stretch run in the great four-team pennant scramble of '67 - but I had Kaat ranked 15th on my list of post-1920 lefties, five spots behind Guidry.

All in all, I think Bill's list is pretty similar to mine. And even if Bill is right and Guidry is the 14th best post-1920 southpaw rather than the 10th, I still think he belongs in the Hall.

If You Had To Win One Game...

2010-02-18T05:36:00.000-08:00

If you had to choose one pitcher to start a critical, late September game in a tight division race, who would you choose? Sabathia? Halladay? Santana? Carpenter?

I know who I would choose, and you know who I'd choose, too, because his picture is to the right. I'd choose Roy Oswalt, the Astros ace, hands down. Year after year Roy has put up Guidry-like numbers in September with the Astros in contention for a division title or wild-card spot. He's as close to infallible in a battle for the post-season as any pitcher of his generation.

Thanks to the three division, wild-card format, the Astros have been in contention for a post-season berth in every year of Oswalt's career other than 2007 and 2009. Oswalt has made 40 September starts in the seven tight races in which he's participated and his record is 28-7 with a 2.49 ERA in 267.1 innings pitched. However, two of his losses came in late September 2002 after the Astros had been eliminated (the only two starts of his 40 September starts that occurred after the Astros had either clinched or been eliminated). Take away those starts and Oswalt is 28-5 with a 2.39 ERA in 38 September starts while the Astros were still in contention.

And Roy's been getting better as he goes along. In his last five post-season races ('03, '04, '05, '06 and '08) he is 24-3 with a 2.33 ERA. In his last two - '06 and '08 - he's 10-1 with a 1.64 ERA. Four times Roy has won five games in September in the heat of races for the post-season, a feat matched only by Ron Guidry since 1954.

Over his last 30 September starts in tight races, Oswalt has won 24 games. As I said, Guidry-esque.

Throw in his 4-0 post-season record and it should be pretty obvious why Roy is my go-to guy.

There is no doubt that Roy is a late starter and fast closer; his August and September career statistics are vastly superior to his career statistics for the first four months of the season. But Roy's spectacular numbers in the heat of post-season races are more than just a function of his fast finishes. As I mentioned, the Astros were out of contention in September in only two of Roy's seasons - '07 and '09 - during which Roy made seven starts, going 0-2 with a 4.73 ERA in 40 innings. Throw in the last two starts of 2002 (after the Astros had been eliminated) and Roy's career record in September when the Astros are not contending is 0-4 in nine starts with a 4.76 ERA in 51 innings. That's right: 28-5 when it meant the most, but 0-4 when it meant little or nothing.

It's pretty plain that Roy likes the big stakes, thrives on pressure, and wants the ball in the big games. There's a term for guys like that. They're called "big game pitchers," and they are just about the most precious commodity in major league baseball.

Demythologizing Bert's Famous "Bad Luck"

2010-01-30T10:57:00.000-08:00

The June 1976 SI article was published shortly after Bert's first appearance with the Rangers, in which Bert and Mark "The Bird" Fidrych each went 11 innings, with the Tigers prevailing, 3-2. Including Bert's last two starts with the Twins, this made the third consecutive start where Bert had pitched well and been tied going into the late innings but lost. But the SI article wasn't a product of Bert's disappointing results in tight games over the preceding few weeks. The SI article was prompted by two conspicuous aspects of Bert's record that had persisted for years. First, Bert's W-L record never seemed to match the rest of his record - the superior ERAs, the shutouts, the complete games and the strikeouts. Second, Bert had a propensity to lose a lot of close games in the late innings.

Bert's fanatical supporters always have two deceptively simple explanations at the ready for Bert's mediocre W-L records in the '70s: he received poor run support, and he was unlucky. Each of these two rationalizations offered by Bert's backers fail completely to explain Bert's relatively poor W-L records, and each are particularly absurd for having been offered by people who purport to possess some degree of sophistication in statistical analysis. Each can be dismissed quickly and definitively.

Run Support. Bert's run support was slightly below average for much of the '70s. In this respect, Bert's backers are correct. But Bert's run support in the '70s was enough so that a pitcher with Bert's record of stinginess in allowing runs should have had a W-L percentage of approximately .600!

Bert had completed six seasons in the major leagues when the SI article appeared in June 1976, and had allowed an average of 3.16 runs/game while receiving approximately 4.0 runs/game from the Twins. Plug those two figures into the so-called Pythagorean Theorem with which any of Bert's statistically inclined supporters is familiar and you receive a projected winning percentage of approximately .615. Bert's actual winning percentage from 1970 to 1975 was .528. The Pythagorean Theorem suggests Bert should have been able to compile his .528 winning percentage while receiving only 3.35 runs/game from the Twins.

This disparity between Bert's actual record and his projected Pythagorean record persisted for the remainder of the '70s. At the end of the decade, Bert's winning percentage was .536. The Pythagorean Theorem says Bert should have had a winning percentage of .602.

To put it another way, if Bert's run support in the '70s had been 3.3 runs/game, Bert's backers would have a point about poor run support accounting for Bert's poor W-L record. But Bert's run support was approximately 4.0 runs/game during the decade, approximately 20% higher than the 3.3 runs/game that might have explained Bert's .536 winning percentage.

Bad Luck. It is particularly curious that Bert's backers would resort to this argument, one borne of superstition and anti-rationalism rather than the rigorous statistical analysis Bert's backers purport to favor. It is a wholly unworthy argument - even silly - for two simple reasons. First, the suggestion that Bert's "bad luck" could persist for a solid decade, across 350 starts and more than 2600 innings, following Bert from Minnesota to Texas to Pittsburgh, is pure nonsense as a statistical matter. Second, it is particularly nonsensical given the abundance of statistical evidence demonstrating that Bert had an astoundingly bad record in tight, low-scoring games and that this record was attributable to Bert's unusually poor performance in the late innings of tight games.

The rap on Blyleven, as expressed in the SI article, was that you could get to him in the late innings, and the statistics bear out that reputation. The following table shows Bert's performance in "late and close" situations (i.e., plate appearances against Bert in the 7th inning or later with the batting team tied, ahead by one, or the tying run at least on deck).

The pertinent numbers here are in the last two columns - the tOPS+ (Bert's OPS+ in late and close situations relative to his general OPS+ for the season) and the sOPS+ (Bert's OPS+ in late and close situations relative to the general league-wide OPS+, which by definition is 100 each year). Throughout the '70s Bert suffered declines in performance in late and close situations greater than any other elite pitcher of the era - his tOPS+ for the decade was 119. From 1980 to the end of his career the more mature Bert compiled a very good 86 tOPS+. Not coincidentally, Bert's winning percentage of .533 after 1979 almost exactly matches his projected Pythagorean winning percentage of .530, a stark contrast to the huge disparity between Bert's actual and Pythagorean winning percentages in the '70s.

Bert's improved performance in late and close situations from '80 to the end of his career coincided with a dramatic drop in the number of plate appearances against Bert in late and close situations. During the '70's approximately 14% of the plate appearances against Blyleven came in late and close situations. This figure dropped to less than 9% after 1979. This change is explained primarily by the fact that Bert was pulled from the game earlier in the '80's when he got in trouble in late and close situations, which contributed greatly to Bert's improved late and close performances later in his career. Consequently, Bert faced on average more than 8 batters per late and close game in the '70s, but just over 6 batters from '80 to the end of his career. This trend started in '79, when plate appearances against Bert in late and close situations dropped dramatically as a result of Chuck Tanner's decision to pull Bert at the first sign of trouble. The strategy worked spectacularly for the Pirates, who won 23 of Bert's 37 starts that year (a .622 winning percentage) despite the fact that in the great majority of Bert's 20 no-decisions he left the game either tied or behind.

The late and close statistics reveal that in the seven seasons preceding Tanner's '79 "quick hook" strategy, Bert had five seasons in which his tOPS+ was greater than 130 and his sOPS+ was 100 or greater. During these seven seasons Bert's tOPS+ was 128. No other elite pitcher of the era comes close to this record of performance decline in late and close situations over such an extended period. Bert's sOPS+ was 105, meaning that in these five seasons Bert was an average or below average pitcher in late and close situations. Of the other premier pitchers of the era who, like Bert, had a dozen or more seasons in which they faced 100 or more batters in late and close situations, no other pitcher had more than three seasons in which their tOPS+ was greater than 130 and the sOPS+ was greater than 100. Steve Carlton and Gaylord Perry each had three such seasons and a fourth season that nearly qualified, but these were spread over careers more than 20 years long. The occurrence of five such seasons in a period of seven years during the peak of Blyleven's career explains to a significant degree the striking discrepancy between his actual W-L record and the kinds of W-L records projected by the Pythagorean Theorem.

Boswell on Blyleven (or, "Bert Backers Bash Boswell")

2010-01-25T07:51:00.000-08:00

Of all the commentary in the aftermath of the HOF voting results I was most struck by the following comments by Thomas Boswell during the course of an online chat at the Washington Post website:

"The push for Blyleven drives me crazy. I follwed his whole career. His reputation was that, more than any other top stuff pitcher, he would find a way to lose or not to win. He's just not a HOFer, in my book. He only won 20 games one time and more than 17 only twice! And he pitched in the era when top starters got 4-5 more starts a year and 20 wins was easier. BB had nine seasons with 36-to-40 starts and averaged 38 in those years. When Chuck Tanner got him in Pittsburgh the word went around that Chuck had decided, over BB's protestations, to take him out of late-and-close games because he'd never had the stomach for it. 'Take him out before he can lose.' Tanner never said it in public. But BB's winning opercentage gets better."

Photo Left: Thomas Boswell

Well, we'll never know what was in Chuck Tanner's head, and Chuck is a classy guy and he ain't sayin'. But we do know the following: Boswell is absolutely correct regarding Blyleven's reputation, and Chuck Tanner did indeed resort to a quick hook with Blyleven beginning in the 1979 season, a strategy that succeeded wildly and was a critical part of the Bucs' march to the World Series that year.

I get the impression a lot of Bert Backers are too young to have closely followed the game back in the '70s, but Bert's reputation as a guy who lost the close ones and stumbled in the late innings of tight games is simply a fact, and also a matter of record. That was Bert's reputation; Boswell remembers it correctly. I remember it, too, and anyone else who followed the game back then would also remember it. Of course, reputations aren't always earned, and reputations in baseball are sometimes born unfairly out of an incident or two, or out of nothing at all.

However, if the issue is whether Bert actually had the reputation claimed by Boswell, we don't have to rely on Boswell's recollection. Bert's reputation for "finding a way to lose", as Boswell put it, was the subject of a Sports Illustrated article in 1976 published shortly after Bert's trade from the Twins to the Rangers, entitled "The Stuff, and No Nonsense: As a Texas Ranger He is Richer, But Will He Pay Attention?"

After recounting the rather ugly facts regarding Bert's infamous exit from Minnesota (i.e., Bert's heated salary dispute with Twins owner Clark Griffith and his flip-off to Twins fans after Bert's last appearance for the Twins) and offering a comic tableau of Bert losing a battle of concentration with a resin bag, the article shifted to the crux of the matter: "However, what was really at issue was not Blyleven's bad manners or the size of his paycheck, but whether he might now become the big winner so many think he ought to be." The following two paragraphs of the SI article neatly capture the gist of the matter.

When Blyleven does lose, his downfalls seem to occur in the late innings. For this he has blamed the Twins' relievers. Given a better bullpen, he claims "I would have 40 more career victories."

But many baseball people believe his late-inning reversals have been mostly his own doing. "Bert throws basically two pitches," says Bonds, "a hard fastball and a hard curveball. Everything comes in at the same speed, so sooner or later you can get your timing down. It takes a few innings and by then maybe Bert's lost a bit off his fastball. It starts to flatten out. And maybe in later innings his curveball will hang every so often."

Bert's problems in late and close situations were common knowledge in baseball, although the theories for the problem varied. (None of the theories, however, focused on the Twins bullpen; notwithstanding Bert's claim of 40 lost victories, Bert lost only 11 wins to bullpen malfunctions between '70 and '76, fewer than Niekro, Kaat, Hunter, Ken Holtzman, Joe Coleman, Andy Messersmith, Carl Morton, Fritz Peterson and Dave McNally, among others.)

The SI article used virtually the precise language used by Boswell in recollecting Bert's reputation as a pitcher who pitched just well enough to lose.

If Blyleven's parts have seemed greater than the whole, he attributes it to his struggles with a mediocre team. But as Dick Williams, the manager of the Angels, says, "I've seen a lot of pitchers who never had Blyleven's stuff win 20 games with teams a lot worse. Some pitchers pitch just good enough to win, whether it's 1-0 or 9-8, and others always seem to pitch just good enough to lose."

Dick Williams didn't name his "20 wins for bad teams" all-star team, but he wouldn't have had any problem filling out the rotation. Randy Jones won 20 for a Padres team in '75 that won only 71 games and 22 for a 73-win Padres team in '76; Steve Busby won 22 games for a Royals team that was 16 games under .500 when Busby wasn't the pitcher of record; and Jim Colborn won 20 games in '73 for a Brewers team that won only 74 games. And then there were pitchers who seemed to specialize in winning 20 games a season for mediocre teams, like Ferguson Jenkins, Mel Stottlemyre and Wilbur Wood, each of whom won 20 games three times for teams that were either .500 or below or would have been had their ace pitcher's W-L records been subtracted from their teams' record.

Perhaps the most glaring example of a pitcher who won 20 games without benefit of Bert's stuff and for teams worse than Bert's teams was Jim Kaat. Kaat was rebounding from arm problems when the Twins traded him to the White Sox in '73 and he no longer had the stuff he'd had for the Twins in the 60's. But Kaat put together back-to-back 20 win seasons for White Sox teams that finished behind the Twins in the AL West in '74 and '75. Bert, meanwhile, was winning 17 and 15 games, respectively, in '74 and '75.

The SI article from June 1976 is pretty compelling evidence that Boswell's recollection is correct: Bert had the reputation, fairly or unfairly, as a pitcher who pitched just well enough to lose, a pitcher who didn't produce results worthy of his nasty stuff, and a pitcher who seemed to sag in the late innings of tight games. Bert Backers can contest the fairness of this reputation but they cannot deny the existence of the reputation. I'm fairly certain that won't stop them from attacking Pat Jordan, the celebrated SI writer who wrote the article, or those the article quoted, like Bobby Bonds, Jim Palmer, Dick Williams and Gene Mauch. But they might consider that the source for Bert's alleged tendency to lose his concentration in tight spots was Bert himself, and that Bert's shabby attempt to blame the Twins bullpen for his troubles, absurdly blaming his teammates for costing him more wins than Bert's total number of no-decisions in that period, suggests that Bert was aware of his reputation and rather defensive about it.

I distinctly recall that this SI article was not the only notice the media took of Bert's reputation, but few publications maintain archives of 43 year old articles. I also recall, as apparently Boswell does, that Bert's unwanted reputation only grew after this article, as his late inning troubles in '77 for the Rangers and '78 for the Pirates exceeded his Minnesota woes and became a source of contention with Pittsburgh manager Chuck Tanner.

