Happy birthday to the greatest living Yankee.

The apparent disregard for Guidry by the sportswriters who cast the ballots for the Hall of Fame is not wholly inexplicable. There are reasons why HOF voters may have missed what seems so obvious. Some of the reasons are specific to Guidry and some are not. Let's take a look at them.

1. The impact of the 5-man rotation and the rise of the bullpens. These factors have significantly reduced innings, wins, starts, strikeouts, complete games and shutouts for pitchers. Obviously a Hall of Fame voter should allow for these factors when considering the record of any pitcher in the last 30 years. Only recently has the HOF had to consider those who pitched during and after the shift to 5-man rotations that took place in the '80's. In many ways Ron Guidry has been a test case, the Yankee's early adoption of the 5-man rotation in '76/'77 and Guidry's relatively short career combining to make him one of the first to be considered by the Hall from the era of expanded rotations and increased bullpen utilization.

The leading pitchers today generally start 32 to 34 games per year, as compared to 38 to 40 in the '70s. The last pitcher to make 38 starts in a season was knuckleballer Charlie Hough in 1987. There were 117 38-start seasons in the '70s. No pitcher has had 34 decisions in a season since Joaquin Andujar in 1984. There were 57 such seasons in the '70s. In practice the 5-man rotation has reduced starts for front-of-the-rotation pitchers by about six per season. For elite pitchers that means roughly 3 wins per season. I think the impact of this is profound. Mike Mussina will present an interesting test case in five years. If I'm not mistaken Mussina will be a marginal HOF candidate, but does anyone believe an eight-time 20 game winner wouldn't be a first-ballot HOFer? That's how many 20-win seasons Mussina might have had in a 4-man rotation (with six 18+ win seasons and two more 17 win seasons he almost certainly would have had six 20 win seasons).

Guidry had three 20 win seasons and might have had four more with the benefit of five to six additional starts each year.

In 1977 Guidry didn't join the Yankees' starting rotation until May 17th (the Yanks' 33rd game of the season), making only one spot start on April 29th. As a result he made only 25 starts, winning 15. Had Guidry been in the starting rotation the whole year he likely would have won 18 or 19 games - the equivalent of a 21 or 22 win season in a four-man rotation.

In 1979 Guidry won 17 of 30 starts. He went two weeks between starts in early May when he was moved to the bullpen and replaced an injured Goose Gossage as the Yanks' finisher, picking up an additional win to total 18 for the season (or the equivalent of approximately 21 wins in a 4-man rotation).

In 1980 Guidry won 16 of 29 starts. He went a month between starts from mid-August to mid-September after he volunteered to go to the bullpen to make room for Gaylord Perry in the Yanks' rotation. This was thorougly mystifying move by the Yanks which, like the acquisition of the aging Perry, was likely motivated in part by George Steinbrenner's rising panic as the Orioles were shaving the Yankees' division lead in August. Guidry went 1-1 in his month-long foray into the bullpen to finish with a record of 17-10. He returned to the rotation in mid-September, winning four consecutive starts to finish the season. He likely would have won 19 games but for missing approximately five starts while in the bullpen.

In 1981 labor strife wiped out one-third of the season, and Guidry won 11 of 21 starts. The Yanks' used Guidry sparingly after early September, having already been awarded a post-season spot as a result of leading the division when the strike occurred (two of Guidry's starts in September were abbreviated 2 and 3 inning tune-ups). After play resume in early August Guidry enjoyed his most dominating stretch since the great '78 season, going 6-2 with a 1.74 ERA in August and September. But for the strike Guidry would almost certainly have won 17 or more games, another season equivalent to a 20 win season in days of the 4-man rotation.

Something tells me HOF voters would find the following record considerably more impressive:

21-9
25-3
20-9
20-11
18-8
15-9
23-10
13-14
23-7

That's a conservative estimate of Guidry's projected records from '77 to '85 if he'd made 35 starts each season rather than averaging a shade less than 30 starts a year as result of a 5-man rotation, the 1981 strike and the Yankees' periodic dubious decisions to shift one of the best starting pitchers in baseball into the bullpen. The foregoing projection is based on an assumption that Guidry would have won a mere 45% and 50% of his incremental starts rather than the 57% win/start ratio he maintained between '77 and '85.