I believe anyone who reads the SI article will agree that Boswell is owed an apology by those Bert Backers who accused him of fabricating his claim regarding Bert's reputation. Boswell's recollection is correct. The reputation existed. I'll examine in a subsequent post whether the reputation was deserved.

"But If You Put Guidry In The Hall...

2009-06-02T07:52:00.000-07:00

...then don't you have to also induct [fill in the blank]?" I believe the name cited most frequently to fill in that blank is Dwight Gooden. It's true that the similarities between Gator and Doc are striking, so let's compare and contrast.

Any discussion of Dwight Gooden has to begin with the acknowledgment that he was the greatest pitching phenom in major league history. Only Feller comes close to Gooden's achievements before reaching the age of 21. He finished 2nd in Cy Young voting in his rookie year, shattering the record for most strikeouts per nine innings by more than two-thirds of a strikeout. He then had one of the greatest seasons ever in his sophomore year. He was Dr. K, and he was the biggest star in the game at the age of 20. There was talk that we might be witnessing the greatest pitcher in the history of the game. It didn't turn out that way.

The parallels between Guidry and Gooden are many. Both were absolute sensations in their first two full years; no pitcher has ever had a better two-year start than Guidry and Gooden. Each produced one of the greatest pitching seasons in history in his second year, winning the Cy Young Award unanimously. Neither again achieved the dominance he displayed in his second season, but each nonetheless proceeded to compile by far the highest winning percentage of any starting pitcher in his league over the next seven seasons. Each was a figurative runaway freight train down the stretch in pennant races in their first two full seasons. Each maintained a winning percentage over the first 200 decisions of his career approaching .700.

The similarities don't stop there.

A year-by-year approach I believe is a simple way to compare careers in more detail and depth than merely examining career totals. The following Guidry v. Gooden demonstration reveals striking similarities in the arcs of their respective careers.

Again, the similarity in their careers is striking. There's not much to choose from in a comparison of their first four full seasons. And the statistical similarity continued for the balance of the respective productive careers. The following are Guidry's career totals and Gooden's totals through 1996 (the last season Gooden would pitch enough innings to qualify for the ERA title):

Almost identical, save for a meaningful, but not huge, edge for Guidry in the ERA+ number. Here's the difference, however. After Dwight's first four seasons he never really put together a season that clearly qualified him as one of the premier pitchers in his league. Despite putting up consistently good winning percentages for good Met teams, Gooden's ERAs and other statistical achievements were notably mediocre. Consider the following:

1. Gooden didn't lead the N.L. in a single major pitching category after his historic 1985 season. He didn't add a single point to his "Black Ink" total.

Guidry, by contrast, led the A.L. in major pitching categories numerous times after his great '78 season - ERA in 1979, WHIP in '81, complete games in '83, wins and winning percentage in '85, and fewest BB/IP in '86. Guidry added 15 Black Ink points after his '78 season - more than half his career total - and passed Gooden, 29 to 23.

2. After Gooden's first four seasons, he went five consecutive years in which he did not have a season with double-digit wins and an ERA+ greater than 102. During that stretch, his best ERA+ was 113 in 1989, but injuries limited Gooden to 9 wins and 118 IP. He won 19 and 18 games in '90 and '88, respectively, but had ERA+'s of only 102 and 98. Gooden would have only one more season in which he'd win more than 10 games and have an ERA+ greater than 102 - he had a 117 ERA+ in 1993 while struggling to a 12-15 record with a Mets team in decline.

Guidry, by contrast, added three more seasons over the latter half of his productive career in which he had both impressive win totals and an ERA+ significantly better than the average: '81, '83 and '85. He had two more 20 win seasons and two more seasons in which his ERA+ was at least 20% better than league average.

3. Gooden received only incidental consideration for the Cy Young Award after '85. Gooden finished 4th in '90, 5th in '87 and 7th in '86, and had only a .18 CY award vote share.

Guidry compiled a .87 CY award vote share after '78, finishing 2nd in '85, 3rd in '79, 5th in '83 and 7th in '81.

The simple fact is that Doc was never really a premier pitcher in the NL after his first three years. And as great as those three years were, three great years have never put anyone in the HOF. Guidry's first three years were also monumental, but he added three more years in '81, '83 and '85 when he was unquestionably one of the top pitchers in the AL, and was the lefthanded starter on the Sporting News annual all-star teams.

Throw in the big disparity in post-season performances and Guidry's edge over Gooden becomes decisive.

Quite simply, you can put Guidry in the Hall and leave Doc out, and no one could complain too much about Doc being done an injustice.

Pick Five

2009-05-31T05:18:00.000-07:00

Here are the averages of the best five seasons of various great pitchers. Each of the anonymous pitchers are already in the Hall or, if I don't miss my guess, will be. See if you can determine who they are based on their wins, losses, winning percentage and ERAs. The ERA figures in the following table are the product of their ERA+ and an assumed league average ERA of 4.00.

The identities of our hurlers are on the next page. Here are some hints: all had fewer wins than Blyleven, Kaat and John, and all were most certainly inducted (or, if not yet inducted, will be) on the strength of their amazing peak seasons rather than their accumulation of gaudy career totals. Here's one more hint: I'm not comparing Guidry to Blyleven, Morris or Sutton this time; the comparison is to many of the greatest pitchers of all time. All but one are Hall of Famers. The one non-HOFer is not yet eligible for the HOF ballot but is generally considered a very good bet to make the Hall.

Here are the identities of these pitching greats:

I included a "Guidry A" and "Guidry B" ("Guidry A" corresponding to "Pitcher G" in the first table) because Guidry, uniquely among these pitchers, had one of his better seasons interrupted by labor strife in baseball. "Guidry A" includes the strike-shortened '81 season; "Guidry B" substitutes his '83 season (21-9, 113 ERA+) for the '81 season. After a slow start in '81 (2-2, 4.30 ERA in his first five starts) Guidry was 9-3 with a 2.30 ERA over the last sixteen starts of the season. The strike, however, wiped out nearly ten weeks of the season from early June to early August, costing Guidry about 12 starts. Guidry gave every indication that he was accelerating toward a big season, and ended the season leading the AL in WH/IP and strikeout-to-walk ratio, and finished in the top five in the league in strikeouts per inning, fewest hits per inning and fewest walks per inning.

Guidry's best five seasons (using either the '81 or '83 season as the fifth) compare favorably with the best five seasons of these other great pitchers. Koufax's ERA and winning percentage obviously stand out. Feller and Hubbell were each very big winners, averaging 23 and 24.4 wins respectively in their best years (Koufax would have averaged more wins per year had he not missed two months of the '62 season and the last six weeks of the '64 season). Gomez's best five seasons include two pitching triple crown seasons, but Guidry's numbers still compare quite well. Hubbell's best five include three ERA titles, but Guidry's ERA, particularly if one includes the '81 season, is virtually the same as Hubbell's.

Just to give some sense of how spectacular the peak seasons of these pitchers are, there are seven pitching triple crown seasons among them - three for Koufax, two for Gomez and one each for Hubbell and Feller. Each of the pitchers listed averaged a 140 or better ERA+ over their best five seasons, with Koufax leading the way with a 167 ERA+ (Gibson was second in this group with a 152 ERA+). The lowest winning percentage in the group was Gibson's .667; Koufax and Guidry both maintained an incredible winning percentage over .750 over their five best seasons.

There were a few small surprises for me in these numbers and one big one. The small surprises included Schilling's excellent winning percentage (.731) and Feller's excellent ERA (I was, for some reason, unaware of how good Feller's ERA+'s were in his prime years). The big surprise was that Guidry won a higher percentage of his starts in his best five than Koufax; Guidry won an astounding 64% of his starts to Koufax's 63%.

The Greatest Southpaws In American League History

2009-05-29T06:20:00.000-07:00

I suggested in this post that Ron Guidry may be the fourth greatest lefthander in the modern (i.e., post-1920) history of the American League, behind only Grove, Ford and Gomez. The more I look at it, the clearer the case becomes. The only other lefthander who might conceivably crack the top four is Randy Johnson, whose AL statistics are remarkably close to Guidry's. Let's look at the Guidry/Johnson comparison, and rank the top 10 southpaws in modern AL history.

In ten seasons with the Mariners and two with the Yankees Johnson compiled a 164-93 record, .638 winning percentage, and a 3.60 ERA (a 122 ERA+). He spent his first four seasons with the Mariners learning his craft and struggling to assert control and mastery over his outrageous stuff, a high '90s fastball and wickedly biting slider. He blossomed in 1993 and by 1995 was clearly the best pitcher in the AL, posting an 18-2 record in the strike-shortened season and winning the Cy Young Award (taking 26 of 28 first place votes). He missed almost the entire 1996 season with arm troubles but rebounded in 1997 with a 20-4 record and 2.28 ERA. Only Roger Clemens' triple crown season prevented Johnson from winning a second Cy Young Award. Johnson's impending free-agency and negotiations with the Mariners seemingly distracted Johnson in 1998 and he struggled to a 9-10 with Seattle before being traded to the D'backs and completely dominating the NL over the last two months of the season. He returned to the AL in 2005 at the age of 41 and spent two seasons with the Yankees, going 34-19 with very mediocre ERAs.

Johnson's AL record is almost identical to Guidry's - six fewer wins than Guidry and two more losses - for a .638 winning percentage that ranks behind only Ford, Grove, Guidry, Gomez and Pettitte since the inception of the AL in 1901. His dominance of the AL for four full seasons between '93 and '97 (a five year stretch that includes Johnson's very abbreviated season in '96) closely mirrors Guidry's domination of the AL for the three period between '77 and '79: Johnson was 75-20 (.789 win%) with a 162 ERA+; Guidry was 59-18 (.766 win%) with a 161 ERA+. Johnson won one Cy Young Award and had two second place finishes and one third, as compared to Guidry's first, third and seventh place finishes between '77 and '79.

Johnson's period of dominance in the AL was slightly longer than Guidry's, and that's a plus for Randy. But Randy's AL career was rather shallow aside from those four seasons, and none of his other AL seasons placed him among the AL's premier pitchers. Johnson played nine full seasons in the AL ('89, '96 and '98 were all partial seasons due to either trades or injury) and the four seasons I've mentioned were the only ones in which he received Cy Young consideration. Guidry had six seasons over a nine-year stretch in which he received CY consideration and his career in the AL is accordingly a little deeper than Johnson's.

What really tilts the decision in favor of Guidry are the post-season and pennant race performances. Johnson participated in three tight divisional races in the AL (with Seattle in '95 and '97 and the Yanks in '05) and was outstanding in all three, going a combined 12-0 in 15 starts with a 2.04 ERA, but his 5-0 September record in '95 was the only one in which his impact on the race approached Guidry's '77, '78 and '85 seasons, in which Guidry led two spectacular Yankees comebacks and one aborted comeback. In '97 Johnson made only three September starts in the Mariner's division title push. Although his victory over the Red Sox on the 2nd to last day of the 2005 season clinched the division title and a playoff spot for the Yankees, his 4 victories in six starts were less significant than Aaron Small's five wins in five starts, which included four straight wins in the first 20 days of September while Johnson was logging two no-decisions in three starts. It was Small's four straight wins while the Yanks overcame a four game deficit in early/mid September that keyed the Yanks' comeback.

Guidry's biggest edge is in the October performances. Johnson won his first post-season start in '95 and picked up another win in relief to clinch Seattle's series win over the Yankees in the ALDS. After that he made six starts in AL post-season competition and went 0-4 with a 5.35 ERA. He pitched well in a relief stint for the Yanks in the last game of the 2005 ALDS, but his failures in his six starts contributed significantly to four series losses by the Mariners and Yankees.

Altogether Johnson was 14-4 in 22 starts in AL pennant races and post-seasons, posting a 2.80 ERA in 157.1 innings. As I've noted, Guidry was an astounding 31-6 in 40 starts in pennant races and the post-season with a 2.74 ERA. Guidry's outstanding 3-1 record and 1.69 ERA in the World Series further cement his edge.

Johnson's amazing NL record vaults him to the top of the ranks of major league lefthanders, behind only Grove in my estimation. His .655 winning percentage in the NL equals Koufax's, and his amazing 158 ERA+ in the NL is probably enough to make him the greatest NL lefthander of all-time, a nose ahead of Sandy. Johnson is plainly the superior pitcher in any comparison of Johnson's career vs. Guidry's, but based purely on their AL records Guidry narrowly wins and places fourth on my list of modern era (i.e., post-1920) AL lefties.

Santana obviously had the potential to move ahead of Guidry among AL lefthanders, and he still might if he ever returns to the AL, but his 93-44 record in the AL and only four full seasons as a starter don't provide enough data. Newhouser might have challenged Guidry's standing, but the fact that two of his three dominant years occurred during the war years hurts his case. Plank and Waddell were great in the pre-1920 era, the best of their time, but it's virtually impossible to make valid comparisons with post-1920 pitchers because of the vastly different nature of the game in the early part of the century.

My top ten modern era AL lefties are, in order, Grove, Ford, Gomez (by a nose over Guidry), Guidry, Santana, Pennock, Pettitte, Newhouser, Kaat and Lopat. Jimmy Key, Billy Pierce and Tommy John narrowly miss the cut. Mark Buehrle and C.C. Sabathia can enter into the discussion with three or four more good years.

It somehow strikes my as very odd that the fourth (or even the fifth or sixth) greatest leftie in modern AL history could be rejected by the Hall of Fame. Veterans Committee, are you listening?

Did You Know That Ron Guidry...

2009-05-28T12:40:00.000-07:00

...is the only pitcher to have won a Cy Young and received CY votes in five other seasons and be rejected by the Hall?

There have been twelve pitchers to do this and other than Ron Guidry each is already in the Hall or, barring unforeseen circumstances, will be a first ballot HOFer. The twelve are Tom Seaver, Jim Palmer, Ferguson Jenkins, Steve Carlton, Ron Guidry, Dennis Eckersley, Roger Clemens, Randy Johnson, Greg Maddux, Pedro Martinez, Tom Glavine and Johan Santana.

There are three more pitchers who received CY votes in six or more years but never won a Cy Young Award: Mike Mussina (nine years), Nolan Ryan (eight) and Jack Morris (seven). Ryan's already in, Morris is knockin' on the door, and Mussina's candidacy is certain to be stronger than Morris'.

That makes 15 pitchers who have received Cy Young support in six different seasons, and every one received (or will receive) more than 40% support for the Hall of Fame, except one. You know his name. I'll remind you that he never even received 9% of the vote.

Incomprehensible. Really, just inexplicable.

P.S. Another interesting Cy Young fact: Guidry's six seasons in which he received CY votes happened within a nine year span. Randy Johnson took only eight years to accumulate six such seasons. Carlton, Glavine, Jenkins, Eckersley, Ryan and Morris each took more than nine years to accomplish the feat.

How Long Does a Hall of Fame Career Have To Be?

2009-05-28T07:28:00.000-07:00

How many wins must a Hall of Fame pitcher have? How many innings are enough, and how many not enough?

The most frequently cited criticisms of Guidry's HOF qualifications are "not enough wins" and "he didn't do it long enough." Most agree that in Guidry's case the quality was there, it's just a matter of quantity. It's certainly true that the duration of Guidry's career, and his number of wins and innings, would place him on the low end of the HOF pitching roster, but does he really fail to meet some informal minimum for the Hall?

It seems this debate always veers to a discussion of Koufax and Dean (who had 165 and 150 wins, respectively) and a discussion of an apparent exception for great pitchers who careers were prematurely ended by injury. But there are also six 20th century starting pitchers in the Hall with fewer than 200 wins who are not named Koufax or Dean and don't qualify for the prematurely-ended-career exception, and thirteen who won fewer than 220 games. Each of these pitchers pitched in times when 4-man rotations were the rule, complete games the expectation, and 20 wins and 280 to 300 innings common for elite pitchers.

Here's the question for the BBWAA and the Veterans Committee: if the five Hall of Famers pictured above (left to right, Lefty Gomez, Hal Newhouser, Bob Lemon, Don Drysdale and Happy Jack Chesbro) are Hall worthy despite win totals ranging from 184 to 209, are 170 wins too few for the Hall if attained in the age of five-man rotations and seven-inning starts?

Let's look at some other HOF pitchers with short careers.

A distinguished group, to be sure. Every era is represented, with pitchers who pitched primarily in each of the decades of the 20th century from the first decade through the 1970's. In every decade there has been at least one pitcher whose career length, wins and innings are notably low, and whose peak career was relatively brief. Let's sharpen the focus to the period from 1920 to 1970 and look at five pitchers: Dazzy Vance, Lefty Gomez, Hal Newhouser, Bob Lemon and Don Drysdale.

The average career win total for this group is 202. The average innings pitched is approximately 2950. The average number of starts is approx. 371. Guidry, with 170 wins, 2392 innings and 323 starts, is short in each category. Guidry's totals are actually fairly close to those of Gomez and Vance, each of whom frequently pitched in a five man rotation. Newhouser, Lemon and Drysdale each pitched almost exclusively in four-man rotations in their prime and averaged over 280 innings per year during their peak years.

Guidry, however, like all future Hall of Fame candidates, pitched exlusively in a five-man rotation, his career coinciding with an era in which the five-man rotation became the rule rather than the exception. As I've discussed in a previous post, the impact of this on the statistics of future Hall of Fame candidates will be profound. The five-man rotation reduces the average number of starts by elite pitchers by about 15%, and the 5-man rotation together with shorter starts and more prominent bullpen roles reduce wins and innings by approximately 20%. It is a simple fact that Pedro Martinez's 214 wins will be nearer the median for HOF candidates in the future, and Mike Mussina's 270 wins near the very high end.

If Guidry's totals are adjusted for the impact of the 5-man rotation (which has reduced wins, innings and starts by approximately 15% for front of the rotation pitchers), his win total is approximately 200, his innings pitched 2870 and his starts 371, each remarkably close to the average of our five Hall of Famers.*

The fact is that the very productive portion of his career was essentially as long as those of our five Hall of Famers. Our average Hall of Famer had 11 seasons in which he pitched enough innings to qualify for the ERA title, with each of Lemon and Gomez having 10 such seaons - the same number as Ron Guidry. He averaged more wins per season during such years than Drysdale and virtually the same number as Vance, despite making substantially fewer starts than either. If Guidry's wins are increased by 15% to account for the impact of the 5-man rotation, he averaged nearly as many wins per season as Bob Lemon.

These Hall of Fame pitchers won more games than Guidry not because their careers were longer, but because they either pitched primarily in a four-man rotation or in an era when starting pitchers frequently picked up a few wins a year in relief (Gomez, Newhouser and Lemon benefited from these "easy" wins). It is simply not a valid argument that Guidry did not have a long enough career or win enough games, because the length of his productive career was virtually the same as our five Hall of Famers and his win total, when adjusted for the impact of the 5-man rotation, was also virtually the same. And there are four more 20th century pitchers in the Hall - Walsh, Waddell, Chesbro and Marquard - whose careers were no longer than Guidry's and whose win totals are no more impressive when controlled for the impact of the shift from 4-man to 5-man rotations.

The Hall of Fame voters will simply have to acknowledge the impact of modern pitching practices on the career statistics of future candidates. The crop of recently retired or soon to retire pitchers who started their careers in the '80's won't force this acknowledgment because they all had extraordinarily long careers and consequently huge win totals - Maddux, Clemens, Glavine and Johnson. But there are pitchers whose candidacies are on the near horizon - Mussina, Schilling and Brown, for example - who will force HOF voters to closely examine these issues. And it is all but inevitable that in the slightly more distant future there will be pitchers who, like Guidry, win about 170 games over a productive career of ten to twelve years and yet are manifestly Hall worthy; just think of Halladay, Oswalt or Santana, if for some reason they only have three or four more productive seasons. Or think Josh Beckett if he manages to put together four or five more seasons of 15 to 20 wins and grab some more World Series glory. Just think Brandon Webb if he puts together five more top flight seasons and wins another Cy Young or two. What if, like Guidry, each of these pitchers remains one of the top pitchers in their league right up to the moment they hit the 170 or 180 win mark, and then their career ends?

I believe the Hall will soon have to acknowledge that Mussina's 270 wins are the equivalent of the win totals posted by Early Wynn and Lefty Grove. I similarly believe the Hall will have to acknowledge that Ron Guidry might have had five or six 20 win seasons but for the impact of the 5-man rotation and a strike-shortened season, and most certainly would have won approximately as many games as Gomez, Vance, Newhouser, Lemon and Drysdale.

In short, I hope the Veterans Committee recognizes a few things the BBWAA apparently failed to recognize: Ron Guidry was the best big game pitcher of his time, the best pitcher in the American League after Palmer's prime and before Clemens', and his career was as long and productive as at least ten pitchers who are in the Hall. These are all incontrovertible statements of fact, and all strongly argue for Ron Guidry's induction into the Hall of Fame.
____________________________
* I arrived at Guidry's win total by multiplying it by 1.15 and adding an additional 5.5 wins for the strike-shortened '81 season. I also multiplied Guidry's innings and starts by 1.15 although the impact of 5-man rotations and increased bullpen utilization has been to decrease each by approximately 20%. I did this both to be conservative in adjusting Guidry's stats and also because the trend toward increased bullpen utilization, though it began during Guidry's career, increased significantly after Guidry's productive career ended in 1986.

Guidry v. Schilling

2009-05-27T06:53:00.000-07:00

I'm ambivalent about Schilling's qualifications for the Hall, but let's face it - he's going in. His big game reputation and outstanding post-season record will put him over the top.

Schilling Shills generally acknowledge that his record is very erratic, his inconsistency and periodic arm issues resulting in numerous single-digit win totals and poor winning percentages throughout his career. The Shills fairly argue, however, that Schilling's peak years were excellent and deserving of HOF induction. Let's compare Schilling's peak years to Guidry's, doing a year-by-year comparison.

The following table lists Schilling's and Guidry's peak years in descending order of wins.

I've inserted a "G" or "S" in the middle column to indicate which pitcher, in my opinion, had the superior year. Here's my reasoning for each year.

Year One, Guidry's '78 v. Schilling's '02. Amazing year for both. A clear and significant edge for Guidry, however, on the basis of his historic record and ERA, the amazing September and post-season performance, and the fact that Guidry's season was the key to the Yanks' comeback, the biggest in AL history.

Year Two, Guidry's '85 v. Schilling's '01. The same record for each, but Schilling's great October and excellent ERA give him the decision.

Year Three, Guidry's '83 v. Schilling's '04. Another win for Schilling. Better record, better ERA, plus a good October for Curt.

Year Four, Guidry's '79 v. Schilling's '97. Similar records and ERA+'s, but slight edges to Guidry in each case. Also, Guidry won the ERA title.

Year Five, Guidry's '80 v. Schilling's '93: Good records but mediocre ERAs for each. I thought about giving the nod to Schilling on the basis of his good Sept/Oct for the Phils. Guidry also had a good September, however, and has the superior ERA+, so he gets the edge.

Year Six, Guidry's '77 v. Schilling's 2006. Similar records, but Guidry's superior ERA+ and tremendous Sept/Oct performance during the Yanks' championship season give Guidry the clear win.

Year Seven, Guidry's '82 v. Schilling's '99. Schilling has the superior record and ERA, so a clear win for Curt.

Year Eight, Guidry's '81 v. Schilling's '98: An odd comparison because Guidry's season is the strike-shortened '81 season. Schilling has a very slight edge in ERA+, but Guidry's clearly superior record, selection as Sporting News' lefthanded starter for the A.L. and impressive World Series performance gives him the clear edge.

Year Nine, Guidry's '84 v. Schilling's '92: Easy win for Curt; Guidry's only season where arm injury was a significant factor.

Year Ten: Slight edge for Schilling, but this season and all other seasons for each not reflected in this table don't really qualify as "peak seasons."

It's split, five seasons for each, but Guidry takes four of the top six. The point here, however, is not to make some fine distinction between Schilling and Guidry, but to demonstrate how close the two are. The "big game" comparison doesn't really resolve anything, either: both have very similar World Series records, Schilling has the overall post-season edge, but Guidry has a huge edge over Schilling in pennant race performances.

I would ask all the BBWAA voters who will vote for Schilling to explain how the BBWAA as a group could find no more than about 9% of the vote for Guidry. Isn't it apparent that over their peak years they were very similar? Isn't it also apparent that Schilling's "non-peak" years (more numerous than Guidry's, who played only a few years after his peak ended) are not a plus in his HOF resume? Here they are:

This number of mediocre records and short seasons are actually a negative, from my point of view, and when the BBWAA considered Bret Saberhagen for the Hall they apparently felt the same way - good pitcher, too many poor or abbreviated seasons.

Guidry has the edge over Schilling in my book because he was a more consistent winner, had the distinctly superior record down the stretch in pennant races, and never stumbled in a pennant race. Schilling was great in October, but uneven in September, and he played a significant role in tanking the D'backs shot at one division title and almost losing another.

I don't know if Schilling belongs in the Hall of Fame, but I'm pretty damn sure he's going in. I'm also sure of one other thing: if Schilling goes into the Hall, Guidry belongs there, too.

A Note About Catfish Hunter

2009-05-26T16:25:00.000-07:00

Online commenters and kibbitzers tend to disparage Catfish Hunter's HOF qualifications - only 224 wins, an elite pitcher for only a six or seven year span, rather pedestrian ERAs, and, they argue, a big winner only because he played for great teams that gave him excellent run support.

These observations from Catfish's critics may have some merit, but they don't detract from the following consideration. Catfish Hunter made 34 starts for the A's in Sept/Oct of '72, '73 and '74. Almost all of them were big starts because the A's won the AL West by narrow margins each year, clinching only in the last week of each season. His record in these 34 starts was 20-5 with a 2.38 ERA in 246 innings pitched. He was the unquestioned ace of the only non-Yankee team to win three consecutive World Series, and he went 7-1 in the six post-season series the A's played on their way to those three world championships.

The BBWAA obviously thinks that carries a lot of weight. I do, too. I should point out that the same community of online commenters who question Hunter's HOF bona fides generally seems to attach great weight to Curt Schilling's post-season record and reputation as a big game pitcher.

20-5, 2.38 ERA in 246 of the biggest innings in his career and in the history of the Oakland A's franchise. That positively shouts "Hall of Fame" to me. It's enough to put a five time 20-game winner with a Cy Young award and five world championship rings over the top and into the Hall.

More September Big Game Records

2009-05-26T11:18:00.000-07:00

It occurred to me that I've somehow omitted any discussion of Blyleven's pennant race performances.

Bert participated in seven tight division races - '70, '77-80, '87 and '89 (again, I've defined a tight division race as one in which the race was within five games at some point in September prior to elimination or clinching, and the pitcher made at least one September start when the race was within five games). Bert's teams won two world championships, three division titles and had an average winning percentage of .562 (equivalent to 91 wins in a 162 game season). In other words, these were good teams, and yet Bert's September records in these races were as strikingly mediocre as the rest of his regular season performances for these teams. Bert made 40 starts in these seven races and had a 13-14 record and 3.04 ERA in 278 innings pitched.

It's the same ol' Bert story: decent ERA but a relatively low win total and winning percentage despite pitching for good teams. Bert didn't win as many as three games in any September until his last one in '89. The fact is that Bert played in seven tight divisional races and didn't have a significant impact on any of them. Three times Bert made six or more starts in September and won only two games. Twice he made five or more starts and won only one game. Even Jack Morris, for all his September troubles, had two Septembers in which he won four games.

The Bert Backers would no doubt remind us that Bert had an excellent post-season record. He absolutely did, but as is the case for many other pitchers, the post-season sample size for Bert is rather small - six decisions and 47.1 IP. In any event, Bert's October record can't obscure the fact that he was perfectly mediocre across 40 starts in seven years in which his teams played very important games in September.

I haven't checked Jim Kaat's pennant race records, but I happened to stumble across an account of Kaat's amazing performance in the great '67 AL pennant race in which he was 7-0 with a 1.51 ERA.

It seems as if every pitching candidate for the Hall of Fame managed to have at least one September where he made his presence felt in a pennant race. Every candidate other than Bert Blyleven, that is.

The Thin Man

2009-05-25T09:29:00.000-07:00

The following is the opening paragraph from an article on Guidry in Sports Illustrated's September 19, 1977 edition entitled "Getting Fat With The Thin Man," a reference to the slender Louisianan's emergence as the Yankee ace as the team surged past the Red Sox and Orioles to win the AL East title.

"From Aug. 7 through the end of last week, the Yankees won 28 of 34 games and moved from third place, five games out, to two ahead in the American League East...And when a team goes on a tear, there invariably is a starting pitcher high on the list of streakers. Because the Yanks' staff is loaded with the likes of World Series heroes Catfish Hunter, Don Gullett and Ken Holtzman, it is hardly surprising that New York found a hot arm. The astounding thing is that the limb is attached to the left shoulder of Ron Guidry, a pitcher whose reputation had been as puny as his 5'11", 158-pound body."

Guidry's epic performance during the '78 pennant - the win in the one-game playoff at Fenway, the back-to-back two-hit shutouts of the Sox in September - didn't come as a surprise in Yankee fans. In fact, it seemed very familiar, because Guidry had been almost as dominant during the Yanks' 41-13 charge down the stretch in '77. It's likely Guidry's '77 performance would occupy a more significant place in baseball lore but for the shadow cast by the legendary '78 season.

The Yankees lost four of their first five games in August '77 to drop five games behind the Red Sox and 2.5 games behind the Orioles. Don Gullet, the Yanks' prize free-agent signing of '77, was on the disabled list. Catfish Hunter, Mike Torrez and Ed Figueroa, the mainstays of the Yanks' staff in '76, were collectively 26-25. And Ron Guidry, a relief pitcher plucked from the bullpen by Billy Martin in mid-May to bolster the stumbling starting staff, had a decent if unspectacular record of 8-6 and a 3.25 ERA.