2. The strike-shortened 1981 season. Guidry's 1981 season was by any measure an outstanding season. Guidry led the league with the lowest WHIP, the highest strikeout/bb ratio, was third in strikeouts/inning, fourth in fewest hits/inning and fifth in fewest bb's/inning. He was The Sporting News' lefthanded pitcher on its All-Star team. The 11-5 record, a product of the strike and the Yanks' sensible decision to use Guidry somewhat sparingly in September, simply doesn't reflect Guidry's excellence in '81 and is likely given insufficient regard by HOF voters.

3. Possible 20-win seasons in '79 and '80 lost to bullpen detours. The Yankees decision to pitch Guidry out of the bullpen at the beginning of the '77 season is understandable - Guidry had been a relief pitcher with the Yankees' AAA affiliate in '75 and '76, his slight 5'11", 165 lb. frame considered inadequate to the rigors of starting pitching, particularly given Guidry's fastball/slider, power-pitching style. The decisions by the Yankees in '79 and '80 to shift one of the best starting pitchers in baseball to the bullpen, however, are difficult to understand. In each case Guidry volunteered to make the move, a testament to his sense of teamwork and selflessness. The decision in '79 was a stopgap measure to compensate for Gossage's loss to injury. The decision in '80 was simply bizarre. Gaylord Perry was 6-9 with Texas when the Yanks acquired him in mid-August, albeit with a creditable 3.43 ERA. The decision to make Guidry a long-reliever, however, rather than shifting Perry or the 39-year old Luis Tiant to the role, simply didn't make sense.

Back-to-back 20 win seasons in '79 and '80, coming on the heels of Guidry's magnificent 25-win season in '78, would most certainly have carried significant weight with HOF voters who couldn't muster 10% of the vote for Guidry in his nine years on the ballot. Of the 13 pitchers who've had 5 or more 20-win seasons since WW II all are in the Hall of Fame.

My purpose here is to promote Ron Guidry's candidacy for the Hall of Fame, not deride Bert Blyleven's candidacy or anyone else's. I've raised the subject of Bert Blyleven in two posts for one very simple reason: Blyleven perfectly illustrates the difference between my conception of the Hall of Fame and the conception of those who focus almost exclusively on the accumulation of gaudy career statistics. In my view, the other camp is missing the forest for the trees. The best way to demonstrate the basic differences between the pro-Bert and anti-Bert camps (and, by so doing, describe how the two camps view the Hall of Fame differently) is to compare Bert once again to two pitchers whom Bert-Backers love to cite: Don Sutton and Phil Neikro.

The Bert Backers argue that Bert is essentially the same as Sutton and Neikro but with two important qualifications: Bert fell just short of the essentially arbitrary 300 win threshold, and Bert had materially better ERAs (in fact, Bert's advantage over Neikro in ERA+ is really not very significant - 118 to 115). These are fair and compelling arguments. Blyleven's statistics generally compare quite favorably to Sutton's and Niekro's.

There is an army of Blyleven Backers deployed across the internet armed with three and four letter statistical acronyms - RSAA, WARP, RCAP - designed to demonstrate that Blyleven would have been a consistent big winner if only he'd played for better teams and received better run support. They purport to prove that Bert would have won 313 games with better run support, or that his mediocre .537 career win percentage would have been .570, or that he'd have won 20 games in a season more than once if only he had been backed by elite teams rather than also-rans. They have an explanation for everything, a rationalization for every glaring deficiency in Bert's Hall of Fame qualifications.

But there's one thing - one really big thing - that they just can't seem to explain: why wasn't Bert a consistent big winner when he actually played for good teams that gave him solid offensive support? Because it is a fact that Blyleven pitched for some very good teams that gave him very good support, and Bert still couldn't put up Hall of Fame numbers.

By my count Bert pitched eight seasons for teams that either won 90 or more games, were serious contenders for division titles, or both. These teams won two World Series, three division titles and finished 2nd three other times. They had a cumulative .562 winning percentage. Bert made 261 starts over these eight seasons and pitched more than 1800 innings. Here's his record for these eight seasons:

100-83, .546 win percentage, 3.55 ERA.

The simple fact is that Bert averaged 12.5 wins per season for these eight years and had a lower winning percentage - .546 - than the .562 winning percentage posted by his teams. But Bert's battalions tell us we should ignore what actually happened when Bert pitched for good teams and instead believe what they tell us Bert would have done if those mediocre Twins and Indians teams had been powerhouses.

Here are the eight seasons:

Let's begin with 1970. OK, it was Bert's rookie season, and the Twins didn't give Bert very good run support.