Torrez pitched a six-hitter on August 7th to break a three-game Yankee skid and begin a streak of 24 wins in 27 games that vaulted the Yankees past the Red Sox and Orioles into first place in the AL East. The Yankees remained hot the rest of the season, ultimately winning 41 of their last 54 games, equalling the '51 Giants' 54 game dash to the NL pennant in the Miracle of Coogan's Bluff. As Sports Illustrated noted, the Yankees' ace down the stretch was, improbably, the slightly built Louisianan who'd pitched only 54 innings in the major leagues before joining the Yankees starting staff.

Guidry went 8-1 with a 2.16 ERA during the Yankees' finishing kick, including a complete game, five hit victory over the Red Sox on September 13th that boosted the Yanks' lead to 2.5 games. He won seven consecutive starts between August 21 and September 25, pitching five complete games, three shutouts, and compiling a 1.02 ERA over 61.2 innings. His record in six September starts was 5-1 with a 1.89 ERA.

Guidry added a victory over the Royals in the ALCS and a complete game, four-hit victory over the Dodgers in game four of the World Series to put the Yankees one win away from the world championship. In acknowledgment of Guidry's performance during the Yanks' stretch drive, MVP balloters gave him more votes than any other starting pitcher in the AL.

El Tiante v. Louisiana Lightning

2009-05-24T09:05:00.000-07:00

Baseball Crank has an excellent evaluation of Blyleven, Morris, Kaat, John, Tiant, Guidry and others in a January 2001 post. It's a very detailed, incisive and fair assessment of the HOF qualifications of various pitchers, and I agree with his conclusions that Morris, John and Kaat fall short, if just barely. And I really applaud his support of Luis Tiant's induction, particularly his citation of Tiant's outstanding September records for the Red Sox in '70s pennant races. We differ on Blyleven, but Baseball Crank's evaluation of Blyleven is one of the few I've seen that candidly acknowledges the faults in Blyleven's HOF resume: the generally mediocre win totals and winning percentages even when pitching for solid teams.

I'll discuss on the next page Baseball Crank's discussions of Luis Tiant and Ron Guidry. I think Baseball Crank would agree that upon closer examination Guidry has many of the same qualifications as Tiant. I also think that Baseball Crank would agree (fair-minded fellow that he is) that in one instance he grossly mischaracterized Guidry's record.

The Crank begins by noting that Tiant posted particularly outstanding ERAs in '68 and '72:

"Consider: between 1921 and 1993, only three pitchers qualified for the ERA title with an ERA below 2.00 more than once: Sandy Koufax, Hal Newhouser, and Luis Tiant. Tiant's 1.91 mark in 1972 was the lowest at Fenway between Babe Ruth's 1916 season and Roger Clemens in 1990; his 1.60 ERA in 1968 remains the lowest in the AL since Walter Johnson in 1919. Those gaudy ERAs are less impressive when you consider that 1972 and 1968 were the low points for scoring in the AL after 1920, but the translated ERAs for the two seasons are still impressive, 1.99 and 2.16."

As the Crank acknowledges, '68 and '72 were the two most pitching dominated years in modern American League history. Still, Tiant's ERAs were outstanding, translating to a 186 ERA+ in '68 and a 170 ERA+ in '72. There were only eight pitchers between 1921 and 1993 who posted more than one season with a 170 ERA+ or better: Lefty Grove, Lefty Gomez, Ted Lyons, Dazzy Vance, Whitey Ford, Sandy Koufax, Hal Newhouser and Tom Seaver. A trio of lefties - Spahn, Carlton and Hubbeel - narrowly missed achieving the feat.

Tiant's '68 and '72 ERAs were indeed outstanding, and he maintained an impressive 119 ERA+ for the first 3000 innings of his career before a late-career decline dragged caused him to finish with a 114. But I would point out to the Crank that as great as Tiant's '68 and '72 ERAs were, if you averaged Tiant's ERA+ for his best three seasons ('68, '72 and a 133 ERA+ in '74) you get a 154 ERA+, a lower ERA+ than Guidry maintained over three consecutive years from '77 to '79. In fact, you can throw in Guidry's 129 ERA+ from the strike-shortened '81 season and his four-year average is 156, slightly higher than Tiant's average over his best three years.

The Crank then makes the following observation relative to his discussion of Tiant's outstanding ERAs in his best seasons:

"As the TR for Tiant indicates, he was a guy who would have been a winner even on average teams; his offenses, on balance, just weren’t that great."

Sorry, Crank, but this is simply not correct. Tiant's offensive support during his years with Boston - the bulk of his HOF resume - was very, very good, if not great. In five of Tiant's seven full seasons with the Sox his run support ranged from .7 to 1.5 runs/game higher than the league average! Even adjusting for the Fenway factor, this is tremendous run support. Throw in the other two years, when his support from the Sox approximated the league average, and Tiant's run support from the Sox was approximately .7 runs/game higher than the league average over the period '72 to '78.

The Crank then compares Tiant's career statistics to the stats of eight HOF pitchers (including Bunning, Drysdale, Hunter and Newhouser) and draws the following conclusion:

"The best case for Tiant is that he meets the standard they don't: a guy who would still have had very good records even with just average teams. Yeah, Catfish won more games in the postseason, but tell me that Tiant wasn’t as good a big-game pitcher as anyone in his time; counting the postseason, Peter Gammons in “Beyond the Sixth Game” noted that Tiant’s September/October record with the Red Sox – in some of the tightest pennant races and series ever – was 32-10. 32-10!"

It's not clear what Tiant would have done with "just average" teams, but it's very clear what he did with good teams because the Sox averaged more than 90 wins a season and compiled a cumulative .562 winning percentage from '72 to '78. It's true that the Cleveland teams Tiant pitched for in the '60s were generally mediocre, but the Crank would have to admit that Tiant didn't compile "very good records" with the Indians other than in '68. The Crank's suggestion that Tiant's teams weren't as good as those Drysdale and Hunter pitched is misleading; the Sox teams were very good and any edge the '60s Dodgers or '70s A's may have had was due to deeper pitching staffs and bullpens, because the '70s Sox teams were very good hitting teams.

One quibble with the September stats the Crank so astutely references: Tiant was 31-12 with Sox in September and October, not 32-10. However, I completely concur with the Crank's assertion that Tiant was one of the great big game pitchers of his time. Tiant's 31-12 Sept/Oct record with the Sox certainly deserves the exclamation point the Crank attaches. But if 31-12 deserves an exclamation point, then Guidry's pennant race record - 26 wins in 30 starts - deserves a fireworks display.

Here's the Crank's take on Guidry's HOF qualifications:

"...[W]ith him the question is simple: did he stay on the mountaintop long enough? Maybe it’s just a gut feeling at this point, but I say no. His ERAs and other numbers in 1983 and 1985 just don’t say “Dizzy Dean” or “Ed Walsh;” he was a very good pitcher with a very good offense in those years, but he wasn’t carrying the team on his back. That really just leaves a 3-year stretch (1977-79) when he dominated the league, and in two of those years he fell short of 20 wins. Guidry was only a slightly healthier version of Saberhagen or Gullett – great pitchers all when 100%, but rarely all in one piece. He's OUT."

I'll offer brief rejoinders to the Crank's first two claims. First, Guidry stayed "on the mountaintop" at least as long as Tiant, and his mountaintop was higher. Tiant had arguably eight very good seasons (seven with the Sox and one with the Tribe) during which he was 142-83 (a .631 win%) with a 126 ERA+. Guidry's totals for his best eight years were 144-56 (a .720 win%) with a 129 ERA+. Here's the really startling fact, however: the Sox and Indian teams over those eight years had a .543 winning percentage when you subtract Tiant's records; Guidry's Yankee teams had a .552 winning percentage without his contribution. Simply put, Tiant's winning percentage relative to his teams was great, but Guidry's was astounding.

Second, as for Crank's contention that Guidry's ERAs in ' 83 in '85 "just don't say 'Dizzy Dean' or 'Ed Walsh'", I would respond simply that Guidry's ERAs in those two years compare quite favorably with Dean's ERAs (though neither compares with Walsh, who compiled the lowest career ERA in baseball history during an era when the game barely resembled the game Dean and Guidry played). The Crank cites the '83 and '85 seasons because Guidry had great W-L records in those years but comparatively pedestrian ERA+ of 113 and 123, respectively. Contrary to the Crank's claim, however, those ERAs say "Dizzy Dean" quite clearly - Dean had ERA+ of 124 and 114 in his 3rd and 4th best years (i.e., '36 and '33). I'd further point out that Dean's ERA+ of 159 and 135 in his two best seasons don't begin to compare with Guidry's peak years from '77 to '79. Dizzy Dean was a great pitcher, one who averaged nearly 27 wins per season in the 3 1/2 years preceding Earl Averill's line drive off Dean's toe in the '37 All-Star game, and he clearly belongs in the Hall in my opinion. But the Crank's unfavorable comparison of Guidry's ERAs to the Diz's is off target.

That brings me to my final rejoinder to the Crank's characterization of Guidry's HOF bona fides. The Crank calls Guidry a "slightly healthier version" of two famously injury-plagued pitchers, Don Gullett and Bret Saberhagen. The Crank couldn't be further off the mark with this one. In fact, I'm completely mystified by this claim because Guidry was virtually injury-free except for the '84 season. During Gullett's peak from '71 to '77 he average only 181 innings per season and failed to pitch enough innings to qualify for the ERA title in four of those seasons. Saberhagen averaged approximately 200 innings per season during his peak from '84 to '91 and failed to qualify for the ERA title in three of those years. Guidry, by comparison, averaged 230 innings during his peak from '77 to '85, pitching enough innings to qualify for the ERA title every year. Just to illustrate the absurdity of the Crank's characterization of Guidry, consider that the consensus "iron man" of the '80s, Jack Morris, averaged 262 innings per season from '80 to '88 (adjusting for the strike-shortened season); surely the difference between an "iron man" and "injury plagued" can't be a mere 30 innings per season.

I liked the Crank's take on these Hall of Fame debates, but his views of Tiant's and Guidry's comparative HOF qualifications reflected a few glaring misconceptions. Bottom line: I second the Crank's nomination of El Tiante to the Hall, and argue that Louisiana Lightning is even more qualified than the crafty Cuban.

Pedro in '99, Grove in '31, Gibson in '68, Guidry in '78...

2009-05-22T10:06:00.000-07:00

...McLain in '68, Koufax in '65 (or '66, or '63), Gooden in '84. These are some of the greatest seasons pitchers have ever had. Let's examine various measures of pitching dominance and compare Guidry's '78 season to many of the other greatest seasons in baseball history. A statistical analysis confirms that Guidry's '78 season is among the greatest ever. When one considers that this performance occurred during one of the most legendary pennant races in baseball history and fueled the greatest comeback in American League history, it is not unreasonable to suggest that Guidry's magnificent season is the greatest ever.

The Record: 25-3. It's the highest winning percentage for a 20-win season in baseball history.

It's one of five seasons in which a 20 game winner lost only three games (Roe in '51, Cone in '88, Clemens in '01 and Lee in '08).

It's one of six seasons in which a pitcher was 22 or more games over .500 (Grove was 27 over in '31, McLain 25 over in '68, Dean 23 over '34, Grove 23 over in '30, Vance 22 over in '24).

Since 1954 (the earliest year for which the data is available) only four 20 game winners have won a higher percentage of their starts in a season (Martinez in '99, Clemens in '86, Welch in '90 and McLain in '68).

The ERA. We'll look at ERA+, which normalizes for league performance and park factors.

Guidry's 208 ERA+ was the third highest in modern history (i.e., post-1920) at the time, behind only Gibson's 258 in '68 and Grove's 219 in '31. Only Martinez, Clemens and Grove have ever posted a higher ERA+ in the American League. Oddly, Guidry retains the distinction of being the only A.L. pitcher to make as many as 35 starts in his 200+ season (in the N.L., Gooden started 35 games in '85 and Luque started 37 in '23).

Only nine pitchers have had a 200 or greater ERA+ since 1920. Because the standard deviation in the distribution of ERAs widens in times of both very low and very high offensive production, we've seen a proliferation of these kinds of seasons since 1990 (Martinez has topped 200 five times, Clemens three times, Maddux twice and Kevin Brown once). When Guidry accomplished it, however, it was only the third time it had been done in the A.L. since 1920, and only the fifth time in the major leagues since 1920 (Luque in '23, Grove in '31, Pierce in '55 and Gibson in '68).

In terms of simple ERA, only Pedro Martinez has matched Guidry's ERA in the A.L. since '78 (Martinez posted a 1.742 in 2000 compared to Guidry's 1.743 in '78). Guidry's 1.74 remains the 12th lowest since 1920 for a full season (Nolan Ryan compiled a 1.69 ERA in the strike-shortened '81 season).

Opposition OPS+. Opposition OPS+, like ERA+, is normalized for the league average and park factors. As such, it is a better measure of pitching dominance than WH/IP or H/IP, each of which can vary widely across eras depending on the general level of offense during a particular era.

Data for Opp. OPS+ is only available as far back as 1954. Between 1954 and 1978 only one American League pitcher had held opposing batters to an OPS+ of less than 53 - Joe Horlen of the White Sox in 1964 who had an Opp. OPS+ of 49.*

Guidry held opposing batters to an OPS+ of 50 in 1978. Throw out Horlen's performance and only Bob Gibson in his historic 1968 season posted a lower Opp. OPS+ - 47. Here are the ten lowest Opp. OPS+ posted between 1954 and 1978:

1. Gibson ('68), 47
2. Horlen ('64), 49
3. Guidry ('78), 50
4. Marichal ('66) and Sutton ('72), 51
6. Koufax ('65), 52
7. Score ('56), Aquirre ('62), Chance ('64), 53
10. Koufax ('63), 54

As of 1993 Guidry's 1978 OPS+ remained behind only Gibson's and Horlen's marks, with Clemens in '86 and Appier in '93 each joining Guidry by posting an OPS+ of 50. In the National League, Dwight Gooden posted a 52 OPS+ in 1985 to crack the top 10.

Since 1993 there has been a profusion of very low Opp. OPS+ marks, with Martinez, R. Johnson, Maddux, Santana and Clemens combining to post 15 different seasons with OPS+ of 50 or less, with each posting at least one season with an OPS+ better than Gibson's old record of 47. The record is now an extraordinary 18, posted by Martinez in 2000.

The 40 year period between 1954 and 1993 saw many extraordinary pitchers and pitching performances - Koufax, Marichal, Gibson, Seaver, Carlton, Guidry, Gooden, Palmer, Clemens and others. It is worth noting that Guidry's Opp. OPS+ of 50 in '78 was better than any posted by the foregoing pitchers other than Gibson in '68. One should be careful about ranking seasons on the basis of small differences in a single statistical category, but Guidry's OPS+ establishes at a minimum that his dominance of major league batters was on a par with Koufax in his prime, Gooden in his extraordinary '85 season and Gibson in '68.
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* This performance is somewhat suspect, however, because of evidence that the White Sox manager, Eddie Stanky, tampered with the baseballs at the Sox's home games by storing them overnight in a very cold, damp room in Comiskey Park, and employed groundskeeping strategems to deaden batted balls (i.e., long infield grass, very damp and soft infield turf). Judging by the White Sox's pitching staff's performance in '64, Stanky's strategies were wildly successful - the Sox's staff posted an extraordinary team Opp. OPS+ at home of 68, approximately the same Opp. OPS+ recorded by Jim Palmer in his Cy Young year of 1975.

Jim Kaplan Nailed It 23 Years Ago

2009-05-20T14:37:00.000-07:00

"Three kinds of players dominate the Baseball Hall of Fame: batters who hit a lot, sluggers who homer a lot, pitchers who win a lot. Their glitzy stats jump out of the bios sent to electors. But there are equally deserving players who don't make the Hall: men whose numbers aren't catchy enough and whose contributions are often too subtle to be summarized. Some of them are subsequently elected by the Veterans' Committee, but that group's deliberations don't begin until 23 years after a player has retired.

"One way to try to right these wrongs is to build up support for worthy but underrated players before they get lost in the shuffle. I have in mind three current players who merit election to the Hall but possibly will not make it based on past voting patterns: Tony Perez, Ron Guidry and Ozzie Smith."

Jim Kaplan, in the June 2, 1986 edition of Sports Illustrated

SI's Jim Kaplan was prophetic - or at least 67% prophetic. Tony Perez and Ozzie Smith have indeed been inducted into the cherished Hall. Ron Guidry, however...

I highly recommend the article. Kaplan succinctly stated the case for Perez, Guidry and Smith, and also neatly summarized the rather narrow perspective of the typical BBWAA voter. Click here to read the whole article.

There is a very telling quote in Kaplan's article from Ray Miller, the manager of the Twins at the time and former Oriole pitching coach.

"Ron definitely deserves to be in the Hall. He throws strikes and has great leverage when he comes over the top. And he's one of the best fielding pitchers I've ever seen. Sure, his fastball isn't what it used to be, but he throws two different sliders and mixes in curves and change-ups. The only problem with Guidry is that he doesn't talk up his own case."

Indeed, Guidry does not talk up his own case. It's just not Guidry's nature to tout himself. I fear the accomplishments of the Quiet Cajun have been overshadowed by the legends and myths surrounding the outsized personalities in the Bronx Zoo - Steinbrenner, Jackson and Martin. A few more trips to the SI archives might help remind the Veterans Committee of how highly Guidry was regarded in his time.

Guidry Gets An Endorsement From Jim Rice

2009-05-20T10:53:00.000-07:00

You know my opinion about Ron Guidry's HOF bona fides. How about getting Jim Rice's view?

Rice was asked about Blyleven and Morris on a conference call with the press shortly after his election to the Hall. Rice made the point that it's about more than numbers. For a player, it was about what great competitors these guys were. Rice plainly thinks Blyleven and Morris are HOF quality candidates. What was really interesting, however, is that he goes out of his way to mention two other pitchers he felt epitomized great competitors:

"So when you look at pitchers like [Blyleven and Morris], like a Ron Guidry, you look at a Goose Gossage, that you go out there and you face everyday, and you knew they were going to be the best."

I think Jim Rice knows a thing or two about Hall of Fame pitchers. Thanks, Jim, from the Gator Guy and all the Ron Guidry fans.

Cooperstown Chronicles

2009-05-20T10:18:00.000-07:00

I've posted a link to Cooperstown Chronicles at LestersLegends.com. Ryan Lester is the proprietor of LestersLegends and he offers his views of the HOF qualifications of various Hall of Famers and HOF prospects. While I don't always agree with Ryan, I find his insights interesting and illuminating. Here's his take on Ron Guidry's candidacy for the HOF:

"I would have liked to see Ron Guidry get more than the 170 victories he totaled. If he got 30 more at the same winning percentage (.651), I think he would have been a no-brainer. He had a nine-year stretch when he was one of the very best pitchers in the game. His 25-3, 1.74 ERA in 1978 is legendary. His 3-1, 1.69 ERA in World Series play shows he could elevate his game. I’m a Red Sox fan, but I appreciate how good Ron Guidry was. I think he should be a HOFer. If he’s good enough for to have his number retired by the Yankees and a spot in Monument Park, then he’s good enough for Cooperstown."

I think Ryan touches on the key issues: Guidry's winning percentage, nine-year stretch of excellence and superior post-season record merit induction.

Here are Ryan's takes on the HOF qualifications of some of the other pitchers I've discussed. We don't agree on Blyleven and certain others, but Ryan fairly states the case for each.

Bert Blyleven:

"How long does Bert Blyleven have to wait until the Hall comes knocking on his door. He has 287 wins…287 wins. He pitched 22 seasons. Do the math and you see that if he won about .5 more wins per game in his career he would have the magical 300 wins and I wouldn’t be typing this post. The fact that he pitched on some pretty bad teams should factor into the equation. I understand he never won the Cy Young awards, but neither did a lot of pitchers…including Nolan Ryan. I’m not saying he’s on the same level as Nolan, but they do have some similarities...

"...There are thirty nine pitchers in the HOF with less wins than Bert (take a look for yourself ). Now Bert is a good broadcaster for the Twins. Given his past success and his continued involvement in baseball, I believe it’s time to let him in."

Jack Morris:

"Gone are the days of 300 wins careers. With five-man rotations, you just don’t start enough games to reach the plateau. If the voters can’t look past not reaching that mark, starting pitching will got the way of the dinosaur in terms of the Hall of Fame. There has to be more to it than just numbers. If someone is a top five pitcher for a decade with a history of big games in the postseason and unmatched durability, he’s a Hall of Famer in my book."

Jim Bunning:

"He was one of the best pitchers of his era, as judged by his numerous Top 10 finishes in the major pitching categories and the slew of All-Star Game appearances. Perhaps just as important was his role in forming the Players Association. Looking at his numbers though, and I’m left puzzled. I’m not exactly sure how Bunning got into Cooperstown. I suppose his overall impact on the game is enough to get him in, but he is Exhibit A why some of the other pitchers I’ve profiled deserve inclusion as well."

Tommy John:

"Most young fans know his name for the surgery that has he made famous, but Tommy John was a heck of a pitcher too. He won 288 games (5th most among lefties) at a .555 winning percentage and a 3.34 ERA over a career that spanned 26 years. He also had a 6-3 record with a 2.65 ERA in postseason play. Tommy was a four-time All-Star and won the Hutch Award and the Lou Gehrig Memorial Award. He was in the top 10 in ERA and wins six times, Win-Loss % 10 times (led the league in ‘74), Walks/9 innings pitched 12 times, Complete Games 4 times, and Shutouts 7 times (led the league three times). He injured the ulnar collateral ligament in his pitching arm in 1974, and after a revolutionary surgical operation he was able to pitch until he was 46. For the amount of victories, the brilliant control he exhibited over his lengthy career, as well as his lasting mark on the game with the surgery he helped coin I believe Tommy John is overdue induction into baseball’s hallowed Hall."

How Dominant Was Guidry At His Peak?

2009-05-19T07:05:00.000-07:00

Pretty damn dominant. There are various measures of pitching dominance, but in the final analysis it's about not surrendering runs. Guidry was the best in the business at Job One for pitchers in the years '77, '78 and '79, leading the American League in ERA twice and compiling a major league leading 161 ERA+ over those three years.

It turns out that Guidry's 161 ERA+ over a three year period is a pretty unusual achievement, so unusual that Guidry was only the third American League pitcher in the modern era (i.e., post-1920) to accomplish the feat. If you exclude the War Years (when Hal Newhouser did it) then Guidry was the first American League pitcher to turn the trick since Lefty Grove in the '30s.

We'll look at the select group of pitchers who've managed to maintain this level of dominance over a three-year span and examine the curious concentration of these achievements in two brief and distinct periods in baseball history.

Since 1920 there have been 15 pitchers to average a 160 ERA+ or better over a three year span. Only three pitchers accomplished it before WW II: Dazzy Vance, Lefty Grove and Carl Hubbell. Hal Newhouser did it from '44 to '46. Twenty years passed before Koufax and Marichal accomplished the feat from '64 to '66. Gibson did it from '68 to '70 and Seaver from '69 to '71. Guidry did it from '77 to '79. Clemens did it from '90 to '92. The explosion in offense over the last 15 years has produced a profusion of these dominant ERA+ performances, with Greg Maddux, Pedro Martinez and Randy Johnson averaging over 160 over more than a decade span, and Kevin Brown over a six-year span. Clemens did it a second time between '96 and '98. Johan Santana maintained a 160 ERA+ during the 5-year span between 2002 and 2006. Before this explosion in 160+ performances Lefty Grove had been the only pitcher in modern baseball history to maintain a 160 ERA+ for more than five years.

Of the 15 pitchers to accomplish this feat nine did it during two relatively brief and distinct periods: Koufax, Marichal, Gibson and Seaver did it during the era of pitching dominance from '64 to '71; Maddux, Brown, Martinez, Johnson and Santana have done it during the recent offensive heyday in baseball. This is not coincidental. The standard deviation in the distribution of ERAs during very low scoring and very high scoring periods tends to increase. During periods like the 1950's and 1980's, when scoring is more in line with the historical average for the 20th century, the standard deviation contracts.

Averaging a 160 ERA+ for a three year span is a tremendous achievement. Bunning and Drysdale never reached a 160 ERA+ for even a single season. Neither did Blyleven or Morris.

Again, to be clear, I am not arguing that any achievement or performance over a mere three-year period should be sufficient, in and of itself, to qualify one for the Hall of Fame. My purpose is to put into context Guidry's dominance during this period. He dominated to an extent few have, and in a way even many of the greats never did.

More "Did You Know..."

2009-05-18T11:59:00.000-07:00

There have been 19 pitchers who led all starting pitchers in their league in MVP balloting in consecutive seasons. Fourteen have been eligible for the Hall of Fame. Ten have been inducted into the Hall. (Five of those ten are pictured above; from left to right: Dizzy Dean, Hal Newhouser, Red Ruffing, Bob Feller and Dazzy Vance.)

The only pitchers to have been rejected so far are Bucky Walters, Mort Cooper (who did it during the War years), Denny McLain (whose personal life imploded the year after pulling off the feat 1969) and Ron Guidry. Guidry led all AL starting pitchers in MVP balloting in '77 and '78.

Roger Clemens, Pedro Martinez, Greg Maddux, Tom Glavine and Chris Carpenter each led all starting pitchers in their league in the MVP balloting but have yet to be eligible for the Hall. All but Carpenter are certain to make it (unless Roger is rail'roided). The ten Hall of Famers who've achieved this are Dazzy Vance, Burleigh Grimes, Carl Hubbell, Dizzy Dean, Red Ruffing, Bob Feller, Hal Newhouser, Warren Spahn, Sandy Koufax and Jim Palmer.

Guidry led all AL starting pitchers in MVP balloting in '78, of course. I think most people would expect that the other year would be '79, when Guidry led the league in ERA and went 18-8, but '77 was the other year. Guidry edged out 20 game winner Jim Palmer in MVP balloting among starting pitchers, largely on the strength of his great second half - 10-2 with a 2.16 ERA, including wins in seven straight starts between Aug. 21 and Sept. 25th as the Yankees prevailed in a three-way dogfight with the Red Sox and Orioles.

Guidry's five top-three MVP finishes among starting pitchers is another category in which he ranks among the best pitchers of the last 50 years. It's more top-three finishes than Drysdale, Bunning, Schilling or Morris. It's as many as Marichal and Palmer.

Could someone please tell me why Ron Guidry isn't in the Hall of Fame?

Did You Know That Ron Guidry...

2009-05-18T10:13:00.000-07:00

...is the only American League pitcher to win consecutive ERA titles and be rejected by the Hall of Fame? Did you know that he is the only pitcher since WW II - A.L. or N.L. - to win consecutive ERA titles and be rejected by the Hall?

Walter Johnson, Red Faber, Lefty Grove, Hal Newhouser and Ron Guidry are the only HOF-eligible American League pitchers to have won back-to-back ERA titles. All are in the Hall except Guidry. Roger Clemens and Pedro Martinez are the only other A.L. pitchers to win consecutive ERA titles, and they'll enter the Hall in their first year of eligibility (again, assuming Clemens doesn't run aground on the steroids issue).

Christy Mathewson, Pete Alexander, Ray Kremer, Carl Hubbell, Bucky Walters, Sandy Koufax, Tom Seaver, Gred Maddux and Randy Johnson are the only N.L. pitchers to win consecutive ERA titles, and all but Kremer and Walters are either in the Hall or are surefire bets to be first-ballot inductees.

This isn't to say that winning consecutive ERA titles should qualify one for automatic induction into the Hall. It's just to point out that it's rarely done, only very good pitchers do it, and those who do it almost invariably go into the Hall of Fame.

Just something for the Veterans Committee to consider.

Above Photo: Walter Johnson
Right Photo: Grover "Pete" Alexander

Guidry's Best Seasons v. The Best of Two All-Time Greats

2009-05-17T07:50:00.000-07:00

My last post compared Guidry and Drysdale and argued that they had very similar Hall of Fame qualifications - relatively brief careers but sustained excellence and exceptional records as big game pitchers. As I've noted, however, there are many who consider Drysdale's HOF qualifications marginal, a view apparently shared by many in the BBWAA, who waited ten years and ten ballots before inducting the Dodger great.

I'm very conscious of the fact that comparing HOF candidates to the most marginal inductees can lead to a gradual loosening of HOF standards. If a sufficient argument for induction is that a candidate is 95% as great as the most marginal Hall of Famers, then HOF standards will gradually be eroded. That's not to say that Guidry is any less deserving of the Hall than Drysdale, because in my opinion he is every bit as deserving and his induction would in no way represent a loosening of HOF standards. If there's any doubt about that, just compare Guidry to two Hall of Famers whom no one would suggest were marginal inductees.

Here's a comparison of the top seven seasons of three great pitchers, one of whom is Guidry. In the case of each pitcher these top seven seasons comprise the overwhelming bulk of their HOF qualifications. These are the respective averages of the top seven seasons for each of these three pitchers:

Pitcher 1 is Juan Marichal, who was inducted into the Hall in 1983 in his third year of eligibility. Pitcher 2 is Jim Palmer, a first-ballot inductee in 1990. The ERAs actually represent the ERA+ for each pitcher and an assumed league average ERA of 4.00.

Both Marichal and Palmer obviously made more starts and pitched more innings because they pitched in the conventional 4-man rotation that prevailed in the '60's and most of the '70s. Guidry, by contrast, pitched exclusively in a 5-man rotation throughout his career. Leaving aside that consideration, the average of their respective top seven seasons is remarkably close. I defy anyone to argue that Marichal and Palmer are solid and unquestionable Hall of Famers but Guidry is not.

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* Because one of Guidry's top seven seasons was the 1981 strike-shortened season, Guidry's seven season totals are divided by 6.67 (the Yankees' 108 games played in 1981 equalling .67 of a full season).

Guidry v. Drysdale: A Year-By-Year Comparison

2009-05-16T22:24:00.000-07:00

Here's a year-by-year comparison of Guidry and Drysdale. The seasons are listed on the basis of wins, in descending order.