But in 1977 the Texas Rangers won 94 games and scored 4.93 runs/game in Bert's 30 starts - .4 runs/game better than the league average and .2 runs/game better than Texas' 4.73 runs/game average that year. Bert was 14-12 in 30 starts - a .538 win percentage for a .580 team.

In 1978 Bert moved to Pittsburgh. The Pirates won 88 games that year and finished 2nd in the A.L. East. Bert was backed with 4.24 runs/game - precisely average for the Pirates; the league averaged 3.99 r/g that year. Bert went 14-10.

In 1979 the Pirates won 98 games and won the World Series. They scored 4.36 r/g for Bert - higher than the league average of 4.21 that year but lower than the Pirates average of 4.72 r/g. Bert won 12 games in 37 starts. Bert would have lost substantially more games that year except the Pirates took him off the hook by coming back to tie or take the lead in an astounding 13 games in which Bert left the game in a position to take the loss (just to give you some context, Guidry was similarly bailed out only 20 times in his entire career and Bert was never bailed out more than 4 times in any other season in his career).

In 1980 Bert went 8-13 for a Pirates team that had a two game division lead when Bert took the mound on August 21. But Bert went 1-5 in his last 8 starts with a 4.38 ERA and the Pirates collapsed to finish 8 games back. Bert had poor run support in '80 - just 3.3 r/g - but Bert was hardly any better than his offense, finishing with a worse than league average 3.82 ERA.

In 1987 Bert pitched for another Series winner. The Twins lavished 5.15 r/g on Bert in his starts. The Twins averaged 4.85 r/g that year and the league average was 4.9 r/g. Bert went 15-12. Frank Viola received .7 r/g fewer than Bert did that year, but went 17-10.

In 1988 the Twins won 91 games. Bert went 10-17 with a terrible ERA of 5.43. The offensive support wasn't great for Bert, but it was better than Allan Anderson got from the Twins that year, and Anderson went 16-9.

In 1989 Bert finally came through for a winning team, going 17-5 for an Angels teams that won 91 games and scored 4.8 r/g for Bert, about .5 r/g more than the league average. Good for Bert. Chuck Finley, by contrast, received only 3.9 r/g from the Angels - far below the league average and nearly a run less per game than Bert - but still managed to go 16-9.

Why wasn't Bert able to do what Finley did in '89, i.e., muddle through when receiving less than average support? Why couldn't Bert do what Jim Kaat did in '74 and '75, when he put together back-to-back 20 win seasons for a White Sox team that was sub-.500 over these two seasons and gave him less than average run support? It's true Bert averaged 18 wins a season from '72 to '74 for the Twins, but his winning percentage was only .514, just a shade better than the Twins .502 winning percentage over those years. By contrast, Kaat had a .603 winning percentage in '74-'75 for teams that had a .483 winning percentage.

Why couldn't Bert do what Tommy John did from '77 to '80 when John averaged 20 wins per year for good teams? Granted, John's Dodger and Yankee teams had a .594 winning percentage compared to the .561 compiled by the good teams Bert pitched for in the eight seasons we've examined, but does that explain the difference between John's 20 wins per season and Bert's 12.5 wins, or John's .696 winning percentage during this period and Bert's .546?

This is the crux of the matter. Bert couldn't establish himself as a consistent winner even when pitching for good teams; he couldn't do what elite pitchers are supposed to do - significantly improve upon their team's usual performance. True, he had very good ERA's for many mediocre teams, but compiled won-loss records that were too often no better than mediocre pitchers who received even less run support than Bert did. And when Bert pitched for good teams, he continued to compile mediocre won-loss records. This is the problem for Bert's army of backers and their arsenal of esoteric statistics. They can't explain why Bert didn't win consistently for good teams. They can't explain how Bert could receive better run support than Twin pitchers like Joe Decker and Jim Hughes and Dick Woodson and compile records no better than these mediocre pitchers.

Here's the task for the Bert Backers. Explain how this putative Hall of Fame pitcher could receive an average of 4.39 runs/game from these good teams, whose overall scoring average was 4.34 runs/game over these eight seasons, and yet have a lower winning percentage than his teams? The average pitcher on these teams received slightly less run support than Bert and yet had a higher winning percentage - was the average pitcher on these Pirate, Twin and Angel teams a Hall of Famer?

That's Randy Johnson and Curt Schilling after winning the 2001 World Series and being selected as co-MVPs. Here's what you get if you aggregate the September pennant race numbers and the post-seasons numbers for each pitcher, subtracting any games pitched after clinching or elimination.*

Here are the September pennant race records of many of the biggest "big game" pitchers of the last half century.