I've inserted a "G" for Guidry or "D" for Drysdale in the middle column to indicate which pitcher had, in my estimation, the superior season (and, in one instance, an "E" for even).

You can quibble with my decisions - one could argue that Drysdale's '65 season was superior to Guidry's '85 season, notwithstanding Guidry's superior record and slightly better ERA+, because Drysdale had a magnificent September in the midst of a hotly contested pennant race and teamed with Koufax to lead the Dodges to a World Series championship. Similarly, one could argue that Guidry's '77 season was superior to Drysdale's '57 season, notwithstanding Drysdale's higher win total and slightly superior ERA+, because Guidry had a magnificent September and October to lead the Yankees to a World Series Championship.

But it seems difficult to quibble with the following assertion: Guidry was at least the equal of Drysdale over their respective nine best seasons. Drysdale and Guidry had virtually the same number of victories after ten complete major league seasons (Drysdale was 164-118; Guidry was 163-80, despite making substantially fewer starts). Drysdale finished with 39 more career victories only because he went 45-48 over his next (and last) four seasons, compared with Guidry's 7-11 record in two seasons following his first ten complete seasons.

Drysdale won only 209 games (more than Guidry, perhaps, but an unimposing figure for a Hall of Famer). His career winning percentage, in contrast to Guidry's, is pedestrian. Drysdale is in the Hall of Fame primarily for one reason: he proved his mettle in numerous pennant races for the Dodgers, and was generally spectacular in the '63, '65 and '66 N.L. pennant races. Koufax may have been the dominant force in the Dodgers' run of three N.L. pennants and two World Championships in four years, but Drysdale was a compelling force and a worthy sidekick to the great Koufax. If one can judge by online debates, many find Drysdale's qualifications for the Hall marginal, or worse. But I have to agree with the BBWAA on this one - Don Drysdale belongs in the Hall of Fame because his clutch pitching was instrumental in winning three pennants and two World Series for the Dodgers in the mid-'60s.

Anyone who's been reading this blog knows where I'm headed with this. Guidry, too, was spectacular in the heat of pennant races, even moreso than Drysdale, and was instrumental in three Yankee pennants and two World Series championships in a span of five years. But for some reason, Guidry's pennant race performances don't seem to have carried the same weight with HOF voters as Drysdale's.

Take another look at that year-by-year comparison of Drysdale and Guidry. Now compare their September records in pennant races. I would submit that if Don Drysdale belongs in the Hall of Fame (and he does), then so does Ron Guidry.

Did the HOF Really Reject the 10th Best Lefty Ever?

2009-05-16T13:43:00.000-07:00

Is it really possible that the tenth greatest lefthander in the modern history of the game was rejected by the Hall of Fame? Is it really possible the Hall rejected the fourth greatest leftie in modern American League history? Put together your list of the premier southpaws in baseball history - mine's on the next page. Just click below to see my ranking of the 15 greatest lefthanders of all time. I'll tell you right now that the five guys pictured above - Hubbell, Spahn, Grove, Johnson and Carlton - all rank near the top.

Here's my list.

I found it difficult to rank pitchers from the pre-1920, "dead ball" era - it was just such a different game before Ruth revolutionized it. But Eddie Plank and Rube Waddell are definitely my top two from the pre-1920 era.

I rate Guidry ahead of three Hall of Fame lefties: Hal Newhouser, Herb Pennock and Eppa Rixey (who is not on my list at all). Had two of Newhouser's great years not occurred during the war years I probably would have rated him ahead of Guidry. Pennock's claim to Fame rests on his great six-year stretch with the Yankees in the 1920's ('23 to '28), which I judged comparable to, but exceeded by, Guidry's nine-year stretch from '77 to '85. As for Rixey, I'm not really sure why he is in the Hall of Fame.

Although Randy Johnson has won more games in the AL than in the NL, his most dominant period came in the NL (including four of his five Cy Young Award wins). Johnson's AL numbers are very similar to Guidry's (slightly fewer wins, lower winning percentage, a small advantage in ERA+), and on that basis I ranked Guidry as the fourth best lefthander in AL history, behind only Grove, Ford and Gomez.

Obviously Johan Santana has the opportunity to move further up this list. Even though Santana has only made 216 starts in his career, he's been the best pitcher in baseball for five years now and shows no signs of relinquishing the title. That's an impressive achievement.

As for the rest of the list, I'm fairly confident about the top three spots, but the four through eight spots - Hubbell, Spahn, Carlton, Ford and Glavine - are very tight, and I could look at these five a week from now and feel differently. For instance, Tom Glavine probably has a credible argument for ranking as high as fifth. I'm certain there are many who would rate Glavine ahead of Ford and maybe even Carlton, just as there are many who would rate Koufax higher than third.

Here are the "honorable mentions", in no particular order: Tommy John, Ken Holtzman, Frank Viola, Mike Cuellar, "Steady Eddie" Lopat, Fernando Valenzuela, Vida Blue, Hippo Vaughn, Jimmy Key, Rube Marquard, Mickey Lolich, Jerry Koosman, David Wells, Eppa Rixey, Jamie Moyer, Billy Pierce, Mel Parnell, Harry Brecheen, Wilbur Cooper and Chuck Finley.

Where the Veterans Committee Gets It Right and the BBWAA Gets It Wrong

2009-05-13T09:47:00.000-07:00

Joe Gordon, Ted Williams, Bobby Doerr and Bill Dickey

The Veterans Committee's selections over the last 30 years fall into two main groups: middle infielders (i.e., catchers, 2nd basemen and shortstops) and players with relatively brief careers or brief primes.

Joe Gordon, the pre-1943 Veterans Committee selection from last year, clearly fits in the "brief career" category. Ron Santo and Tony Oliva, two of the top three votegetters in last year's post-1943 Veterans Committee election, fit squarely into the latter category. Neither had huge career totals but each was considered one of the premier hitters in his league for a period of seven or eight years. Neither had a very long or distinguished career following his prime (in each case about five years).

The following are Hall Famers selected by the Veterans Committee since 1979, in reverse order of induction: Joe Gordon, Bill Mazeroski, Orlando Cepeda, George Davis, Lary Doby, Nellie Fox, Jim Bunning, Richie Ashburn, Vic Willis, Phil Rizzuto, Hal Newhouser, Tony Lazzeri, Red Schoendienst, Bobby Doerr, Ernie Lombardi, Enos Slaughter, Arky Vaughan, Rick Ferrell, Pee Wee Reese, George Kell, Travis Jackson, Johnny Mize, Chuck Klein, Hack Wilson, Addie Joss.

I've italicized the middle-infielders and bolded those who had relatively brief careers or brief primes. A reasonable inference from the foregoing roster of inductees is that the Veterans Committee apparently believes the BBWAA gives short shrift to (i) players who played positions generally considered more defensive in nature and (ii) players who were great for a relatively brief period and consequently did not compile particularly impressive career statistical totals. Of the remaining VC inductees - Bunning, Ashburn and Cepeda - it's pretty clear that the VC felt Ashburn's reputation as a great defensive centerfielder didn't receive sufficient consideration from the BBWAA (making Ashburn an outfield variant of the "middle infielder" phenomenon in VC voting).

In the case of Bunning and Cepeda, neither compiled huge career totals because neither had a particularly long career nor was considered an all-time great for a brief period; both were merely very good for about a decade. I excluded Bunning and Cepeda from the "brief career/brief prime" category because each had a prime of about ten to twelve years, but both plainly had shorter productive careers than most BBWAA inductees to the Hall over the last 30 years.

Santo and Oliva both suffer from a double whammy of sorts; each were truly premier for a period of only seven to eight years and each had their best years in the '60s, a period of relative pitching dominance, and accordingly their hitting statistics aren't necessarily that impressive when compared to the great hitters of the '30s or '90s. Santo and Oliva are receiving more support from the Veterans Committee than they received from the BBWAA, but not significantly more (both Santo and Oliva topped 40% in BBWAA voting in their best year on the ballot).

This is where the VC gets it right and the BBWAA doesn't: it's about how great a player was at his peak and maintaining that peak for a period of at least five to eight years. It's not about playing a long time and compiling huge career stats. Were Don Sutton and Bert Blyleven better ballplayers than Santo or Oliva, or did they merely hang around long enough to pile up huge win totals? The BBWAA too often focuses on that one line of statistics at the bottom of the baseball card - the career stats. The Veterans Committee appears more capable than the BBWAA of engaging in a nuanced assessment of a player's greatness.

That's a good omen for Ron Guidry, I believe. Nine years as one of the handful of best pitchers in the game ought to be enough. Nine years of compiling a winning percentage of historical proportions - ranking with the Groves, Koufaxes and Madduxes - ought to be enough.

Happy 84th, Yogi

2009-05-13T05:40:00.000-07:00

Happy birthday to the greatest living Yankee.

That's Yogi, Ron and Derek at the original Yankee Stadium in 2008. Yogi's already in the Hall, of course, and Derek is certain to join him. I think Ron belongs there, too.

It's Up To The Veterans Committee

2009-05-12T10:14:00.000-07:00

Phil Rizzuto, Nellie Fox, Bill Mazeroski, Tony Lazzeri and Red Schoendienst

Guidry is eligible for inclusion on the 2010 Veterans Committee ballot (the VC votes only every other year and won't vote in 2009). There's no assurance he'll be on it, but he'll be eligible. There is a winnowing process that reduces the number of candidates to ten.

The Veterans Committee consists of 65 Hall of Famers appointed by the Hall's Board of Directors. A list of the Veterans Committee members can be found at the bottom of this page at the HOF website.

As we all know, baseball Hall of Fame elections are controversial and hotly debated among fans. The Veterans Committee has come in for some heavy fan criticism for selecting players like Phil Rizzuto and Bill Mazeroski. Middle infielders in particular attract controversy, probably because they tend to have weaker offensive statistics. Joe Gordon, the great Yankees 2nd baseman from the '30's and '40's, is the most recent VC inductee. Other notable middle infielders who've been inducted by the VC over the last 30 years are Red Schoendienst, Nellie Fox, Tony Lazzeri and Bobby Doerr.

Like any other baseball fan I have my own opinions about some recent Veterans Committee electees, but on the whole I think they do a better job than the baseball writers, who have been guilty of some egregious oversights. Any group that could reject Johnny Mize and Arky Vaughan for the Hall of Fame has some explaining to do.

Johnny Mize was sixth on the all-time home run list when he retired in 1953. Arky Vaughan is the second greatest shortstop in National League history, behind only Honus Wagner. It is simply inconceivable that the BBWAA could have treated Mize and Vaughan so dismissively. It defies comprehension. Fortunately, the Veterans Committee fixed the BBWAA's mistake.

The Veterans Committee appears more capable than the BBWAA of looking past the career totals and focusing instead on whether a player was truly great for a period of years. From my perspective, I don't care if Lefty Gomez won 200 games - he's a no-brainer for the Hall. But it took the Veterans Committee to rectify the BBWAA's mistaken rejection of Gomez. Neither Hal Newhouser or Jim Bunning had huge career win totals, but the Veterans Committee saw in each a period of five to six years in which he could claim to be among the best pitchers in baseball.

Here's hoping the Veterans Committee does the right thing by Ron Guidry. I'll tell you this: I'm glad to see Rod Carew, Robin Yount, Reggie Jackson, Paul Molitor, Eddie Murray and Carl Yastrzemski on the Veterans Committee. These six Hall of Famers hit a combined .230 against Guidry.

How Could HOF Voters Have Been So Misguided?

2009-05-10T04:28:00.000-07:00

The apparent disregard for Guidry by the sportswriters who cast the ballots for the Hall of Fame is not wholly inexplicable. There are reasons why HOF voters may have missed what seems so obvious. Some of the reasons are specific to Guidry and some are not. Let's take a look at them.

1. The impact of the 5-man rotation and the rise of the bullpens. These factors have significantly reduced innings, wins, starts, strikeouts, complete games and shutouts for pitchers. Obviously a Hall of Fame voter should allow for these factors when considering the record of any pitcher in the last 30 years. Only recently has the HOF had to consider those who pitched during and after the shift to 5-man rotations that took place in the '80's. In many ways Ron Guidry has been a test case, the Yankee's early adoption of the 5-man rotation in '76/'77 and Guidry's relatively short career combining to make him one of the first to be considered by the Hall from the era of expanded rotations and increased bullpen utilization.

The leading pitchers today generally start 32 to 34 games per year, as compared to 38 to 40 in the '70s. The last pitcher to make 38 starts in a season was knuckleballer Charlie Hough in 1987. There were 117 38-start seasons in the '70s. No pitcher has had 34 decisions in a season since Joaquin Andujar in 1984. There were 57 such seasons in the '70s. In practice the 5-man rotation has reduced starts for front-of-the-rotation pitchers by about six per season. For elite pitchers that means roughly 3 wins per season. I think the impact of this is profound. Mike Mussina will present an interesting test case in five years. If I'm not mistaken Mussina will be a marginal HOF candidate, but does anyone believe an eight-time 20 game winner wouldn't be a first-ballot HOFer? That's how many 20-win seasons Mussina might have had in a 4-man rotation (with six 18+ win seasons and two more 17 win seasons he almost certainly would have had six 20 win seasons).

Guidry had three 20 win seasons and might have had four more with the benefit of five to six additional starts each year.

In 1977 Guidry didn't join the Yankees' starting rotation until May 17th (the Yanks' 33rd game of the season), making only one spot start on April 29th. As a result he made only 25 starts, winning 15. Had Guidry been in the starting rotation the whole year he likely would have won 18 or 19 games - the equivalent of a 21 or 22 win season in a four-man rotation.

In 1979 Guidry won 17 of 30 starts. He went two weeks between starts in early May when he was moved to the bullpen and replaced an injured Goose Gossage as the Yanks' finisher, picking up an additional win to total 18 for the season (or the equivalent of approximately 21 wins in a 4-man rotation).

In 1980 Guidry won 16 of 29 starts. He went a month between starts from mid-August to mid-September after he volunteered to go to the bullpen to make room for Gaylord Perry in the Yanks' rotation. This was thorougly mystifying move by the Yanks which, like the acquisition of the aging Perry, was likely motivated in part by George Steinbrenner's rising panic as the Orioles were shaving the Yankees' division lead in August. Guidry went 1-1 in his month-long foray into the bullpen to finish with a record of 17-10. He returned to the rotation in mid-September, winning four consecutive starts to finish the season. He likely would have won 19 games but for missing approximately five starts while in the bullpen.

In 1981 labor strife wiped out one-third of the season, and Guidry won 11 of 21 starts. The Yanks' used Guidry sparingly after early September, having already been awarded a post-season spot as a result of leading the division when the strike occurred (two of Guidry's starts in September were abbreviated 2 and 3 inning tune-ups). After play resume in early August Guidry enjoyed his most dominating stretch since the great '78 season, going 6-2 with a 1.74 ERA in August and September. But for the strike Guidry would almost certainly have won 17 or more games, another season equivalent to a 20 win season in days of the 4-man rotation.

Something tells me HOF voters would find the following record considerably more impressive:

21-9
25-3
20-9
20-11
18-8
15-9
23-10
13-14
23-7

That's a conservative estimate of Guidry's projected records from '77 to '85 if he'd made 35 starts each season rather than averaging a shade less than 30 starts a year as result of a 5-man rotation, the 1981 strike and the Yankees' periodic dubious decisions to shift one of the best starting pitchers in baseball into the bullpen. The foregoing projection is based on an assumption that Guidry would have won a mere 45% and 50% of his incremental starts rather than the 57% win/start ratio he maintained between '77 and '85.

2. The strike-shortened 1981 season. Guidry's 1981 season was by any measure an outstanding season. Guidry led the league with the lowest WHIP, the highest strikeout/bb ratio, was third in strikeouts/inning, fourth in fewest hits/inning and fifth in fewest bb's/inning. He was The Sporting News' lefthanded pitcher on its All-Star team. The 11-5 record, a product of the strike and the Yanks' sensible decision to use Guidry somewhat sparingly in September, simply doesn't reflect Guidry's excellence in '81 and is likely given insufficient regard by HOF voters.

3. Possible 20-win seasons in '79 and '80 lost to bullpen detours. The Yankees decision to pitch Guidry out of the bullpen at the beginning of the '77 season is understandable - Guidry had been a relief pitcher with the Yankees' AAA affiliate in '75 and '76, his slight 5'11", 165 lb. frame considered inadequate to the rigors of starting pitching, particularly given Guidry's fastball/slider, power-pitching style. The decisions by the Yankees in '79 and '80 to shift one of the best starting pitchers in baseball to the bullpen, however, are difficult to understand. In each case Guidry volunteered to make the move, a testament to his sense of teamwork and selflessness. The decision in '79 was a stopgap measure to compensate for Gossage's loss to injury. The decision in '80 was simply bizarre. Gaylord Perry was 6-9 with Texas when the Yanks acquired him in mid-August, albeit with a creditable 3.43 ERA. The decision to make Guidry a long-reliever, however, rather than shifting Perry or the 39-year old Luis Tiant to the role, simply didn't make sense.

Back-to-back 20 win seasons in '79 and '80, coming on the heels of Guidry's magnificent 25-win season in '78, would most certainly have carried significant weight with HOF voters who couldn't muster 10% of the vote for Guidry in his nine years on the ballot. Of the 13 pitchers who've had 5 or more 20-win seasons since WW II all are in the Hall of Fame.

Sutton, Niekro and Blyleven

2009-05-09T04:40:00.000-07:00

My purpose here is to promote Ron Guidry's candidacy for the Hall of Fame, not deride Bert Blyleven's candidacy or anyone else's. I've raised the subject of Bert Blyleven in two posts for one very simple reason: Blyleven perfectly illustrates the difference between my conception of the Hall of Fame and the conception of those who focus almost exclusively on the accumulation of gaudy career statistics. In my view, the other camp is missing the forest for the trees. The best way to demonstrate the basic differences between the pro-Bert and anti-Bert camps (and, by so doing, describe how the two camps view the Hall of Fame differently) is to compare Bert once again to two pitchers whom Bert-Backers love to cite: Don Sutton and Phil Neikro.

The Bert Backers argue that Bert is essentially the same as Sutton and Neikro but with two important qualifications: Bert fell just short of the essentially arbitrary 300 win threshold, and Bert had materially better ERAs (in fact, Bert's advantage over Neikro in ERA+ is really not very significant - 118 to 115). These are fair and compelling arguments. Blyleven's statistics generally compare quite favorably to Sutton's and Niekro's.

But there's one area where the difference between Blyleven, on the one hand, and Sutton and Niekro, on the other, is quite striking. This difference virtually leaps from the pages of the baseball encyclopedias. Both Sutton and Niekro consistently and significantly outperformed their teams over an extended period while receiving run support comparable to that afforded the other pitchers on the staff. Bert Blyleven did not.

We've already looked at Bert's performance with teams that either won 90 or more games or were serious contenders for a division title (i.e., the years '71, '77 to '80 and '87 to '89) and learned that Bert's winning percentage in these years was actually lower than that of his teams. Now let's look at Bert's early peak years from '71 to '75, a period during which he would win more games and have lower ERAs than in any other comparable stretch in his career.

Bert had poor run support in both '71 but managed a 16-15 record for a 74-86 Twins team. That's what we'd expect a good pitcher to do - outperform his team even with inferior run support. But from '72 through '75 Bert received average run support from the Twins (the Twins averaged 4.18 r/g generally and 4.19 r/g for Bert) and went 69-61 for a winning percentage of .531. The Twins record in games in which Blyleven was not the pitcher of record was 316-321 for a .496 winning percentage. In other words, Bert performed approximately 7% better than the average Twins pitcher while receiving the same run support. And the average Twins pitcher against whom we're comparing Bert wasn't very good during this period - aside from 1972, when the Twins had a very good staff, the Twins team ERA+'s without Blyleven's contribution were below league average.

The contrast with Sutton and Niekro couldn't be more striking. From '71 to '80 Phil Niekro was approximately 20% better than his teams, compiling a .525 winning percentage for teams that had a winning percentage of .437 in games in which Niekro was not the pitcher of record. In effect, Phil Niekro made a last-place Braves team into a team on the cusp of contention when he took the mound - the difference between a .437 win% and a .525 win%.

From '71 to '80 Don Sutton compiled a .617 winning percentage for pretty good Dodger teams that had a .558 winning percentage in games in which Sutton wasn't the pitcher of record. The Dodgers had the record of a contender or solid, second-place team when Sutton wasn't pitching, but had the record of a 100-win pennant winner when Sutton was on the mound. Sutton improved on the Dodger's record by approximately 10.5%, an increase that looks even more impressive when you consider that the average Dodger pitcher upon whom Sutton was improving was a pretty good pitcher. The Dodgers consistently had one of the premier pitching staffs in the National League in that era, compiling team ERA+'s between 108 and 120 every year other than '71 and '79. But Sutton improved upon the best National League pitching staff of the '70s by 10.5%.

Great pitchers transform their teams. Great pitchers turn poor teams into mediocre teams, mediocre teams into good teams, and good teams into champions. That's what Guidry did between '77 and '85, compiling a winning percentage 26.5% better than that of his teams when other pitchers were on the mound.

The "he lacked run support" excuse does not explain why Bert Blyleven only marginally improved upon his team's performance. As we've seen, Bert generally received run support commensurate with that provided to other pitchers on his teams, and yet Bert barely won a higher percentage of his decisions than the rest of the staffs on these mediocre teams. There is no need to adjust for park factors, or control for differences among teams - the very average pitchers who lead Minnesota to mediocre records in the '70s were backed by the same offenses and defenses as Blyleven was. For large swaths of Blyleven's career, including during his prime years in the '70s and the late '80's, he generally received the same run support as other pitchers on his teams but compiled records only marginally better.

Whatever are the intangibles that make certain pitchers "winners", Bert didn't have them. Sutton and Niekro did, at least during the decade in which they were in their prime. And Ron Guidry possessed these intangibles in spades, in effect taking good Yankee teams in the late '70s and early/mid '80s and turning them into a .700 team - the 1927 or 1998 Yankees. Yes, he received slightly better run support than other pitchers on those teams, but only marginally, and the small difference in run support cannot begin to explain the vast difference between Ron's .697 winning percentage from '77 to '85 and the .552 winning percentage of the teams he played on in games in which other pitchers took the decision.

All of this leads back to the fundamental difference between the pro-Bert and anti-Bert camps in their conception of the Hall of Fame. I believe baseball is about winning, not piling up huge stats over lengthy careers. As a fan, I would rather my team have great players who had relatively short careers but produced World Series championships, pennants, division titles and exciting races in September. It's what baseball is all about. It's what turns entire cities into baseball hotbeds in September as their hometown team makes a run for glory. It's what gets your wife talking about baseball some years. It's why the butcher is talking about baseball on Saturday morning as you shop for something to put on the barbecue Labor Day weekend. It's about aspiring to win it all. And when it comes to the Hall of Fame, it's about talent and competitive drive so great that it etches itself into that epic, dramatic narrative arc that constitutes every baseball season. And it's about the great players who did the most to propel their teams not only to wins and championships but into the consciousness of the casual fan and into baseball lore. Those are the players who belong in the Hall of Fame.

The personal statistics sometimes capture the greatness of these players and sometimes don't, and statistics can look pretty similar but really mean completely different things. Bert Blyleven's 287 wins mean something quite different than Randy Johnson's 297 (and counting). The ostensible similarity between Koufax's and Guidry's career numbers mean different things as well, and in this case mean one pitcher was great enough for nine or ten seasons to be the best of his time, and the other was so dazzling for a brief 5 year period as to elevate him into the ranks of the greatest ever. The Hall of Fame has to be about more than a small selection of arid, three and four digit numbers. Presumably that's why HOF selections are delegated to the sportswriters and the players rather than the statisticians; the sportswriters and the players are there day after day during the season, observing not only the aspects of the game that show up in the boxscore but those that don't, as well.

The Veterans Committee of the Hall of Fame has evinced an understanding of this in the past. Lefty Gomez and Stan Coveleski and Hal Newhouser may not have been 250 game winners, but there were Veterans Committee members who remembered actually being on the field with these guys and remembered things that sterile stats can't hope to convey. They remembered that these guys were intense competitors who were just damn tough to beat. They remembered that these guys were great pitchers for many years, and were considered among the best pitchers in the game during their prime, even if they didn't play 18 or 20 years and rack up those 250 W's. They remembered what it was like to actually stand in the batters box against these guys, where a hitter doesn't need a stat sheet to know who the great pitchers are.

Here's hoping there are enough guys on the Veterans Committee who remember competing against Ron Guidry, because anyone who does ought to be a surefire vote for Gator's induction in the Hall of Fame.

The Crux of the Matter

2009-05-06T05:01:00.000-07:00

There is an army of Blyleven Backers deployed across the internet armed with three and four letter statistical acronyms - RSAA, WARP, RCAP - designed to demonstrate that Blyleven would have been a consistent big winner if only he'd played for better teams and received better run support. They purport to prove that Bert would have won 313 games with better run support, or that his mediocre .537 career win percentage would have been .570, or that he'd have won 20 games in a season more than once if only he had been backed by elite teams rather than also-rans. They have an explanation for everything, a rationalization for every glaring deficiency in Bert's Hall of Fame qualifications.

But there's one thing - one really big thing - that they just can't seem to explain: why wasn't Bert a consistent big winner when he actually played for good teams that gave him solid offensive support? Because it is a fact that Blyleven pitched for some very good teams that gave him very good support, and Bert still couldn't put up Hall of Fame numbers.

By my count Bert pitched eight seasons for teams that either won 90 or more games, were serious contenders for division titles, or both. These teams won two World Series, three division titles and finished 2nd three other times. They had a cumulative .562 winning percentage. Bert made 261 starts over these eight seasons and pitched more than 1800 innings. Here's his record for these eight seasons:

100-83, .546 win percentage, 3.55 ERA.

The simple fact is that Bert averaged 12.5 wins per season for these eight years and had a lower winning percentage - .546 - than the .562 winning percentage posted by his teams. But Bert's battalions tell us we should ignore what actually happened when Bert pitched for good teams and instead believe what they tell us Bert would have done if those mediocre Twins and Indians teams had been powerhouses.

Here are the eight seasons:

Let's begin with 1970. OK, it was Bert's rookie season, and the Twins didn't give Bert very good run support.

But in 1977 the Texas Rangers won 94 games and scored 4.93 runs/game in Bert's 30 starts - .4 runs/game better than the league average and .2 runs/game better than Texas' 4.73 runs/game average that year. Bert was 14-12 in 30 starts - a .538 win percentage for a .580 team.

In 1978 Bert moved to Pittsburgh. The Pirates won 88 games that year and finished 2nd in the A.L. East. Bert was backed with 4.24 runs/game - precisely average for the Pirates; the league averaged 3.99 r/g that year. Bert went 14-10.

In 1979 the Pirates won 98 games and won the World Series. They scored 4.36 r/g for Bert - higher than the league average of 4.21 that year but lower than the Pirates average of 4.72 r/g. Bert won 12 games in 37 starts. Bert would have lost substantially more games that year except the Pirates took him off the hook by coming back to tie or take the lead in an astounding 13 games in which Bert left the game in a position to take the loss (just to give you some context, Guidry was similarly bailed out only 20 times in his entire career and Bert was never bailed out more than 4 times in any other season in his career).

In 1980 Bert went 8-13 for a Pirates team that had a two game division lead when Bert took the mound on August 21. But Bert went 1-5 in his last 8 starts with a 4.38 ERA and the Pirates collapsed to finish 8 games back. Bert had poor run support in '80 - just 3.3 r/g - but Bert was hardly any better than his offense, finishing with a worse than league average 3.82 ERA.

In 1987 Bert pitched for another Series winner. The Twins lavished 5.15 r/g on Bert in his starts. The Twins averaged 4.85 r/g that year and the league average was 4.9 r/g. Bert went 15-12. Frank Viola received .7 r/g fewer than Bert did that year, but went 17-10.

In 1988 the Twins won 91 games. Bert went 10-17 with a terrible ERA of 5.43. The offensive support wasn't great for Bert, but it was better than Allan Anderson got from the Twins that year, and Anderson went 16-9.

In 1989 Bert finally came through for a winning team, going 17-5 for an Angels teams that won 91 games and scored 4.8 r/g for Bert, about .5 r/g more than the league average. Good for Bert. Chuck Finley, by contrast, received only 3.9 r/g from the Angels - far below the league average and nearly a run less per game than Bert - but still managed to go 16-9.

Why wasn't Bert able to do what Finley did in '89, i.e., muddle through when receiving less than average support? Why couldn't Bert do what Jim Kaat did in '74 and '75, when he put together back-to-back 20 win seasons for a White Sox team that was sub-.500 over these two seasons and gave him less than average run support? It's true Bert averaged 18 wins a season from '72 to '74 for the Twins, but his winning percentage was only .514, just a shade better than the Twins .502 winning percentage over those years. By contrast, Kaat had a .603 winning percentage in '74-'75 for teams that had a .483 winning percentage.

Why couldn't Bert do what Tommy John did from '77 to '80 when John averaged 20 wins per year for good teams? Granted, John's Dodger and Yankee teams had a .594 winning percentage compared to the .561 compiled by the good teams Bert pitched for in the eight seasons we've examined, but does that explain the difference between John's 20 wins per season and Bert's 12.5 wins, or John's .696 winning percentage during this period and Bert's .546?

This is the crux of the matter. Bert couldn't establish himself as a consistent winner even when pitching for good teams; he couldn't do what elite pitchers are supposed to do - significantly improve upon their team's usual performance. True, he had very good ERA's for many mediocre teams, but compiled won-loss records that were too often no better than mediocre pitchers who received even less run support than Bert did. And when Bert pitched for good teams, he continued to compile mediocre won-loss records. This is the problem for Bert's army of backers and their arsenal of esoteric statistics. They can't explain why Bert didn't win consistently for good teams. They can't explain how Bert could receive better run support than Twin pitchers like Joe Decker and Jim Hughes and Dick Woodson and compile records no better than these mediocre pitchers.