There is much that is confirmed and much revealed in the table above. As many would expect, pitchers like Bob Gibson and Tom Seaver elevated their game when the race was hot and time was short. Koufax and Drysdale also pitched marvelously during pennant races (in Koufax's case, more than the numbers above indicate), which is why the Dodgers won those mad N.L. scrambles in '63, '65 and '66.

I imagine many would be surprised at the disparity between Schilling's October numbers and his September numbers. Jack Morris and John Smoltz are two others whose September records don't quite match their October achievements and reputations.

What follows is a brief examination of the Septembers, good and bad, of these pitchers. Click on the pitcher's name to go to a season-by-season breakdown of their performances in pennant races.

Roger Clemens didn't really distinguish himself down the stretch in tight races. He was great in August, and slightly better in Septembers in which his team was out of the race or cruising to a division title. His best September was probably 1991 when he went 4-2 with a 3.00 ERA for the Red Sox as they faded after trailing the Blue Jays by only 1.5 games with 12 to play.

Don Drysdale pitched in seven tight pennant races for the Dodgers and pitched well. But it was probably his performances down the stretch in '65 and '66 that propelled him into the Hall. Drysdale was 9-2 with a 1.83 ERA in 16 starts as he and Koufax became legends. Oddly, Drysdale didn't perform as well when pitching against the other contenders in September, as the parenthetical notations in the linked chart indicate. For instance, he made a total of four starts against the Dodgers arch-nemesis, the Giants, in the '62, '65 and '66 N.L. pennant races and didn't win any of them. But the numbers don't lie. The Dodgers always seemed to win those tight races in the mid-'60s because they had Drysdale and Koufax.

Whitey Ford's numbers don't include his rookie season in 1950 (the detailed game logs aren't yet available for 1950 at Baseball-Reference.com or Retrosheet.org), when he was plugged into the legendary Reynolds/Raschi/Lopat rotation in mid-season and proceeded to win 9 of 10 decisions, including four in September. Ford was consistently solid, if unspectacular, when the Yankees found themselves in the unusual position of not having wrapped-up the pennant by September. His best Septembers were in '55, '62 and '64, in each of which he was 3-1 with ERAs of 2.33, 2.68 and 1.84, respectively.

Who didn't expect Bob Gibson to be spectacular down the stretch in September? I was initially surprised to see only four tight Septembers in Gibson's career, but then recalled that the '67 and '68 Cards waltzed to the N.L. pennant and were never challenged in September. Gibson, like Drysdale, was not infallible, however, taking a no-decision in a critical game the Cards ultimately lost to the Dodgers in '63 and losing to the Reds in '64. I mention these games not to criticize Gibson (whose seven consecutive complete-game World Series victories place his big-game credentials beyond reproach), but to emphasize how extraordinary is Guidry's 6-0 record against the other contenders in tight races.

Randy Johnson was simply "lights out" in September when a post-season berth was at stake. The 22-2 record and 2.39 ERA are obviously spectacular. Both of Johnson's losses came in September 2000, the second of which occurred on the last day of the season, long after the D'backs had been eliminated. Johnson had eight non-decisions, in which his team went 2-6, but he generally pitched well in those non-decisions, compiling a 3.04 ERA over 50.1 innings. Johnson is the flip of Schilling - he was magnificent in September races but rather pedestrian in October (7-9, 3.50 ERA in 121 innings). Still, anyone who would question Johnson's big-game bona fides should consider that he was 20-0 in five September races (which excludes 2000).

Sandy Koufax's numbers tell a tale of two Koufax's. There was the pre-'63 Koufax, who was 3-8 with a 5.08 ERA, and the '63 to '66 Koufax, who was 16-3 in 24 September starts with a 1.54 ERA in 192.1 innings. Whoa. In games against other contenders, Koufax lost to the Pirates at the beginning of September in 1965 and took a no-decision in a game the Dodgers lost to the Giants in early September 1966 - again, this is not to quibble with the astounding record of Koufax in his prime, but to illustrate that while even Gibson and Koufax could lose head-to-head matchups with other pennant race contenders, Guidry never did.

Greg Maddux's September record doesn't quite stack up with his overall regular season record, but on the other hand it didn't seem to prevent Atlanta from winning the N.L. East every year. It's Maddux's below par post-season record that really sticks out on his resume, but that won't matter either when it comes to Cooperstown - 355 career wins in the age of the five-man rotation begins and ends the discussion of Maddux's qualifications for the Hall.