Here's the task for the Bert Backers. Explain how this putative Hall of Fame pitcher could receive an average of 4.39 runs/game from these good teams, whose overall scoring average was 4.34 runs/game over these eight seasons, and yet have a lower winning percentage than his teams? The average pitcher on these teams received slightly less run support than Bert and yet had a higher winning percentage - was the average pitcher on these Pirate, Twin and Angel teams a Hall of Famer?

The Biggest Games Of Their Lives

2009-05-03T12:47:00.000-07:00

That's Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling after winning the 2001 World Series and being selected as co-MVPs. Here's what you get if you aggregate the September pennant race numbers and the post-seasons numbers for each pitcher, subtracting any games pitched after clinching or elimination.*

These were undoubtedly the biggest games in the careers of these pitchers. Again, it is notable that Guidry won more games in significantly fewer starts than Schilling or Johnson.

_______________________

* Schilling won games after his team clinched playoff spots in '93 and '05 and won a game after the D'backs were eliminated in 2000. Guidry won a game after elimination in '83. Johnson was blown out in a game after the D'backs had been eliminated in 2000.

Guidry in Sept/Oct = McLain '68

2009-05-03T09:10:00.000-07:00

When Guidry's post-season statistics are added to his '77 to '85 September pennant race statistics they bear a striking resemblance to the historic season of another pitcher. It gives you some idea of exactly how dominating Guidry was in the biggest games in September and October.

The nominal ERAs aren't that similar, but the ERA+ is much closer (McLain's nominal ERA came in the Year of the Pitcher, after all).

Big Games, Big Pitchers

2009-05-01T15:07:00.000-07:00

Here are the September pennant race records of many of the biggest "big game" pitchers of the last half century.

There is much that is confirmed and much revealed in the table above. As many would expect, pitchers like Bob Gibson and Tom Seaver elevated their game when the race was hot and time was short. Koufax and Drysdale also pitched marvelously during pennant races (in Koufax's case, more than the numbers above indicate), which is why the Dodgers won those mad N.L. scrambles in '63, '65 and '66.

I imagine many would be surprised at the disparity between Schilling's October numbers and his September numbers. Jack Morris and John Smoltz are two others whose September records don't quite match their October achievements and reputations.

What follows is a brief examination of the Septembers, good and bad, of these pitchers. Click on the pitcher's name to go to a season-by-season breakdown of their performances in pennant races.

Roger Clemens didn't really distinguish himself down the stretch in tight races. He was great in August, and slightly better in Septembers in which his team was out of the race or cruising to a division title. His best September was probably 1991 when he went 4-2 with a 3.00 ERA for the Red Sox as they faded after trailing the Blue Jays by only 1.5 games with 12 to play.

Don Drysdale pitched in seven tight pennant races for the Dodgers and pitched well. But it was probably his performances down the stretch in '65 and '66 that propelled him into the Hall. Drysdale was 9-2 with a 1.83 ERA in 16 starts as he and Koufax became legends. Oddly, Drysdale didn't perform as well when pitching against the other contenders in September, as the parenthetical notations in the linked chart indicate. For instance, he made a total of four starts against the Dodgers arch-nemesis, the Giants, in the '62, '65 and '66 N.L. pennant races and didn't win any of them. But the numbers don't lie. The Dodgers always seemed to win those tight races in the mid-'60s because they had Drysdale and Koufax.

Whitey Ford's numbers don't include his rookie season in 1950 (the detailed game logs aren't yet available for 1950 at Baseball-Reference.com or Retrosheet.org), when he was plugged into the legendary Reynolds/Raschi/Lopat rotation in mid-season and proceeded to win 9 of 10 decisions, including four in September. Ford was consistently solid, if unspectacular, when the Yankees found themselves in the unusual position of not having wrapped-up the pennant by September. His best Septembers were in '55, '62 and '64, in each of which he was 3-1 with ERAs of 2.33, 2.68 and 1.84, respectively.

Who didn't expect Bob Gibson to be spectacular down the stretch in September? I was initially surprised to see only four tight Septembers in Gibson's career, but then recalled that the '67 and '68 Cards waltzed to the N.L. pennant and were never challenged in September. Gibson, like Drysdale, was not infallible, however, taking a no-decision in a critical game the Cards ultimately lost to the Dodgers in '63 and losing to the Reds in '64. I mention these games not to criticize Gibson (whose seven consecutive complete-game World Series victories place his big-game credentials beyond reproach), but to emphasize how extraordinary is Guidry's 6-0 record against the other contenders in tight races.

Randy Johnson was simply "lights out" in September when a post-season berth was at stake. The 22-2 record and 2.39 ERA are obviously spectacular. Both of Johnson's losses came in September 2000, the second of which occurred on the last day of the season, long after the D'backs had been eliminated. Johnson had eight non-decisions, in which his team went 2-6, but he generally pitched well in those non-decisions, compiling a 3.04 ERA over 50.1 innings. Johnson is the flip of Schilling - he was magnificent in September races but rather pedestrian in October (7-9, 3.50 ERA in 121 innings). Still, anyone who would question Johnson's big-game bona fides should consider that he was 20-0 in five September races (which excludes 2000).

Sandy Koufax's numbers tell a tale of two Koufax's. There was the pre-'63 Koufax, who was 3-8 with a 5.08 ERA, and the '63 to '66 Koufax, who was 16-3 in 24 September starts with a 1.54 ERA in 192.1 innings. Whoa. In games against other contenders, Koufax lost to the Pirates at the beginning of September in 1965 and took a no-decision in a game the Dodgers lost to the Giants in early September 1966 - again, this is not to quibble with the astounding record of Koufax in his prime, but to illustrate that while even Gibson and Koufax could lose head-to-head matchups with other pennant race contenders, Guidry never did.

Greg Maddux's September record doesn't quite stack up with his overall regular season record, but on the other hand it didn't seem to prevent Atlanta from winning the N.L. East every year. It's Maddux's below par post-season record that really sticks out on his resume, but that won't matter either when it comes to Cooperstown - 355 career wins in the age of the five-man rotation begins and ends the discussion of Maddux's qualifications for the Hall.

I've covered Jack Morris' record - September, October and otherwise. I've got no problem with Jack Morris' 40%+ vote tallies each year in HOF voting. But if Jack is a 40%+ guy, why isn't Ron Guidry's mug on a plaque in Cooperstown?

No one pitched in more September races than Jim Palmer - he might have logged more than 500 innings in tight races but for the fact that the Orioles had already wrapped up league or division titles in '66, '69, '70 and '71 by the time September rolled around. The September Palmer was the same Palmer the Orioles could always count on - rock steady. He pitched in four tight A.L. East division races while in his prime in the '70s, losing some big games in '72, pitching well but with tough luck in '74 and '75, and going a spectacular 6-0 (1.44 ERA) in September 1977 as the Orioles battled the Yankees and Red Sox for the AL East title.

I've discussed Mr. Bloody Sock. He had seven cracks at September glory. He was good in '93, 2000 and 2001, and mediocre to poor in the rest. He never blazed through September like Seaver in '69, Palmer in '77 or Guidry in '77 and '78. But he saved his best for October, and he loved the cameras and microphones and spotlight.

Tom Seaver had an epic September in 1969 for the Miracle Mets (6-0, 0.83 ERA) and two great Septembers in '80 and '81 for the Reds (a combined 9-1 with a 2.24 ERA). In between he was 11-7 for the Mets and Reds over four Septembers with a 3.91 ERA. Seaver had particular trouble in September starts against other contenders, winning only four of 15 such starts after his victory over the Cubs in September 1969. He stumbled badly in '70, going 1-2 in six starts, the two losses coming to ultimate division champion Pittsburgh in the last 10 games of the season, the second of which all but eliminated the Mets. Seaver was roughed up in both starts, giving up a total of 17 hits in just 9.2 innings. Seaver's 26-8 record and outstanding ERA attest to his status as a clutch September performer, and his relative lack of success against other contenders only demonstrates that Seaver, like everyone other than Guidry and Randy Johnson, was not infallible in a pennant race.

John Smoltz's September numbers don't quite stack up with his fabulous October record. He was 4-0 with a 1.57 ERA in seven starts in his first September race in '91, but precisely .500 thereafter. As with Maddux, however, it didn't seem to prevent the Braves from prevailing in the N.L. East every year.

Luis Tiant is included in this analysis because (i) he was a great pennant race pitcher, (ii) his career numbers compare quite favorably to Jack Morris' and (iii) he polled far better than Guidry in HOF voting (even getting 30.9% in his first year of eligibility in 1988) but far short of Jack Morris. He was consistently excellent in September for the Red Sox in the '70s and downright spectacular in '72, pitching three shutouts and six complete game victories, and going 4-2 against the other three contenders in the race (the Yankees, Orioles and Tigers). In my book he's more deserving of the Hall than Morris or Blyleven. He also raises another variant of that same old question: if Luis Tiant merited 30% support for the Hall, why couldn't Ron Guidry top 9%?

Catfish Hunter pitched in three pennant races for the A's ('72, '73 and '74) and two for the Yankees ('77 and '78). He was 13-4 with a 2.44 ERA in 23 starts in Septembers for the A's as they were on their way to three consecutive World Series titles. Throw in Hunter's ALCS and WS performances in '72, '73 and '74 and Hunter's Sept/Oct record for those three championship teams was 20-5 with a 2.38 ERA in 246 innings. In case anyone wondered why Catfish was considered one of the premier big game pitchers of his era, this is why. Maybe his career win total and ERA were marginal by HOF standards, but when you are the best September/October pitcher in three different pennant races and post-seasons the Hall of Fame opens its doors. Just ask Koufax and Gibson.

The Dominican Dandy, Juan Marichal, compiled an excellent 24-13 September record in pennant races in '62, '64, '65, '66, '69 and '71. He was brilliant in '64, '66 and '69, winning five or more games in each of those Septembers. Despite the seeming omnipresence of the Dodgers and Giants in the NL pennant races of the '60s, Marichal faced the Dodgers only twice in big September games, both times in '62 and both times starting against Johnny Podres. Marichal won the first match-up in early September and took a no-decision in the epic final playoff game, a game ultimately won by the Giants with a four-run 9th inning. It's really difficult to understand how the BBWAA could justify making Marichal wait until his third year of eligibility before inducting him into the Hall of Fame.

Did You Know That Ron Guidry...

2009-05-01T09:24:00.000-07:00

...is the only pitcher with four selections to The Sporting New All-Star Team who has been rejected by the Hall of Fame? It's true. Lefty Grove, Carl Hubbell, Bob Feller, Steve Carlton, Warren Spahn, Jim Palmer, Tom Seaver, Juan Marichal, Sandy Koufax, Whitey Ford and Robin Roberts are all in the Hall of Fame. Roger Clemens, Gred Maddux, Randy Johnson, Tom Glavine and Pedro Martinez are sure to follow.

Bunning was a two-time Sporting News selection. Drysdale, Morris and Sutton were each selected once. Blyleven was never a Sporting News All-Star. Guidry's four selections - in '78, '81, '83 and '85 - were as many as Koufax, Marichal and Seaver.

Ten Innings To Cooperstown: The Jack Morris Story

2009-04-30T11:01:00.000-07:00

Jack Morris sealed his reputation as big game pitcher on October 19, 1991. He pitched a 10 inning shutout that day, winning game 7 of the World Series by a score of 1-0 to make the Minnesota Twins the champions of baseball. It is without question one of the great pitching performances in World Series history. Jack Morris was a gamer, there's no doubt about it.

Jack's Game 7 classic wasn't his only shining moment in October either. He had a 7-4 post-season record in 13 starts, with a 3.80 ERA (even more impressive, he won 7 of his first 8 decisions before a rocky post-season in '92) . As is the case with many great post-season pitchers, he was even better in the World Series, going 4-2 with a 2.96 ERA in seven starts for Detroit, Minnesota and Toronto. He was 4-0 with a 1.54 ERA in his first two World Series (in '84 and '91), before going 0-2 for the Blue Jays in the '92 WS. Guidry was better in October, but Morris was close, particularly if you give him extra-credit for his 10-inning Game 7 shutout (and I think we should).

Morris went 13-13 in 30 September starts in those four races with a 3.34 ERA. He had a particulary difficult time in games against the other contenders in those races, losing twice in the last nine games to eventual division winner Milwaukee in 1981 and losing critical September starts to Baltimore in '83 and Toronto in '87. He was stellar in '92 with Toronto, going 4-1 in 7 September starts with a 3.40 ERA. Morris made two September starts for Toronto in 1993, losing his only decision.

His record over six September pennant races with Detroit and Toronto (Minnesota waltzed to the division title in 1991) was 17-15 in 39 starts, with a 3.44 ERA in 290.2 innings. By my scorecard, Jack Morris was great in five starts in two World Series, bad in two starts in a third World Series, and thoroughly mediocre in 39 starts down the stretch in six pennant races. Based on this, I'd argue that Jack Morris's reputation as a big-game pitcher rests disproportionately on one ten inning game in October.Of course the issue of Jack Morris' big-game bona fides is critical to his Hall of Fame candidacy because his regular season credentials are generally considered short of Hall worthy. I'm agnostic on the issue of Morris' worthiness for the Hall, but I passionately believe that if Morris is now consistently polling above 40% in HOF ballots, then Ron Guidry should be inducted forthwith.

We compared Blyleven's, Morris' and Guidry's prime years in this post. Conveniently, both Morris and Guidry had a prime period of nine years, after which each experienced a precipitous decline. As demonstrated below, although each had approximately the same number of wins, Guidry had a significantly better ERA+ and a significantly greater winning percentage. Both Guidry and Morris pitched for fine teams in the late '70s and '80s, but Guidry's winning percentage over this nine year stretch was an astounding 26.5% better than the Yankees' winning percentage during the same period, while Morris outperformed his Tiger clubs by 13.9%.

But Morris fans would argue, quite fairly, that Jack put together a fine pair of seasons in '91 and '92, while Guidry was essentially finished after his nine-year run. In fairness to Jack, let's take his '91 and '92 seasons and substitute them for his two weakest seasons during his nine-year prime ('80 and '82, in each of which Morris was only one game over .500 with an ERA+ of approximately 100). This provides a comparison of Morris' best nine years in his 18 year career against Guidry's prime of nine consecutive years. Here's the comparison:

Morris narrows but doesn't erase his deficits in ERA, ERA+ and winning percentage. He averages approximately one more win per year, but averages approximately 3.5 starts more per year.

You don't have to take my word that Guidry '77 to '85 seasons were better than Morris' top nine; the Cy Young award voters clearly agreed. Morris received Cy Young award votes in seven of those nine seasons totaling a 0.75 career share. Guidry received Cy Young award votes in six of his nine prime seasons totaling a 1.91 career share.

If Guidry's '77 to '85 seasons were better than Morris' top nine, then Morris' huge edge in the Hall of Fame balloting must relate to the other nine years of his 18 year career - in which he was 90-100 with a 4.55 ERA. Or, more likely, Morris' burgeoning support in the HOF balloting rests in large measure on ten innings he pitched in October 1991.