I've covered Jack Morris' record - September, October and otherwise. I've got no problem with Jack Morris' 40%+ vote tallies each year in HOF voting. But if Jack is a 40%+ guy, why isn't Ron Guidry's mug on a plaque in Cooperstown?

No one pitched in more September races than Jim Palmer - he might have logged more than 500 innings in tight races but for the fact that the Orioles had already wrapped up league or division titles in '66, '69, '70 and '71 by the time September rolled around. The September Palmer was the same Palmer the Orioles could always count on - rock steady. He pitched in four tight A.L. East division races while in his prime in the '70s, losing some big games in '72, pitching well but with tough luck in '74 and '75, and going a spectacular 6-0 (1.44 ERA) in September 1977 as the Orioles battled the Yankees and Red Sox for the AL East title.

I've discussed Mr. Bloody Sock. He had seven cracks at September glory. He was good in '93, 2000 and 2001, and mediocre to poor in the rest. He never blazed through September like Seaver in '69, Palmer in '77 or Guidry in '77 and '78. But he saved his best for October, and he loved the cameras and microphones and spotlight.

Tom Seaver had an epic September in 1969 for the Miracle Mets (6-0, 0.83 ERA) and two great Septembers in '80 and '81 for the Reds (a combined 9-1 with a 2.24 ERA). In between he was 11-7 for the Mets and Reds over four Septembers with a 3.91 ERA. Seaver had particular trouble in September starts against other contenders, winning only four of 15 such starts after his victory over the Cubs in September 1969. He stumbled badly in '70, going 1-2 in six starts, the two losses coming to ultimate division champion Pittsburgh in the last 10 games of the season, the second of which all but eliminated the Mets. Seaver was roughed up in both starts, giving up a total of 17 hits in just 9.2 innings. Seaver's 26-8 record and outstanding ERA attest to his status as a clutch September performer, and his relative lack of success against other contenders only demonstrates that Seaver, like everyone other than Guidry and Randy Johnson, was not infallible in a pennant race.

John Smoltz's September numbers don't quite stack up with his fabulous October record. He was 4-0 with a 1.57 ERA in seven starts in his first September race in '91, but precisely .500 thereafter. As with Maddux, however, it didn't seem to prevent the Braves from prevailing in the N.L. East every year.


Luis Tiant is included in this analysis because (i) he was a great pennant race pitcher, (ii) his career numbers compare quite favorably to Jack Morris' and (iii) he polled far better than Guidry in HOF voting (even getting 30.9% in his first year of eligibility in 1988) but far short of Jack Morris. He was consistently excellent in September for the Red Sox in the '70s and downright spectacular in '72, pitching three shutouts and six complete game victories, and going 4-2 against the other three contenders in the race (the Yankees, Orioles and Tigers). In my book he's more deserving of the Hall than Morris or Blyleven. He also raises another variant of that same old question: if Luis Tiant merited 30% support for the Hall, why couldn't Ron Guidry top 9%?

Catfish Hunter pitched in three pennant races for the A's ('72, '73 and '74) and two for the Yankees ('77 and '78). He was 13-4 with a 2.44 ERA in 23 starts in Septembers for the A's as they were on their way to three consecutive World Series titles. Throw in Hunter's ALCS and WS performances in '72, '73 and '74 and Hunter's Sept/Oct record for those three championship teams was 20-5 with a 2.38 ERA in 246 innings. In case anyone wondered why Catfish was considered one of the premier big game pitchers of his era, this is why. Maybe his career win total and ERA were marginal by HOF standards, but when you are the best September/October pitcher in three different pennant races and post-seasons the Hall of Fame opens its doors. Just ask Koufax and Gibson.

The Dominican Dandy, Juan Marichal, compiled an excellent 24-13 September record in pennant races in '62, '64, '65, '66, '69 and '71. He was brilliant in '64, '66 and '69, winning five or more games in each of those Septembers. Despite the seeming omnipresence of the Dodgers and Giants in the NL pennant races of the '60s, Marichal faced the Dodgers only twice in big September games, both times in '62 and both times starting against Johnny Podres. Marichal won the first match-up in early September and took a no-decision in the epic final playoff game, a game ultimately won by the Giants with a four-run 9th inning. It's really difficult to understand how the BBWAA could justify making Marichal wait until his third year of eligibility before inducting him into the Hall of Fame.